| Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets P Milgrom, I Segal Econometrica 70 (2), 583-601, 2002 | 1993 | 2002 |
| Dynamic mechanism design: A myersonian approach A Pavan, I Segal, J Toikka Econometrica 82 (2), 601-653, 2014 | 742* | 2014 |
| Optimal information disclosure L Rayo, I Segal Journal of political Economy 118 (5), 949-987, 2010 | 711 | 2010 |
| Contracting with externalities I Segal The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (2), 337-388, 1999 | 646 | 1999 |
| Naked exclusion: comment IR Segal, MD Whinston American Economic Review 91 (1), 296-309, 2000 | 634 | 2000 |
| Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts I Segal The Review of Economic Studies 66 (1), 57-82, 1999 | 630 | 1999 |
| The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices N Nisan, I Segal Journal of Economic Theory 129 (1), 192-224, 2006 | 461* | 2006 |
| An efficient dynamic mechanism S Athey, I Segal Econometrica 81 (6), 2463-2485, 2013 | 413 | 2013 |
| Introduction to choice theory J Levin, P Milgrom | 362 | 2004 |
| Exclusive contracts and protection of investments IR Segal, MD Whinston RAND Journal of Economics, 603-633, 2000 | 330 | 2000 |
| Antitrust in innovative industries I Segal, MD Whinston American Economic Review 97 (5), 1703-1730, 2007 | 307 | 2007 |
| Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand I Segal American Economic Review 93 (3), 509-529, 2003 | 258 | 2003 |
| Clock auctions and radio spectrum reallocation P Milgrom, I Segal Journal of Political Economy 128 (1), 1-31, 2020 | 253* | 2020 |
| Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer? I Segal Journal of Economic Theory 113 (2), 147-181, 2003 | 235 | 2003 |
| Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities I Segal, MD Whinston Econometrica 71 (3), 757-791, 2003 | 211 | 2003 |
| What makes them click: Empirical analysis of consumer demand for search advertising P Jeziorski, I Segal American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (3), 24-53, 2015 | 206 | 2015 |
| Monopoly and soft budget constraint IR Segal The RAND Journal of Economics, 596-609, 1998 | 174 | 1998 |
| The Mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation (with applications to hold‐up and risk sharing) I Segal, MD Whinston Econometrica 70 (1), 1-45, 2002 | 158 | 2002 |
| Property rights I Segal, MD Whinston Handbook of organizational Economics 100, 58, 2013 | 153 | 2013 |
| Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation K Leyton-Brown, P Milgrom, I Segal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114 (28), 7202-7209, 2017 | 124 | 2017 |
Paul MilgromProfessor of Economics, Stanford UniversityVerified email at stanford.edu
