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William V. Gehrlein
William V. Gehrlein
Verified email at udel.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
A comparative evaluation of heuristic line balancing techniques
FB Talbot, JH Patterson, WV Gehrlein
Management science 32 (4), 430-454, 1986
4271986
Condorcet's paradox
WV Gehrlein
Theory and decision 15 (2), 161-197, 1983
2531983
Condorcet’s Paradox
WV Gehrlein
Condorcet’s Paradox, 2006
2402006
Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules
WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley
Springer Science & Business Media, 2010
2272010
Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles
WV Gehrlein, PC Fishburn
Public Choice, 1-18, 1976
2161976
The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
WV Gehrlein, PC Fishburn
Journal of Economic Theory 13 (1), 14-25, 1976
1981976
Borda's rule, positional voting, and Condorcet's simple majority principle
PC Fishburn, WV Gehrlein
Public Choice, 79-88, 1976
1711976
Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences*
WV Gehrlein
Theory and decision 52 (2), 171-199, 2002
1392002
General mathematical programming formulations for the statistical classification problem
WV Gehrlein
Operations Research Letters 5 (6), 299-304, 1986
1271986
The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
WV Gehrlein
Mathematical Social Sciences 10 (3), 199-209, 1985
1151985
Condorcet's paradox and the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules
WV Gehrlein
Mathematica Japonica 45, 173-199, 1997
1101997
Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley
Springer, 2017
882017
Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and positional voting rules
WV Gehrlein, PC Fishburn
Social Science Research 7 (3), 272-283, 1978
811978
An analysis of simple two‐stage voting systems
PC Fishburn, WV Gehrlein
Behavioral Science 21 (1), 1-12, 1976
781976
Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
WV Gehrlein, PC Fishburn
Journal of Economic Theory 19 (1), 38-49, 1978
741978
Which scoring rule maximizes Condorcet efficiency under IAC?
DP Cervone, WV Gehrlein, WS Zwicker
Theory and Decision 58 (2), 145-185, 2005
702005
Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
WV Gehrlein
mathematical social sciences 2 (2), 123-130, 1982
681982
Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
PC Fishburn, WV Gehrlein
Theory and Decision 14 (2), 141-153, 1982
631982
An analysis of voting procedures with nonranked voting
PC Fishburn, WV Gehrlein
Behavioral Science 22 (3), 178-185, 1977
631977
Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
WV Gehrlein, F Valognes
Social Choice and Welfare 18 (1), 193-205, 2001
602001
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Articles 1–20