| Implementation without rationality assumptions V Korpela Theory and decision 72 (2), 189-203, 2012 | 35 | 2012 |
| Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals V Korpela Social Choice and Welfare 43 (3), 647-658, 2014 | 25 | 2014 |
| Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? V Korpela, M Lombardi, H Vartiainen Journal of Economic Theory 185, 104953, 2020 | 19 | 2020 |
| Behavioral strong implementation T Hayashi, R Jain, V Korpela, M Lombardi Economic Theory 76 (4), 1257-1287, 2023 | 18 | 2023 |
| A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation V Korpela Journal of Economic Theory 148 (5), 2183-2193, 2013 | 15 | 2013 |
| Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures V Korpela, M Lombardi, H Vartiainen Games and Economic Behavior 128, 202-212, 2021 | 9 | 2021 |
| Procedurally fair implementation under complete information V Korpela Journal of Mathematical Economics 77, 25-31, 2018 | 7 | 2018 |
| Two-player rationalizable implementation R Jain, V Korpela, M Lombardi Journal of Economic Theory, 106031, 2025 | 5 | 2025 |
| Implementation in VNM stable set V Korpela, M Lombardi, R Saulle Department of Economics and Management" Marco Fanno", University of Padova, 2022 | 5 | 2022 |
| An iterative approach to rationalizable implementation R Jain, V Korpela, M Lombardi Available at SSRN 3861192, 2022 | 5 | 2022 |
| Nash implementation theory—A note on full characterizations V Korpela Economics Letters 108 (3), 283-285, 2010 | 5 | 2010 |
| The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view V Korpela, M Lombardi, F Savva Economic Theory 79 (4), 1255-1281, 2025 | 4 | 2025 |
| Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities V Korpela, M Lombardi, RD Saulle Games and Economic Behavior 143, 77-102, 2024 | 3 | 2024 |
| An implementation approach to rotation programs V Korpela, M Lombardi, RD Saulle arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.14560, 2021 | 3 | 2021 |
| Mechanism design with farsighted agents V Korpela, M Lombardi Available at SSRN 3402400, 2019 | 3 | 2019 |
| Behavioral implementation without unanimity V Korpela, M Lombardi, J Zachariassen Discussion paper, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation V Korpela, M Lombardi Games and Economic Behavior 121, 108-116, 2020 | 2 | 2020 |
| Procedurally fair implementation: The cost of insisting on symmetry V Korpela Available at SSRN 2768592, 2016 | 2 | 2016 |
| Yritystuet ja mekanismin suunnittelu V Korpela yritystukien tutkimusjaoston taustaraportti (TEM), 2022 | 1 | 2022 |
| Implementation with farsighted agents V Korpela, M Lombardi, H Vartiainen Discussion paper, 2021 | 1 | 2021 |
Michele LombardiUniversity of LiverpoolVerified email at liverpool.ac.uk
