Security implications for user interface changes?
Free software users are not generally known for their quiet acceptance of user interface changes. Many changes to the UI of desktop environments or popular applications lead to long and loud threads from users—with some percentage of those users claiming they will move to an alternative rather than "put up" with the change. But what happens if the alternative is to stick with an earlier, unsupported version of the application? That's the question that came up in a short, but interesting, thread on the Mozilla security mailing list.
Plans for Firefox to remove the "tabs on bottom" feature have so incensed a vocal subset of users (see this bug report or this lengthy thread on the mozilla.dev.apps.firefox group) that they don't plan to upgrade the browser once this change is implemented. For many releases now, Firefox has had its tabs below the controls and "awesome bar", which is the behavior called "tabs on bottom". More recent versions have had a "Tabs on top" toggle in the toolbar configuration, which moves the tabs to just below the menu (and above the controls and awesome bar). The toggle is slated for removal, with tabs on top becoming the default. The old behavior will still be available by setting browser.tabs.onTop to false in about:config, but users are concerned that will eventually disappear as well.
The ferocity of the arguments against moving the tabs (and removing the toggle) led Zack Weinberg to suggest keeping the toggle and feature:
Web browsers, by their nature, need frequent updates. Because browsers face the often hostile internet and can provide a portal to users' documents, photos, passwords, and so forth, it is critically important for users to keep up with browser updates. Anything that gets in the way of that process is (and should be) worrisome. That is the main reason that Chrome and Firefox have moved to automatic updates, for example.
But there is a tradeoff to be made here. Mozilla's VP of Firefox
Engineering Johnathan Nightingale argues
that, over the years, too much attention has been paid to the most
vocal user contingent. There is code that is "in desperate need of
clean up
", he said, so Firefox developers cannot necessarily afford
to heed the negative feedback:
Every community has conservative elements. They are helpful; they remind us who we are when we forget. But conservative forces prevent change (by definition!) and we have important aspects of our code that need changing.
Weinberg is not convinced that cleaning up the code base overrides the security issue, however. He is concerned that the "tabs on bottom" issue is really just the straw that broke the camel's back for some segment of users. Even a small percentage of the Firefox install base can make for a rather large problem:
Drawing a clear line is difficult, though. If any change to the UI can be seen as a "security problem" because users might decide not to upgrade, it will be difficult for Firefox to make any changes. Users have to take some responsibility for their choices. As Curtis Koenig put it:
Users will make poor choices at times, and it is certainly possible that
some change will drive some of them to make those choices. Is there a
"moral responsibility
", as Weinberg claimed, for Firefox (and, by implication, other
applications, desktops, etc.) to continue to deliver a user experience that
its users have become accustomed to? Are UI changes always potential
security problems? There are obviously some kinds of UI changes that are
security flaws, but simply changing the way the user interacts with the
program likely doesn't really reach that level.
Both Koenig and Nightingale do not see the "tabs on bottom" change as a
security issue. There may be design or development issues that need to be
resolved—though Nightingale seems confident that those have largely been dealt
with—but changing some UI elements around is not cause for a security red
flag. In fact, Nightingale called the security concern "a red
herring (or a slippery slope, take your pick)
".
There is only so much that a project can do to protect its users. Part of the problem with this particular case is that the other "major" free alternative, Chrome/Chromium, also has its tabs at the top. One guesses that the uproar would be good deal more subdued if there were an "easy" alternative that behaved the way the "vocal conservatives" want. There may be good reasons to consider leaving the "tabs on bottom" feature alone; security isn't really one of them. But it is always good to see projects thinking about and debating where these lines are.
| Index entries for this article | |
|---|---|
| Security | Desktop |
| Security | Web browsers |
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