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mnt: fail closed on untrusted workdir candidates - #381
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krishna28238-arch wants to merge 1 commit into
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findWorkDir() accepted any pre-existing entry at a candidate path as long as access(R_OK) succeeded: a symlink or a foreign-owned directory planted in a shared parent such as /tmp was silently selected as the staging root, and both mount backends then attached the jail-root tmpfs to it through path-based operations that follow the planted entry. Verify every candidate with a new util::openVerifiedDir() helper: only a real directory (O_NOFOLLOW) owned by the current euid is accepted, and the verified fd is returned to the callers. The new-API backend attaches the detached root tmpfs with move_mount() against that fd, and the legacy backend mounts its staging trees through /proc/self/fd handles, so the attach targets the verified inode instead of re-resolving the path.
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2D30
While auditing how nsjail picks its staging directories, I found a seam the recent hardening work in this area doesn't cover:
findWorkDir()can select and attach the jail staging root onto an entry a local attacker planted first. This PR makes that selection fail closed.The problem
findWorkDir()builds candidates like/tmp/nsjail.<uid>.<purpose>under world-writable parents (/tmp,/dev/shm, writable dirs found under/).tryCreateDir()accepts a pre-existing entry whenevermkdir()reportsEEXIST— regardless of who owns it or whether it is a symlink — and every caller then attaches the staging tmpfs by path:mount(2)in the legacy backend,move_mount(2)plus two lateropenat()re-opens in the newapi backend. A path-based attach takes whatever entry currently sits at that location.So on a shared multi-user box, a local user who creates
/tmp/nsjail.0.root(a directory they own, or a symlink into their home) before root runs nsjail gets the staging root — and the populated jail root tree — mounted onto their own directory, with the candidate names fully predictable from uid and purpose. This is the same class as #323 (log file opened through a symlink), one layer above what the other PRs in this arc hardened: #292 rejects traversal in the destination strings inside the staging tree, #325 (open) anchors legacy mount destinations to a verified parent, and #334 made flag application fail closed — but the staging root itself was still chosen by an unverified path. #287 explored a descriptor-confined resolution for destinations and was closed; this applies the descriptor idea to the staging root selection itself.What this PR does
util::openVerifiedDir(): creates or reuses a directory and returns anO_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOWfd only afterfstatconfirms the inode is owned by the current euid. Symlinks, regular files and foreign-owned directories are refused.findWorkDir()validates every candidate through it and skips a refused candidate (fail closed, in the spirit of mnt: fail closed when explicit security mount flags cannot be applied #334); the verified fd travels back to the caller so nothing re-resolves the path afterwards.move_mount()attaches the jail root onto the verified fd itself (MOVE_MOUNT_T_EMPTY_PATH), and the twoopenat()re-opens of the staging root gainedO_NOFOLLOW./proc/self/fd/<fd>, pinning the verified inode instead of re-walking/tmp.Before / after
/tmp/nsjail.<uid>.rootO_NOFOLLOW)Testing
makebuilds clean (with-Werror) on top of master (d8415bc)./tmp/nsjail.<uid>.rootand/tmp/nsjail.<uid>.tmp(old code accepts the paths and then dies at mount), nsjail now skips the poisoned candidates, falls back to the/dev/shmcandidate, builds the mount tree and runs the payload inside the jail normally.One note for review: my end-to-end run exercised the legacy backend (the test container has no
move_mount, soisAvailable()selects legacy). The newapi fd-target path is compile-checked and its fd logic is covered by the unit test; a native run there would be a useful second opinion.The diff is +101/−16 over six files, most of it the helper and the two attach sites. Happy to reshape or split anything.