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David C. Parkes
David C. Parkes
George F. Colony Professor of Computer Science, John A. Paulson Dean, Harvard University
Verified email at eecs.harvard.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Machine behaviour
I Rahwan, M Cebrian, N Obradovich, J Bongard, JF Bonnefon, C Breazeal, ...
Nature 568 (7753), 477-486, 2019
18382019
Artificial intelligence and life in 2030: the one hundred year study on artificial intelligence
P Stone, R Brooks, E Brynjolfsson, R Calo, O Etzioni, G Hager, ...
arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.06318, 2022
14172022
Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice
DC Parkes, LH Ungar
Aaai/iaai 7481, 53, 2000
6962000
Computational-mechanism design: A call to arms
RK Dash, NR Jennings, DC Parkes
IEEE intelligent systems 18 (6), 40-47, 2005
4672005
Iterative combinatorial auctions: Achieving economic and computational efficiency
DC Parkes
University of Pennsylvania, 2001
4662001
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
DC Parkes, J Kalagnanam, M Eso
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 17 (1), 1161-1168, 2001
3622001
Economic reasoning and artificial intelligence
DC Parkes, MP Wellman
Science 349 (6245), 267-272, 2015
3592015
Rationality and self-interest in peer to peer networks
J Shneidman, DC Parkes
International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, 139-148, 2003
3502003
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
DC Parkes
Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 148-157, 1999
3031999
Optimal auctions through deep learning
P Dütting, Z Feng, H Narasimhan, D Parkes, SS Ravindranath
International Conference on Machine Learning, 1706-1715, 2019
3002019
How do fairness definitions fare? Examining public attitudes towards algorithmic definitions of fairness
NA Saxena, K Huang, E DeFilippis, G Radanovic, DC Parkes, Y Liu
Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, 99-106, 2019
2982019
Beyond dominant resource fairness: Extensions, limitations, and indivisibilities
DC Parkes, AD Procaccia, N Shah
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 3 (1), 1-22, 2015
2972015
Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions
DC Parkes, J Kalagnanam
Management Science 51 (3), 435-451, 2005
2902005
The AI Economist: Taxation policy design via two-level deep multiagent reinforcement learning
S Zheng, A Trott, S Srinivasa, DC Parkes, R Socher
Science advances 8 (18), eabk2607, 2022
2682022
An MDP-based approach to online mechanism design
DC Parkes, S Singh
Advances in neural information processing systems 16, 2003
2612003
Truth, justice, and cake cutting
Y Chen, JK Lai, DC Parkes, AD Procaccia
Games and Economic Behavior 77 (1), 284-297, 2013
2572013
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
MT Hajiaghayi, R Kleinberg, DC Parkes
Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 71-80, 2004
2532004
On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis
J Freudiger, MH Manshaei, JP Hubaux, DC Parkes
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications …, 2009
2392009
Decentralized, adaptive resource allocation for sensor networks
G Mainland, DC Parkes, M Welsh
Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design …, 2005
2332005
AI can help humans find common ground in democratic deliberation
MH Tessler, MA Bakker, D Jarrett, H Sheahan, MJ Chadwick, R Koster, ...
Science 386 (6719), eadq2852, 2024
2292024
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