| Maximizing social influence in nearly optimal time C Borgs, M Brautbar, J Chayes, B Lucier Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2014 | 1144 | 2014 |
| Combinatorial auctions via posted prices M Feldman, N Gravin, B Lucier Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2014 | 288 | 2014 |
| A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer M Babaioff, N Immorlica, B Lucier, SM Weinberg Journal of the ACM (JACM) 67 (4), 1-40, 2020 | 273 | 2020 |
| Prophet inequalities made easy: Stochastic optimization by pricing nonstochastic inputs P Dutting, M Feldman, T Kesselheim, B Lucier SIAM Journal on Computing 49 (3), 540-582, 2020 | 225 | 2020 |
| Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient M Feldman, H Fu, N Gravin, B Lucier Games and Economic Behavior 123, 327-341, 2020 | 194* | 2020 |
| An economic view of prophet inequalities B Lucier ACM SIGecom Exchanges 16 (1), 24-47, 2017 | 163 | 2017 |
| Non-optimal mechanism design JD Hartline, B Lucier American Economic Review 105 (10), 3102-3124, 2015 | 163* | 2015 |
| Dynamic pricing and traffic engineering for timely inter-datacenter transfers V Jalaparti, I Bliznets, S Kandula, B Lucier, I Menache Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGCOMM Conference, 73-86, 2016 | 162 | 2016 |
| Robust optimization for non-convex objectives RS Chen, B Lucier, Y Singer, V Syrgkanis Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30, 2017 | 151 | 2017 |
| Dueling algorithms N Immorlica, AT Kalai, B Lucier, A Moitra, A Postlewaite, M Tennenholtz Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing …, 2011 | 138 | 2011 |
| Equilibria of greedy combinatorial auctions B Lucier, A Borodin SIAM Journal on Computing 46 (2), 620-660, 2017 | 123* | 2017 |
| Beating 1-1/e for ordered prophets M Abolhassani, S Ehsani, H Esfandiari, MT Hajiaghayi, R Kleinberg, ... Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2017 | 114 | 2017 |
| Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou, B Lucier, ... Journal of Economic Theory 156, 343-388, 2015 | 106 | 2015 |
| Maximizing welfare with incentive-aware evaluation mechanisms N Haghtalab, N Immorlica, B Lucier, JZ Wang arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.01956, 2020 | 102 | 2020 |
| On revenue in the generalized second price auction B Lucier, R Paes Leme, É Tardos Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web, 361-370, 2012 | 99 | 2012 |
| Efficient online scheduling for deadline-sensitive jobs B Lucier, I Menache, J Naor, J Yaniv Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in …, 2013 | 98 | 2013 |
| On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 81-90, 2011 | 98 | 2011 |
| From duels to battlefields: Computing equilibria of blotto and other games AM Ahmadinejad, S Dehghani, MT Hajiaghayi, B Lucier, H Mahini, ... Mathematics of Operations Research 44 (4), 1304-1325, 2019 | 97 | 2019 |
| GSP auctions with correlated types B Lucier, R Paes Leme Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 71-80, 2011 | 86 | 2011 |
| An o (log log m) prophet inequality for subadditive combinatorial auctions P Dütting, T Kesselheim, B Lucier ACM SIGecom Exchanges 18 (2), 32-37, 2020 | 83 | 2020 |
Vasilis SyrgkanisAssistant Professor, Stanford UniversityVerified email at stanford.edu
