| Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization P Mandal, S Roy International Economic Review 63 (1), 261-290, 2022 | 28 | 2022 |
| On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options P Mandal, S Roy Economics Letters 211, 110239, 2022 | 10 | 2022 |
| Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism SH Cho, M Koshimura, P Mandal, K Yahiro, M Yokoo Economics Letters 217, 110675, 2022 | 9 | 2022 |
| Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked P Mandal, S Roy | 5 | 2021 |
| Matchings under Stability, Minimum Regret, and Forced and Forbidden Pairs in Marriage Problem P Mandal, S Roy | 3 | 2021 |
| Efficient reallocation of indivisible resources: Pair-efficiency versus Pareto-efficiency P Mandal Journal of Mathematical Economics, 103149, 2025 | 2 | 2025 |
| Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness with single-peaked preferences on trees P Mandal arXiv preprint arXiv:2304.11494, 2023 | 2 | 2023 |
| Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness: A single-peaked preferences investigation: P. Mandal P Mandal Economic Theory, 1-31, 2025 | 1 | 2025 |
| Equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability P Mandal arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.05252, 2023 | 1 | 2023 |
| Compatibility between Stability and Strategy-Proofness: A Single-Peaked Preferences Investigation P Mandal arXiv e-prints, arXiv: 2304.11494, 2023 | | 2023 |
| Simple dominance of fixed priority top trading cycles P Mandal arXiv preprint arXiv:2204.02154, 2022 | | 2022 |
| On percolation in a generalized backbend process P Mandal, S Roy arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.10025, 2021 | | 2021 |
| Stability and (Obviously) Strategy-proofness in Matching Theory P Mandal PQDT-Global, 2021 | | 2021 |
| MATCHING RULES P Mandal, S Roy | | |
