| Design competition through multidimensional auctions YK Che Rand Journal of Economics 24, 668-680, 1993 | 1358 | 1993 |
| Optimal incentives for teams YK Che, SW Yoo American Economic Review, 1996 | 891* | 1996 |
| Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting YK Che, D Hausch American Economic Review, 1999 | 807 | 1999 |
| Optimal design of research contests YK Che, I Gale American Economic Review 93 (3), 646-671, 2003 | 652 | 2003 |
| Caps on political lobbying YK Che, IL Gale The american economic review 88 (3), 643-651, 1998 | 585 | 1998 |
| Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders YK Che, I Gale The Review of Economic Studies 65 (1), 1-21, 1998 | 498 | 1998 |
| Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications E Budish, YK Che, F Kojima, P Milgrom American economic review 103 (2), 585-623, 2013 | 481 | 2013 |
| Competitive procurement with corruption R Burguet, YK Che RAND Journal of Economics, 50-68, 2004 | 454 | 2004 |
| Resolving conflicting preferences in school choice: The “Boston mechanism” reconsidered A Abdulkadiroğlu, YK Che, Y Yasuda American Economic Review 101 (1), 399-410, 2011 | 407 | 2011 |
| Opinions as incentives YK Che, N Kartik Journal of Political Economy 117 (5), 815-860, 2009 | 347 | 2009 |
| Customer return policies for experience goods YK Che The Journal of industrial economics, 17-24, 1996 | 339 | 1996 |
| Recommender systems as mechanisms for social learning YK Che, J Hörner The Quarterly Journal of Economics 133 (2), 871-925, 2018 | 309* | 2018 |
| The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer YK Che, I Gale Journal of Economic theory 92 (2), 198-233, 2000 | 293 | 2000 |
| Expanding “choice” in school choice A Abdulkadiroğlu, YK Che, Y Yasuda American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (1), 1-42, 2015 | 291 | 2015 |
| The economic consequences of data privacy regulation: Empirical evidence from GDPR G Aridor, YK Che, T Salz National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020 | 285* | 2020 |
| Revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion YK Che The Rand journal of economics, 378-397, 1995 | 285 | 1995 |
| Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms YK Che, F Kojima Econometrica 78 (5), 1625-1672, 2010 | 254* | 2010 |
| Robustly collusion‐proof implementation YK Che, J Kim Econometrica 74 (4), 1063-1107, 2006 | 244 | 2006 |
| Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, AM Polinsky, YK Che RAND Journal of Economics 562, 562, 1991 | 233 | 1991 |
| Efficiency, justified envy, and incentives in priority-based matching A Abdulkadiroǧlu, YK Che, PA Pathak, AE Roth, O Tercieux American Economic Review: Insights 2 (4), 425-442, 2020 | 215* | 2020 |
Ian GaleProfessor Economics, Georgetown UniversityVerified email at georgetown.edu
