<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/"><title type="text">Jacobin</title><id>https://jacobin.com</id><updated>2026-11-21T18:46:49.446931Z</updated><link href="https://jacobin.com"/><logo>https://jacobin.com/static/img/logo/logo-type.png</logo><subtitle type="text">Jacobin is a leading voice of the American left, offering socialist perspectives on politics, economics, and culture.</subtitle><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/review-dinkins-mayoralty-police-reform</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/review-dinkins-mayoralty-police-reform"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/910095032235.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/910095032235.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/910095032235.jpg"/><title type="text">David Dinkins Wasn’t Loud Enough for New York City</title><updated>2026-11-21T18:46:49.446931Z</updated><author><name>David Duhalde</name></author><category label="Books" term="Books"/><category label="Cities" term="Cities"/><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><category label="Policing and Repression" term="Policing and Repression"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>In the past few weeks, New York City mayor Zohran Mamdani has proposed breaking up the <a href="https://www.riverdalepress.com/stories/mamdani-moves-to-disband-nypd-strategic-response-group,251660?">Strategic Response Group</a> and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mamdani-sets-plan-close-nycs-notorious-rikers-island-jail-rcna610382">closing Rikers</a> by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/20/nyregion/rikers-island-mamdani-close-2032.html?searchResultPosition=1">2032</a>, the former established by progressive Mayor Bill de Blasio, who also revived a plan to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/nyregion/rikers-island-closing-vote.html">dismantle</a> the latter by 2027. But unfulfilled promises of police and carceral reform efforts go back to the 1990s. How much should the failures of previous mayoral administrations weigh on the decisions of Mamdani and his allies in regard to public safety and police?</p><p>This question has no easy answer. But a new book by James Barney on the tenure of New York City’s first black mayor, David Dinkins, offers insights on his efforts to rein in police excesses based on new research, especially in the local press of the era — and critically how those attempts failed, despite Mayor Dinkins’s desires and promises.</p><p>In <cite><a href="https://fordhampress.com/a-fragile-alliance-hb-9781531514464.html">A Fragile Alliance: David Dinkins, Coalition Politics, and the Struggle to Govern a City in Crisis</a></cite>, Barney, while sympathetic to Dinkins, argues that both Dinkins’s quiet leadership style and inability to create a narrative uniting his own multiracial coalition, much less the majority of the city, proved to be his undoing, dooming his reelection prospects and much of his agenda.</p><p>Barney, critical of identity politics throughout his history book, sums up his reservations here:</p><blockquote><p> . . . in particular, Dinkins’s reliance on the mosaic metaphor betrayed a worldview that privileged difference. While Dinkins repeatedly noted that New York City was a “gorgeous mosaic,” in a “mosaic” each of the pieces is different. They only produce any meaning by being part of a larger piece of art. But this type of thinking was at the heart of Dinkins’s problems as a leader because it emphasized differences rather than commonalities.</p></blockquote><p>Barney’s reservations about celebrating difference are at times too determinative. For instance, I doubt Dinkins could have done much to stop the disintegration of the New Deal/Great Society coalition that voted Democratic as white ethnics left the party across the country. But Barney’s concerns about the communication failures of Dinkins’s tenure were real and went beyond narrative to style.</p><p>While noble at times, the mayor’s quiet leadership style prevented New Yorkers — especially in a time without social media to get news rapidly and easily outside major media like Mamdani enjoys and uses today — from seeing their mayor’s interventions that created more peace than was seen elsewhere in America at the time, for example Los Angeles, which experienced a much deadlier upheaval triggered by the lack of convictions for the police who senselessly beat Rodney King, as well as the killing of teenager Latasha Harlins by a Korean American storeowner. This failure provided an opening to power for demagogues such as Rudy Giuliani to paint a darker picture around crime and disorder than actually existed.</p><p>While New York City’s political landscape has changed in many ways — the Staten Island secession movement, for example, is almost forgotten today — one thing Barney covers remains very much the same. The New York Police Department (NYPD) and institutions around it enjoy strong independence from civilian control that makes it difficult for any mayor to shape policy and personnel decisions commensurate with other major city agencies.</p><p>A famous instance of this was when the Sergeants Benevolent Association (SBA) tweeted out <a href="https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/ed-mullins-docked-70-days-pay-for-offensive-tweets-leaking-chiara-de-blasios-record/3382650/">personal data</a> of then-Mayor de Blasio’s daughter’s arrest related to the George Floyd uprising. Former SBA head Ed Mullins eventually faced <a href="https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/ed-mullins-docked-70-days-pay-for-offensive-tweets-leaking-chiara-de-blasios-record/3382650/">disciplinary charges</a> over this, though by then it was overshadowed by his federal indictment and <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/edward-mullins-former-president-nypd-sergeants-union-sentenced-two-years-prison">conviction</a> of stealing from his members. It is difficult to think of any other agency and its unions who would feel so emboldened to reject democratic oversight.</p><p>Dinkins, unlike most of today’s socialists and progressives, ran on a tough-on-crime agenda. He promised to hire thousands more police officers. The issue of crime polled high across racial and gender categories of voters. But Dinkins targeted his law-and-order proposals to include increasing policing in communities of color with officers of similar backgrounds. A major critic of this policy was Giuliani, who claimed this public safety policy would take police away from white neighborhoods. Giuliani’s racialized law-and-order rhetoric helped sink Dinkins.</p><p>Progressive mayors following Dinkins, such as de Blasio and Mamdani, have reckoned with the political reality that a public safety reform agenda is territory that isn’t worth attempting battle upon. And losing puts their whole left-wing agenda, not just public safety, at risk. Case in point: after Dinkins’s defeat, New York saw two decades of fiscal conservative and anti-police-reform mayors.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Crown Heights as a Turning Point</h2></header><div><p>Two chapters of the book that expand on how such demagoguery on policing helped cost Dinkins his mayoralty focus on the Crown Heights riots and Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) riots, respectively. These chapters also go beyond those two episodes of public violence to discuss how other instances of excessive police force neither led to uprisings nor successful efforts to advance civilian control of law enforcement. Barney’s research uses these events to help us understand how perceived disorder would be viewed as a key reason Dinkins lost, even though the crime rates were falling, and how his relationship with the police leadership and rank and file did not recover despite his own law-and-order narrative.</p><p>Dinkins won a surprise primary victory against three-term incumbent and bombastic erstwhile liberal Ed Koch in 1989. Barney credits Dinkins’s win through efforts to build a black-led, multiracial coalition out of the efforts in and around Jesse Jackson’s 1988 presidential campaign and subsequent Rainbow Coalition. Voter registration and mobilization, especially of black voters, to back Jackson were then used to elect Dinkins.</p><p>Those new voters proved fruitful for Dinkins’s own Rainbow Coalition. Dinkins won over half the vote in the multicandidate Democratic primary against Koch. But his candidacy against the Republican in the general was unusually closer. In New York, the Democratic Party primary more often than not is the de facto election. Not for Dinkins. He faced Giuliani, famous at the time for his federal prosecution of the mafia in New York’s Southern District, in 1989 and 1993. Each time, the victor only bested his opponent by around 2 points.</p><p>Not only were the margins similar, but Barney argues that themes in each election centered around crime, racial tension, and divisive ethnic politics. What made the difference was how a slim number of voters (turnout was roughly the same, 1.9 million in both mayoral races) eventually shifted toward a harsher response to perceptions of disorder, even as crime rates were declining.</p><p>Dinkins lost ground partly because of both the Crown Heights riot and PBA riot. Each contributed to the public perception of an ineffective Dinkins, which undermined his promises to create a safer city and less brutal policing methods.</p><p>The Crown Heights riot story officially begins on August 19, 1991, when a vehicle in a motorcade following the chief Lubavitcher (a sect of Jewish Hasidim) rabbi hit two Guyanese American children. The immediate lack of medical attention for the children by emergency medial technicians, explained by the Jewish volunteer service that initially responded to the accident lacking professional skills needed to treat the young people’s injuries, led to a retaliatory stabbing of a rabbinical student days later. The following unrest, in which 150 people were arrested and one hundred police injured, led the media to publicly question Dinkins’s ability to heal the racial and ethnic divide in the city and portray him as a weak leader.</p><figure><img alt="Footage of the 1991 Crown Heights riot in Brooklyn, New York. " height="1673" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/329749167347.png" width="2577"/><figcaption>Footage of the 1991 Crown Heights riot in Brooklyn, New York. (Wall Street Journal Opinion / YouTube)</figcaption></figure><p>But the conflict in Crown Heights went further back than these two incidents. The riot itself reflected the tension between the religious Jewish enclave and their black neighbors, largely of West Indian descent. In a city where fights over resources can feel zero-sum, the well-organized and self-isolating Lubavitcher community appeared to gain at others’ expense. Their leadership, politically well-connected as a result of their well-organized followers voting as a bloc, primarily looked after their own. Barney notes, for example, that the police protection for the Lubavitcher headquarters was seen as taking officers away from the crack epidemic, fostering further estrangement from their black gentile neighbors.</p><p>Dinkins, viewing this as a battle of “good and evil,” according to Barney, responded to the restive state of Crown Heights by sending in a thousand police officers to quell the violence. Black civil rights leaders and organizers such as the Reverend Al Sharpton and Sonny Carson, at times previously allied with the mayor, turned on him. Sharpton even characterized Dinkins’s action as setting up an “apartheid state.”</p><p>But a second, seemingly contradictory viewpoint sprung up from Giuliani and his allies that Dinkins actually held the police back from acting. This narrative fit well with voters that Barney says wanted to lump Dinkins, Carson, and Sharpton together. Dinkins couldn’t win.</p><p>To make things worse, Dinkins publicly stated — repeating doctors’ misdiagnosis — that the stabbed rabbinical student would recover. But his wounds were fatal. The Jewish man died a few hours after Dinkins’s remarks. The death made Dinkins look, even if unfairly, incompetent.</p><p>Barney credits much of the success the mayor did achieve in facilitating conservations between different Crown Heights faith leaders. These dialogues between Christian and Jewish leaders were rarely reported in the press. To Barney, this was just another example of Dinkins’s “quiet leadership” that, while noble, undermined public perception of governance.</p><p>Ultimately, a 1993 internal city investigation called the Girgenti Report vindicated Dinkins from the viewpoint that he had not, in fact, held back the police nor abetted the prosecution of the rabbinical student’s killing. But the report’s timing was poor for the incumbent. Barney concludes it did more to remind voters in an election year of the chaos of two years earlier than absolving Dinkins in their eyes: “For a mayor who longed to unify, Crown Heights became the moment when broad segments of the public lost confidence in Dinkins and when his vision of a gorgeous mosaic, while laudable, was found insufficient to meet New York City’s realities.”</p><p>The narrative that Dinkins held the NYPD back in Crown Heights was one of many that undermined his relationship with the police department and its officers. Another was that the overwhelming white police force felt the mayor was giving preferential treatment to people of color and criminals.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>The Police Riot as a Point of No Return</h2></header><div><p>In 1992, a police officer shot a Dominican immigrant in Washington Heights, which sparked a series of events that led to a police riot by September. The Washington Heights shooting seemed to be heading toward similar unrest — this time, sparked by young people who felt overpoliced. Dinkins was able to de-escalate the situation well, such that even his critics like Cardinal John O’Connor gave the mayor credit for his handling of the shooting’s aftermath.</p><p>The mayor’s initial success and efforts included allies he recruited. Dinkins had an ally in Lee P. Brown, an African American criminologist and former police chief of Houston, Texas, that took the same role under Dinkins. As commissioner, Brown supported community policing, which brought more officers who looked like the people of the neighborhoods they patrolled. Again, this policy was not favored by some white people who felt it took resources from their residential areas.</p><p>But this balance between reform and political reality in policing became unstable for both Dinkins’s coalition and the NYPD brass. At the time, the police practiced stop and frisk, an invasive and violating search practice that nearly exclusively targeted young men of color. Dinkins would come to regret this policy. Beyond the ethics, stop and frisk also fostered a schism in his coalition between the young people who felt brutalized and the older residents who wanted more police. Roscoe C. Brown Jr, a Tuskegee airman veteran quoted by Barney, summed up this division in the simple fact that black people had been victims of both crime and racist policing. Solving one requires tackling the other.</p><p>But doing so for Dinkins became impossible. Brown resigned as commissioner in 1992, because, according to Barney, even this reformer did not want to go as far as Dinkins in empowering the police watchdog city agency, the Civil Complaint Review Board. Dinkins, unlike Brown, determined the NYPD was unable to hold itself accountable. Still, Brown’s departure was from the worst rebuke Dinkins would experience by the NYPD.</p><figure><img alt="A banner seen at the 1992 Patrolemen’s Benevolent Association riot reads, “Dinkins, you sold out the NYPD.”" height="1304" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/472847659855.png" width="1981"/><figcaption>A banner seen at the 1992 Patrolemen’s Benevolent Association Riot reads, “Dinkins, you sold out the NYPD.” (NY1 / YouTube)</figcaption></figure><p>On September 16, 1992, organized by the police union (PBA), nearly ten thousand off-duty officers rallied outside city hall. Fueled by alcohol and rhetoric from Giuliani and PBA union leaders saying Dinkins favored criminals over cops, some police wore anti-Dinkins shirts, and others overturned barricades.</p><p>While the media and some allies like Sharpton returned to Dinkins’s camp after this because of the racist slurs hurled at Dinkins and noxious nature of the police riot, the damage was done with enough of the public. The perception that Dinkins had lost the police overrode the actual declining crime rates with a sufficient number of voters to eventually swing the election toward Giuliani the next year. This would end a progressive holding the mayor’s office until 2014 with the election of Bill de Blasio.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>NYPD Reform Returns</h2></header><div><p>Today not only is the mayor a progressive but, like Dinkins, a member of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). Zohran Mamdani also shares the challenges of balancing the wishes of his coalition and campaign promises with those of political reality. Policing is no different.</p><p>Recently, Mamdani has <a href="https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2026/11/mamdani-endorse-osses-bill-curb-controversial-nypd-unit/417226/">pledged</a> to disband the Special Response Group (SRG), a controversial police unit with both counterterrorism and protest control duties, and also backed socialist councilmember Chi Ossé’s CURB Act, which would limit tactics employed by SRG. As the SRG’s responsibilities will be reassigned to other police units, a move reportedly supported by NYPD Commissioner Jessica Tisch, limiting existing practices that police reform advocates say they are most against is critical to the success of reform.</p><p>Unlike Commissioner Lee with Dinkins, Tisch was not the incumbent mayor’s appointment but a holdover from the previous mayor. Mamdani has <a href="https://dsaemerge.org/2026/06/08/socialist-governance-means-fund-people-not-police-on-zohran-mamdani-and-the-nypd/">resisted</a> calls from parts of his coalition to fire her; these allies identify her support of Zionism and a strong carceral state as incompatible with a socialist vision. Except for <a href="https://heritagereview.com/mayor-mamdani-drops-plan-for-580-new-nypd-officers-as-police-unions-warn-of-burnout-and-a-looming-summer-crisis/#google_vignette">not hiring</a> nearly six hundred more police officers after <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/12/nyregion/dsa-mamdani-pushback.html">pushback</a> from NYC-DSA and others, the recent moves against SRG nearly a year into his term are a first real push to tackle unaccountable and abusive police power.</p><p>While New York City crime stands at <a href="https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/public-safety/2026/11/09/nypd-october-2026-crime-statistics-murders-shootings-record-lows">record lows</a>, the experience of Dinkins should serve as a warning that statistical realities such as declining rates are sometimes no match for scare tactics. The police still have soft and unchecked power, with council allies allegedly <a href="https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2026/11/mamdani-endorse-osses-bill-curb-controversial-nypd-unit/417226/">quietly opposing</a> the CURB Act.</p><p>Hidden opposition can become public, and allies can return. But sometimes it is too late, as Dinkins experienced after the police riot. As the title of Barney’s book reminds us, holding power can be fragile. It will take a balance of principle and strategic planning to successfully rein in the police. Or else we will set back again.</p><p>A lesson the current mayor can also learn from Dinkins is in a communication style to avoid. Instead, he should continue to present an accessible vision and visible actions so voters and other members of the public can easily understand and repeat his policy priorities.</p><p>Had Dinkins been able to enjoy the social media platforms and fluency that Mamdani does to get around mainstream gatekeepers and parochial local press, he might have been able to overcome the idea he was ineffective. But even with such tools, it requires a willingness to be public, even boastful, which people adverse to demagoguery understandably avoid.</p><p>But good intentions can be fatal. Quiet leadership, while noble, may be silent even to your supporters. And it can be used against you by your enemies. The base needs to know what you’re doing to counter the inevitable lies and distortions thrown at left-wing politicians by their reactionary political opponents.</p><p>The success of a progressive and socialist public safety agenda depends on winning the majority. That requires a tremendous amount of organizing from the grassroots, but also political leaders who can help echo a narrative that can cut through the noise trying to maintain the status quo or reserve the gains made by reformers so far.</p><p><cite>A Fragile Alliance</cite> is worth reading for anyone trying to comprehend how the past can weigh on today’s New York. It is a valuable resource in seeing how old attack frames, especially around identity, which seem outdated but once worked against Dinkins, could return against Mamdani. But more critically, how previous efforts of mayors around police reform failed and succeeded. Learning from that history can better prepare activists to push those in power, even our allied electeds, in a more strategic direction.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/review-dinkins-mayoralty-police-reform?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-21T18:46:49.446931Z</published><summary type="text">David Dinkins, New York’s first black mayor and a Democratic Socialists of America member, practiced a quiet, dignified form of municipal leadership — so hushed that he was easily drowned out by more reactionary and demagogic forces in the city.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/inflation-austerity-oil-class-sweden</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/inflation-austerity-oil-class-sweden"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/520588148507.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/520588148507.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/520588148507.jpg"/><title type="text">Inflation Is About Resources — and Power</title><updated>2026-11-21T16:23:44.927911Z</updated><author><name>Oskar Brandt </name></author><category label="Economy" term="Economy"/><category label="Austerity" term="Austerity"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>After prices began rising and rising in the wake of COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some <a href="https://oversight.house.gov/release/oversight-republicans-bidenflation-is-a-tax-on-hardworking-americans/">blamed</a> welfare and public spending for the inflation. Yet in many economies, <a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/investment-as-a-transmission-mechanism-from-weak-demand-to-weak-supply-and-post-crisis-productivity-slowdown_0c62cc26-en.html">weak demand</a> and falling public investment after 2008 held back investment and productive capacity. Austerity can also <a href="https://www.zew.de/en/publications/slow-recoveries-through-fiscal-austerity-new-insights-in-the-effects-of-fiscal-austerity">weaken</a> productivity and future growth. In the United States, changes to trade policy during Donald Trump’s first presidency added to uncertainty about the economic situation. Trade policy uncertainty between 2017 and 2018 may have lowered investment by 1 to 2 percent. During the pandemic, automakers canceled orders and halted production. Demand returned before factories, suppliers, and transport networks could restart. The Cleveland Fed <a href="https://www.clevelandfed.org/publications/cleveland-fed-district-data-brief/cfddb-20210226-covid-19-and-supply-chains">documented</a> how factory shutdowns, parts shortages, and shipping delays during the pandemic disrupted supply chains. The oil crisis of 1973 is a reminder of how a real supply shock can also become a lasting case for austerity.</p><p>Joe Biden’s American Rescue Plan expanded the child tax credit. Child poverty <a href="https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2022/09/record-drop-in-child-poverty.html">fell</a> from 9.7 percent in 2020 to 5.2 percent in 2021, then <a href="https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2023/demo/p60-280.html">rose</a> to 12.4 percent in 2022 after Congress let the expansion expire. From 2019 to 2023, low-wage workers’ <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/swa-wages-2023/">real pay</a> grew by 13.2 percent. Real manufacturing-construction spending <a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/blog/2023/08/16/the-economics-of-public-investment-crowding-in-private-investment/">rose</a> by 85 percent from January 2021 to a six-decade high in part as a result of new investment laws. These gains helped poor families, workers, and industry, though they cannot all be attributed to Biden’s policies.</p><p>US inflation also fell earlier than in the eurozone. Consumer price index (CPI) inflation <a href="https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2022/consumer-prices-up-9-1-percent-over-the-year-ended-june-2022-largest-increase-in-40-years.htm">peaked</a> at 9.1 percent in June 2022 and <a href="https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2023/consumer-prices-up-3-0-percent-over-the-year-ended-june-2023.htm">fell</a> to 3 percent by June 2023, while eurozone inflation was still <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-19072023-ap">5.5 percent</a>. Global supply pressures eased, energy prices fell, and the Federal Reserve raised rates sharply. Still, stronger wages and public investment can coincide with falling inflation. The gains for poor families, however, can disappear when that policy ends.</p><p>Sweden brings the question into focus in 2026. In its March 2026 <a href="https://www.statskontoret.se/contentassets/9070e861310f489faa806202f27728c4/stk-2026-10-prognos-for-statens-budget-och-de-offentliga-finanserna-mars-2026.pdf">forecast</a>, the Swedish Agency for Financial and Public Management projected a general government deficit of SEK180 billion for the year. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) describes the fiscal policy as expansionary but expects headline inflation to remain below target. Inflation can rise when spending meets shortages of labor or natural resources, limited production, or firms with the power to raise prices. But spending and higher purchasing power do not cause inflation by themselves. The result depends on resources, production, prices, and import dependence. The deficit <a href="https://www.statskontoret.se/uppdrag-och-rapporter/rapporter/2026/prognos-mars-2026/">forecast</a> and the IMF’s <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/05/13/mcs-05132026-sweden-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2026-article-iv-mission">outlook</a> show why.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Production Is Power</h2></header><div><p>Imagine a low-paid worker with rent due and a child to feed two weeks until payday. A pay raise may help, but it cannot create affordable homes or medicine. When the costs of essentials rise faster than incomes, people with little room in their budgets absorb the shock first. Inflation policy decides who loses purchasing power, whose costs get protected, and whose prices remain beyond public control.</p><p>A government that issues its own floating currency <a href="https://stephaniekelton.com/book/">creates</a> money as it spends and withdraws money from the private economy through taxes. But it still faces real limits: labor, technology, materials, energy, and ecological capacity. Reliance on imports, foreign-currency debt, and exchange rate pressure can tighten those limits. If spending exceeds what producers can supply, prices may rise. A deficit alone cannot tell us where that point lies. An <a href="https://bokshop.bod.se/den-lilla-boken-om-pengar-jussi-ora-9789181142747">economy</a> with available workers and room to raise productivity can absorb spending without necessarily generating inflation.</p><p>Banks create money when they <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2014/q1/money-creation-in-the-modern-economy">lend</a>. Each loan creates a matching deposit; as the loan is repaid, that deposit money disappears. But money cannot summon nurses, electricity, medicines, homes, or skilled workers. Private credit can sustain demand when wages and public spending lag, but households and firms cannot increase debt indefinitely. When borrowers repay loans more quickly than banks issue new ones, this bank-created money contracts. Austerity can exacerbate this fall in demand. If households and businesses try to pay down debt at the same time, a financial crisis can ensue.</p><p>Globalization gave rich countries access to abundant goods and helped keep some prices down, but it tied factories to long shipping routes and distant suppliers. Military power can protect routes, resources, and property rights, but it also depends on domestic industrial capacity and state support for its industries. Japan, South Korea, and China built technical capacity through public investment, industrial policy, directed credit, protection, and managed trade, while many Western economies have become dependent on finance, services, and imported goods. This has weakened the West’s <a href="https://norla.no/en/books/580-how-rich-countries-got-rich-and-why-poor-countries-stay-poor">ability</a> to sustain the military power that keeps globalization in place.</p><p>Globalization also exposed the costs of weakening domestic industry. <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015041">Trade shocks</a> left factory workers with lasting job losses and lower incomes. Research has linked layoffs to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00104140211024301">far-right support</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/relative-exposure-to-negative-economic-shocks-racial-animus-and-voting/FC326A9B4D25694BCAE47B0E05CF36A8">unequal</a> exposure to economic shocks to racial animus and right-wing voting in the United States, and local trade shocks to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00104140211024296">authoritarian values</a>.</p><p>A company that dominates its market sector can raise prices with less fear of losing customers. Across industries in fifteen European economies, the average market share of the four largest firms <a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/competition-and-market-dynamism.html">rose</a> from 26 percent in 2000 to 32 percent in 2019; average markups rose about 7 percent. A US manufacturing study <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22750/w22750.pdf">found</a> that mergers were associated with higher markups and little evidence of higher plant productivity. Firms can also use monopsony power to hold down wages and hiring. In a <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28084/w28084.pdf">study</a> of French labor markets, a 10 percent increase in labor market concentration was associated with nearly 0.9 percent lower wages for new hires and 12.4 percent fewer hires.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Shocks Give Price-Setters Cover</h2></header><div><p>COVID caused real <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/959651632896265565/pdf/Supporting-Analysis.pdf">supply problems</a>. Lockdowns disrupted production. Households saved more, while spending shifted from services to goods. Auto demand plummeted in 2020, causing carmakers to cut their chip orders. In turn, chipmakers shifted production to other customers, and when auto demand returned, they could not quickly meet carmakers’ renewed need. Shortages can make it easier for powerful firms to raise prices. When rivals face the same shock and customers expect increases, price hikes <a href="https://peri.umass.edu/publication/sellers-inflation-profits-and-conflict-why-can-large-firms-hike-prices-in-an-emergency/">can spread</a> even without a cartel.</p><p>In 2022, <a href="https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2023/english/wpiea2023131-print-pdf.pdf">profits</a> rose faster than production across the eurozone and accounted for the largest share of price increases. Real cost shocks, like those associated with the recent US wars of 2025–26, can nonetheless <a href="https://www.redjustice.net/pyrrhus-segern-for-vasts-finansmarknader-som-knacker-usas-varldsmaktordning/">coexist with</a> wider margins. In food markets, <a href="https://www.redjustice.net/finansialisering-storre-prishojare-an-matbrist/">financial speculation</a> and stockpiling can drive price rises beyond what shortages alone would explain, especially when war creates expectations of shortages.</p><p>When COVID arrived, manufacturers expected a prolonged recession and cut production, capacity, and orders. <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/2021-07-mpr-part1.htm">Demand</a> and employment recovered faster than expected, leaving shortages of semiconductors, lumber, and other inputs. Fiscal expansion did not invent these bottlenecks; it revealed them. Repeated periods of weak demand can close factories, disperse skilled workers, and delay investment, making supply slower to recover.</p><p>In the 1960s, large industrial firms had built capacity but struggled to sell everything they produced. Some responded by buying unrelated businesses, selling off or outsourcing production, and relying more on short-term finance. This shift away from production gave financial markets <a href="https://gemensam.wordpress.com/2024/07/22/om-hur-de-producerande-storforetagen-forlorade-sin-makt/">greater influence</a> over industrial decisions. In the decades that followed, private debt could temporarily sustain productive capacity despite weak wage growth, but when borrowing slowed, spending and sales fell. Debt-led crises also enabled investors to buy distressed property, companies, and assets from poor households cheaply, at a high social cost.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Debt and Austerity</h2></header><div><p>Some Mesopotamian rulers in antiquity periodically <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/63387/chapter/575436442">canceled debts</a>, freed people from debt bondage, and restored property, in part to check mass indebtedness and land concentration. These measures were episodic, not part of a regular, universal system. Debt was contested in Ancient Greece too, as seen in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10848770.2017.1402516">Solon’s reforms</a>. Rome faced recurring <a href="https://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?id=3110545&amp;url=article">credit crises</a> and <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781351063500-11/ager-publicus-saskia-roselaar">public-land conflict</a>. Debt crises and land struggles shaped the politics of the late Roman Republic.</p><p>The two world wars showed that markets could be governed. During World War I, the US War Industries Board <a href="https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war-industries-board/">coordinated</a> production. After the war, advocates of austerity in Britain and Italy <a href="https://www.claramattei.com/books/the-capital-order">promoted</a> balanced budgets and hard-money policies and accepted high unemployment as ways to restore economic hierarchies at labor’s expense. During World War II, the United States used price ceilings, rationing, taxes, wage policies, credit controls, and resource allocation to restrain inflation, raise revenue, and direct production toward the war effort.</p><p>One historical <a href="https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2014/article/one-hundred-years-of-price-change-the-consumer-price-index-and-the-american-inflation-experience.htm">estimate</a> put the price level more than 30 percent below where it would have been without general price controls. Controls did not abolish scarcity. Many goods were rationed or simply unavailable, but alongside public management of demand and physical resources, the controls worked. World War II was one of the few times that the US came close to <a href="https://stephaniekelton.com/how-to-tell-when-deficit-spending-crosses-a-line/">full</a> productive capacity. During the war, labor shortages and stronger unions also improved many workers’ <a href="https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/chapter5">bargaining position</a>.</p><p>A <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/does-austerity-cause-polarization/5A92279ABBEE623D38E438848B03C060">study</a> of 166 elections in 16 OECD countries from 1980 to 2016 found austerity associated with increased electoral abstention and support for nonmainstream parties. Austerity weakens workers’ bargaining power and public services, reduces demand and investment, and can undermine social stability.</p><p>The late 1990s surpluses, combined with the trade deficit, pushed the US private sector into record deficits. Household debt grew much faster than income as Washington paid down <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2001/February/ReportSection2.htm">public debt</a>. Levy researchers later linked <a href="https://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/what-do-we-save-when-we-doge-the-government/">private sector deficits</a> to the global crisis of 2008. Post-COVID inflation had different causes, including <a href="https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr1080">supply bottlenecks</a>, a shift toward goods, and energy shocks.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>Lessons From Past Shocks</h2></header><div><p>Inflation was already rising in the United States <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-inflation">before</a> the 1973 oil shock. The US chose to escalate the <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/08/war-energy-shocks-inflation-welfare-state">Vietnam War</a>. The war diverted workers, fuel, and materials from civilian production and sent dollars abroad. In 1971, Richard Nixon <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gold-convertibility-ends">ended</a> the dollar’s convertibility into gold. The dollar continued to serve as a major world currency without a promise of redemption in gold. Fiat money still faces real limits: the availability of oil, labor, materials, and productive capacity.</p><p>During the Yom Kippur War, Arab oil states imposed an embargo and <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo">cut production</a>. Separately, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised prices. Iran’s shah, a US ally, pushed for higher oil revenues to finance the country’s military buildup. Nixon had promised to <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/summary">sell</a> him the arms he wanted. A contemporary account <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148022">argued</a> that Washington encouraged Middle Eastern producers to raise prices from 1971; Washington had earlier accommodated the shah’s push for higher prices, but during the crisis it <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo">opposed</a> the Arab embargo and resisted OPEC’s proposed 100 percent price hike.</p><p>The United States did not create the whole crisis. But US leaders accepted higher oil revenues for a strategic ally. Meanwhile, oil companies, banks, and arms firms <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/08/war-energy-shocks-inflation-welfare-state">gained</a> from the new flows of money, while workers and households paid higher prices. Leaders later used the crisis to attack welfare and full employment, even though the oil shock did not prove that public spending caused inflation.</p><p>The shift toward policies that tolerated high unemployment, wage restraint, and public spending cuts was a political choice, not an automatic result of the oil shock. Naomi Klein has <a href="https://tsd.naomiklein.org/shock-doctrine/excerpt.html">traced</a> disaster capitalism to Milton Friedman’s argument that crises can open the way for sweeping economic change. She shows how leaders and businesses have used this approach repeatedly, from Chile and post-Soviet Russia to the <a href="https://naomiklein.org/the-shock-doctrine/">Iraq occupation</a> and Hurricane Katrina, to push privatization and expand corporate control.</p><p>This selfsame policy choice — the choice between using inflation to justify austerity, or addressing its causes and effects — is reflected in Sweden’s response to the latest energy shock.</p></div></section><section id="sec-5"><header><h2>The Swedish Case</h2></header><div><p>The war in the Middle East disrupted shipments through the Strait of Hormuz this past year, raising Swedish motor fuel prices by 25 percent. Yet Eurostat’s <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-18112026-ap">November release</a> put Swedish inflation at just 0.6 percent, compared with 4 percent in the eurozone. On the Riksbank’s <a href="https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/prices-and-economic-trends/price-statistics/consumer-price-index-cpi/pong/statistical-news/consumer-price-index-cpi-october-2026/">target measure</a>, which holds mortgage interest rates fixed, Swedish inflation rose from 0.7 percent <a href="https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/prices-and-economic-trends/price-statistics/consumer-price-index-cpi/pong/statistical-news/consumer-price-index-cpi-august-2026/">in August</a> to 1.5 percent in September before easing to 1.1 percent in October. Excluding energy, it was just 0.1 percent in October.</p><p>Some measures that widened Sweden’s deficit also lowered prices. The <a href="https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/8fc046c8c0af47b487c3263425c3780a/budgetpropositionen-for-2027-prop.-2026271-hela-dokumentet.pdf">November budget</a> projected a 2026 deficit of SEK158 billion, or 2.3 percent of GDP. After Sweden halved the value-added tax (VAT) on groceries in April, food prices fell 5.5 percent that month; a <a href="https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2026/09/livsmedelspriserna-sjonk-med-55-procent-efter-halveringen-av-matmomsen/">government review</a> found that retailers passed on most of the cut. The government also subsidized half-price monthly <a href="https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2026/06/halverade-priser-i-kollektivtrafiken--nu-har-regeringen-beslutat-om-reglerna/">transit passes</a> from July through December. The <a href="https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/ppr/penningpolitiska-rapporter-och-uppdateringar/engelska/2026/monetary-policy-update-november-2026.pdf">Riksbank estimates</a> that without the temporary measures’ direct effects on prices, September inflation would have been 3.0 percent, twice the actual rate.</p><p>Growth continued alongside low inflation. Real GDP grew 1.6 percent, and the European Commission raised its forecast for 2026 growth to <a href="https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-member-states/country-pages-including-country-reports/sweden/economic-forecast-sweden_en">2.8 percent</a>. Household spending, investment, and net exports also lifted growth. The available figures give no separate estimate of how much the relief measures added to output or productivity.</p><p>The labor market recovery has been slower. A labor force <a href="https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/arbetsmarknad/utbud-av-arbetskraft/arbetskraftsundersokningarna-aku/pong/statistiknyhet/arbetskraftsundersokningarna-aku-tredje-kvartalet-2026">survey</a> put trend unemployment at 8.7 percent in the third quarter, even as employment rose. Sweden has also cut support for people in employment programs for more than 300 days. The government expects the cuts to speed up the return to work. But when households on tight budgets cut <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w25417">their spending</a>, local businesses lose sales; and if financial pressure pushes people into jobs that make <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257%2Faer.20150528">poor use</a> of their skills, productivity could suffer. Sweden’s 2026 figures do not yet tell us how large these effects are.</p><p>The <a href="https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/monetary-policy/monetary-policy-report/2026/monetary-policy-decision-november-2026/">Riksbank expects</a> inflation to exceed 2 percent in 2027 as the recovery strengthens and higher energy and import costs feed through. The <a href="https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/c47a389749594fb0982164637dd490ea/finansplan--utdrag-ur-budgetpropositionen-for-2027.pdf">government forecasts</a> 2.8 percent in 2028 when the grocery VAT is due to return to 12 percent. Further disruption in Hormuz, the war in Ukraine, and new trade barriers could also <a href="https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-forecast-and-surveys/economic-forecasts/autumn-2026-economic-forecast-shows-continued-growth-amid-higher-inflation_en">raise costs</a> and weaken demand for Swedish exports.</p><p>Sweden can issue kronor, but what it can buy depends on the fuel, labor, and equipment available. Higher interest rates can slow spending and hiring, but they won’t bring another tanker through Hormuz. Cheaper fares leave commuters with more money in their pockets today, and better public transport gives them a way to use less imported fuel tomorrow.</p><p>A state cannot buy resources that do not exist. But concentrated firms may raise prices before resources run out, while austerity can destroy demand and productive capacity. Inflation reflects pressure on real resources, but power determines who controls them and who pays when prices rise.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/inflation-austerity-oil-class-sweden?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-21T16:23:44.927911Z</published><summary type="text">Inflation policy is a fight over real resources: who controls them, who gets access to them, and who pays when prices rise.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/democratic-socialist-left-movements-history</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/democratic-socialist-left-movements-history"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/129321196741.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/129321196741.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/129321196741.jpg"/><title type="text">Under Capitalism, Socialism Will Never Disappear</title><updated>2026-11-21T15:52:19.004005Z</updated><author><name>Alex McCarron</name></author><category label="Ideas" term="Ideas"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>If socialists and progressives had a good night on November 3, it wasn’t so much because they brought new ideas to the election, but because it was a chance to relitigate fights the Right thought it had won years ago: universal health care, Palestinian solidarity, and the expansion of the labor movement. We even got a rematch between George W. Bush–era Islamophobia and two of the Muslim Americans who had to live in its shadow, Adam Hamawy and Abdul El-Sayed.</p><p>Many have lauded Zohran Mamdani’s novel use of the term “affordability” for the recent shift in political common sense. But while his branding is new, his politics are not. Mamdani has never styled himself as a new kind of politician. He seems to be constantly locating himself in history, comparing himself to Milwaukee’s sewer socialists and New Dealers like Fiorello La Guardia. This makes sense when you consider that his policies represent decades of struggle: the project of expanding democracy into the workplace dates to the late nineteenth century, and the fight to guarantee health care as a right dates to the early twentieth.</p><p>Critics often ask why socialists are bringing a nineteenth-century ideology to bear on twenty-first century problems. The simple answer is that it seems to be what’s working. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, a series of global social movements have sought a new kind of political orientation, one that would allow for a break with the politics of the last century and the historical culs-de-sac they crashed into. Every few years brings a new form of right, center, and left politics: Occupy, Abundance, the Yellow Vests, the Movement of Squares, prison abolitionism. These movements all respond to real problems, but what’s new about them is mostly just branding. Few offer genuinely new critiques or build lasting political constituencies or institutions. Their strength is being novel enough to draw a crowd, drive a news cycle, or launch an academic career. Such innovations move to the same rhythm as capitalism’s own churning drive to simulate invention, revolution, and disruption across the economy.</p><p>At the same time, one sees the appeal. We can’t exactly blame radicals for wanting a disruption of their current institutions. Everywhere you look, leftists are trying to overcome the NGOization of the Left and searching for a common ground between their alienated, specialized critiques. Ecologists want to talk about the environmental catastrophe of the genocide in Gaza, while anti-racists want to connect their work to the extreme weather events that disproportionally effect the Global South. This is the basic drive of left-wing politics: to establish continuities between spheres of knowledge and to build connections between people.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>The 20th Century Never Died</h2></header><div><p>To find that meeting place in socialism is to recognize that what is happening to you has been happening to you for a very long time. Embracing the old language means realizing that you’re settling unfinished business rather than facing a new foe. Comparing the capitalist class to the aristocracy that came before it enables a person to see how arbitrary and contingent ruling-class power really is. One can understand why Bernie Sanders traded loaded terms like “bourgeoisie” and “proletariat” for the “1 percent” and “99 percent.” But it was just as important that he held onto “democratic socialism.” The term signaled that he was continuing a struggle and adding to an existing tradition of critique rather than declaring a year zero for left politics.</p><p>We are likely to be haunted for years by how dynamic, inventive, and exciting the twentieth century was. Every decade brought a new way of dressing, a new style of painting, and new stage in the maturation of cinema and popular music. Our hunger for political novelty is not just a reflection of market forces. It’s also a long shadow of that era of continuous revolution in politics and culture.</p><p>Look closely, though, and you’ll find many of the twentieth-century movements that sought a break with tradition did so while grabbing hold of another tradition buried even deeper in history. Le Corbusier claimed his form of architecture would clear “the charnel house of past ages” that our homes had become, but he did so by marrying the mathematical proportions of the Parthenon to the logic of mass production. As much as Henri Matisse and Pablo Picasso wanted to carry Paul Cézanne’s project into the future, they were also looking for a way to reconnect Western painting to the animism of African sculpture. The French New Wave paid an equally backhanded compliment to the “naive” genre films of Americans like Raoul Walsh and Sam Fuller, whose primitivism could liberate French filmmakers from their own pretensions and refinement.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>As Long as There’s Capitalism, There Will Be Socialists</h2></header><div><p>Even Karl Marx had this moment of paradox. In <cite>The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte</cite>, he writes that “the social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot take its poetry from the past but only from the future.” A few lines later, he quotes the Gospel of Luke 9:60: “Let the dead bury their dead.” Marx was inveighing against the tendency of revolutionaries to reach for the words and costumes of past eras when faced with the task of changing the world: Rome for the French Revolution, the Old Testament for the English Civil War. This awkward LARPing is what turns history’s repetitions into farce. Yet Marx’s famous line about history occurring “first as tragedy, the second time as farce” is itself framed as an amendment to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Even the poetry of the future has a few allusions in it.</p><p>The difference between the French revolutionaries’ idealized Rome and today’s democratic socialism is that socialism is no more a thing of the past than capitalism is. Capitalism constantly calls the concept back into existence, raising its own gravediggers out of the grave, over and over again. As long as capitalism exists, it will exploit workers and destroy the planet, and the masses will find a way to fight back. Our present sits on a much longer timeline than the twenty-four-hour news cycle has accustomed us to. One day we’ll have new words and new costumes, but those belong to a new world, and we’re not there yet.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/democratic-socialist-left-movements-history?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-21T15:52:19.004005Z</published><summary type="text">The Left won the midterms not by inventing a new politics but by reopening old fights the Right thought it had won. As long as capitalism exists, socialism can’t be consigned to the past.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/shaikh-marxian-political-economic-theory</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/shaikh-marxian-political-economic-theory"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/092297346611.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/092297346611.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/092297346611.jpg"/><title type="text">Anwar Shaikh Renewed Marx’s Economic Theory for Our Time</title><updated>2026-11-21T14:57:42.10016Z</updated><author><name>Riccardo Bellofiore</name></author><category label="Economic Science" term="Economic Science"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Anwar Shaikh, who died on October 6, 2026, was one of the most original economists of the last half-century. Few did as much to rescue the Marxian critique of political economy from its theoretical difficulties and develop it into a rigorous, empirically grounded analysis of contemporary capitalism.</p><p>Shaikh’s ambition was extraordinary. He reconstructed classical political economy as an alternative to the neoclassical mainstream, understanding capitalism not as a system tending toward harmonious equilibrium but as a turbulent social order whose normal functioning generates competition, conflict, structural change, and crisis.</p><p>I owe Anwar an immense <a href="https://nsereview.org/index.php/NSER/article/view/119">intellectual debt</a>. For more than fifty years, his writings were a source of inspiration and critical engagement. While our perspectives were never identical, his influence was deeply rooted in my thinking.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>When Marx Was Supposed to Be Dead</h2></header><div><p>I first encountered Anwar’s writings in the mid-1970s. In Italy, where I had studied with Claudio Napoleoni and wrote my dissertation on Rosa Luxemburg, the debate centered on Karl Marx’s theory of value and Piero Sraffa’s criticism of neoclassical economics. The demonstration that prices of production could be determined independently of labor values seemed to many economists to render Marx’s theory redundant. Others retreated into a primarily philosophical defense of Marx, preserving the critique of alienation and fetishism while abandoning much of its economic explanatory content.</p><p>Anwar refused this alternative. In the 1970s and early ’80s, his writings were decisive in restoring Marx as a scientific analyst of capitalism. His contributions on the transformation problem, technological change, international trade, competition, and crisis challenged both the claim that Marx had been superseded by Sraffa and the tendency to reconstruct Marxian political economy using categories borrowed from orthodoxy.</p><p>His celebrated 1974 article, “The Humbug Production Function,” exposed how apparently impressive empirical results could arise from algebraic identities rather than the neoclassical theory they supposedly confirmed. Mathematics, Anwar insisted, could not substitute for an explanation of the social relations underlying economic phenomena.</p><p>His two articles on foreign trade challenged David Ricardo’s understanding of comparative advantage, demonstrating that international competition could reproduce persistent inequalities between nations without requiring monopoly or imperfect competition. His intervention in the transformation controversy showed that Marx’s procedure could be interpreted as the first step in an iterative process leading to prices of production.</p><p>The essential issue was not simply mathematical consistency. Marx was investigating the historically specific relations of capitalist production, the exploitation of workers, and the processes through which accumulation transforms itself. What mattered was to recover and develop this distinctive object of inquiry.</p><p>Anwar’s essays on Maurice Dobb and on the history of crisis theories, both published in 1978, were equally important. He showed that capitalist crises were not accidental departures from equilibrium, because they belonged to the system’s normal movement. To understand capitalist reproduction was simultaneously to understand its interruptions.</p><p>For a generation that had witnessed the collapse of the postwar boom, these arguments were more than academic interventions. They restored confidence that Marxian theory could develop as a living research program rather than survive as a defensive orthodoxy.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>The Turbulence of Capital</h2></header><div><p>Anwar’s reconstruction of <em>real competition</em> was perhaps his most enduring theoretical contribution. From this perspective, competition was neither the harmonious mechanism imagined by neoclassical economics nor something abolished by the concentration of capital. It was a relentless struggle among capitals for profitability and survival.</p><p>As part of this struggle, firms introduced machinery to reduce costs, undercut competitors, and obtain temporary advantages. Successful innovations spread, transforming productive conditions and undermining the advantages that initially motivated them. Decisions that were rational for individual capitalists could have contradictory consequences for capital as a whole. Mechanization, driven by the pursuit of extra profits, could contribute to a declining general rate of profit.</p><p>As Vivek Chibber has reminded us, this view of competition also posed a challenge to the influential monopoly capital tradition associated with Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy. Anwar argued that its claim that concentration had superseded competition rested, paradoxically, on accepting the neoclassical identification of competition with <em>perfect</em> competition.</p><p>This conception was central to my own interpretation of Luxemburg. In my dissertation, completed in 1976, I had explored how technological change emerged from both the antagonism between capital and labor within production and competition among capitals for extra surplus value. These processes could generate problems of realization and insufficient investment, without supporting a theory of capitalism’s inevitable collapse.</p><p>Anwar gave me indispensable analytical tools for developing these insights. Probably, my subsequent reading of his work was more Schumpeterian than he would have accepted. I saw capitalist innovation as a dynamic of endogenous structural transformation that repeatedly displaced existing productive configurations. Anwar was more skeptical of Joseph Schumpeter, whose account he considered insufficiently emancipated from equilibrium thinking.</p><p>My 1985 article on Schumpeter’s monetary theory of development and my 1989 essay, “A Monetary Labor Theory of Value,” developed this difference further. My intellectual formation owed much to Napoleoni as well as Augusto Graziani, Meghnad Desai, and Duncan Foley. For me, Marx’s theory of value was a theory of exploitation within the monetary circuit of capital, not primarily a theory of relative prices.</p><p>I distinguished labor-power from living labor, arriving at the category of living labor-power: the capacity to work inseparable from the human beings who bear it. Its actual expenditure as living labor depends on capitalist command, cooperation, conflict, and resistance.</p><p>Capital cannot purchase a predetermined quantity of living labor as an ordinary commodity. The extraction of surplus labor is contested; new value originates in this process and acquires its social expression in money. Anwar understood exploitation and capitalist command, but our approaches diverged over the connection between labor, value, prices, and money.</p><p>The difference was especially over money. Anwar’s account of real competition and prices of production retained the classical notion of moving centers of gravity and treated money primarily in relation to exchange, prices, and profitability. I drew instead on Schumpeter’s bank-created purchasing power, Graziani’s monetary circuit, and Hyman Minsky’s financing of an uncertain future.</p><p>For me, money is constitutive of capitalist production from the outset: bank finance gives firms command over labor-power before production begins, while sales subsequently validate the value produced. Money as initial finance is not merely money as universal equivalent, nor is financing production identical to financing investment. This did not make Anwar indifferent to credit or finance; it marked a different theoretical starting point.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Different Crises of Different Capitalisms</h2></header><div><p>Our views of capitalist crises were different, but also complementary. Anwar’s distinctive contribution was his theory of profitability crises. Capitalist accumulation, he argued, follows recurrent long rhythms, in which phases of expansion eventually give way to prolonged downturns.</p><p>Beneath shorter business cycles lies the movement of profitability, shaped by real competition, capital-intensive technical change, and the struggle over wages and working conditions. Particular historical shocks operate within these longer movements. For Anwar, the crucial incentive to accumulation was the rate of profit-of-enterprise, the difference between the general rate of profit and the interest rate.</p><p>This distinction was central to his interpretation of the Great Recession, which he called the first great depression of the twenty-first century. The financial collapse of 2007–8 was the trigger, not the underlying cause. But he did not argue that the general rate of profit had simply continued to fall throughout the neoliberal era. On the contrary, he insisted that the attack on labor from the 1980s onward had restrained the decline in profitability, while the dramatic fall in interest rates had raised net profitability and sustained a substantial economic expansion.</p><p>Against this backdrop, cheap credit simultaneously encouraged growing indebtedness and financial speculation. The recovery after the end of the postwar boom in the 1970s was real, but the conditions sustaining it could not be prolonged indefinitely. In his mature reconstruction, Anwar distinguished the normal maximum rate of profit, persistently eroded by capital-intensive technical change, from the normal rate of profit, whose decline could be counteracted by a rising profit share. His account of the neoliberal boom thus gave an essential place to countertendencies, without relinquishing the underlying logic of profitability-driven accumulation.</p><p>I read Marx’s falling rate of profit as a metatheory of crisis, not a law generating identical outcomes in every period. Countertendencies can prevail yet generate new contradictions: rising exploitation may sustain profitability while aggravating realization problems, and struggles over living labor can challenge capitalist command directly.</p><p>My reconstruction suggested a further historical distinction: the nineteenth-century Long Depression and the crisis of the 1970s were both crises of profitability, though arising from different mechanisms; the Great Crash of 1929 and the Great Recession beginning in 2007 revealed instead how the conditions sustaining capitalist expansion could generate crises of realization and financial breakdown.</p><p>Anwar recognized the distinctive historical forms of these crises but sought their underlying unity primarily in the recurrent movements of profitability and accumulation. The crisis of the 1970s was for me not merely a wage squeeze but a crisis of the capital-labor relation itself: a difficulty in extracting the quantity and quality of living labor required by capital.</p><p>The subsequent neoliberal restructuring transformed both production and finance, developing what I called privatized Keynesianism, sustained by asset inflation, private indebtedness, and politically managed monetary policy. Finance did not simply conceal the contradictions of a stagnant capitalism. It helped sustain accumulation and reorganize the conditions under which labor was employed and exploited.</p><p>These were not arguments against Anwar’s theory of competition and profitability. They were attempts to develop a complementary account of how capitalist contradictions take different historical forms.</p><p>Anwar engaged seriously with effective demand, credit, and debt, especially in his writings on Marx, John Maynard Keynes, and Michał Kalecki. Our disagreement was not about profitability versus demand but about how monetary finance, class struggle, and accumulation should be connected in a critique of changing capitalist forms.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>An Expanding Critique of Political Economy</h2></header><div><p>Over time, Anwar’s project expanded from the reconstruction and defense of Marxian political economy into an ambitious alternative framework grounded in classical political economy. Marx remained central, but the wider constellation included Adam Smith, Ricardo, Keynes, Sraffa, Roy Harrod, and Joan Robinson.</p><p>In an autobiographical essay published in 2014, Anwar explicitly characterized his approach to growth as following a “classical-Keynesian-Robinsonian path.” This broadening of his intellectual horizons did not mean abandoning Marx, still less weakening his criticism of capitalism. It expressed his conviction that the classical tradition could provide the foundations for a modern science of capitalist society.</p><p>Empirical investigation had been integral to Anwar’s work from the beginning. With <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/shaikh-obituary-marxist-economics-teaching">E. Ahmet Tonak</a>, he developed a Marxian reconstruction of national income accounts, distinguishing productive and unproductive activities and challenging the seemingly neutral categories of conventional statistics. His research on exchange rates, international inequalities, value-price relations, and profitability similarly connected theoretical arguments with systematic investigation of economic reality.</p><p>Anwar participated in the international conference I organized at Bergamo in 1994, marking the centenary of Friedrich Engels’s publication of the third volume of <cite>Capital</cite>. His contribution, subsequently published in a volume I edited, <cite>Marxian Economics: A Reappraisal</cite>, investigated the empirical strength of the labor theory of value, drawing also on the work of Luigi L. Pasinetti.</p><p>It illustrated a crucial aspect of his intellectual trajectory: Marx’s theory was not merely to be rescued through conceptual reconstruction. Its explanatory propositions had to confront empirical evidence. His association with the Levy Economics Institute, beginning in 1990, further enlarged his research. He engaged with macroeconomic modeling and with approaches related to Wynne Godley’s work without abandoning his classical foundations.</p><p>All this culminated in his monumental <cite>Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises</cite>, a synthesis of decades of research. Few economists have attempted anything comparable. Anwar brought together competition, prices, wages, profitability, investment, effective demand, finance, international trade, and crisis into an integrated alternative to mainstream economic theory.</p><p>Capitalism as he understood it was regulated through turbulence, not by the imaginary perfection of equilibrium markets. His intellectual curiosity remained undiminished: his later research ranged from international trade and exchange rates to econophysics, income distributions, and the measurement of inequality.</p></div></section><section id="sec-5"><header><h2>Perhaps We Are Closer Than We Appear</h2></header><div><p>We met again at a conference in İzmir in October 2014 devoted to the causes of the global crisis. Our discussion returned to a question that had accompanied us for decades: How could Marx’s critique of political economy be developed to account for the transformations of capitalism, drawing on Keynes, Kalecki, and Minsky without losing its theoretical foundations?</p><p>On this occasion, Anwar argued that our differences concerned primarily the movement from abstract categories to concrete capitalist reality. Marx had left his theoretical project unfinished, and subsequent economists had chosen different points at which to depart from it. Money, effective demand, and financial instability required further theoretical development but could not simply be added to Marx from outside.</p><p>Anwar suggested that Keynes, Kalecki, and Minsky could be integrated into an account of accumulation driven by profitability, provided their contributions were critically transformed. He then concluded: “Perhaps we’re much closer than we appear to be.”</p><p>I replied that I agreed with him word for word. My project was not an eclectic combination of Marx and later economists. At the beginning of my presentation, I had insisted on a distinction fundamental to my understanding of Marx: critique is not mere criticism.</p><p>Marx did not simply reject Ricardo’s political economy as false. He appropriated its scientific insights, exposed their limitations, and transformed them within a different theoretical framework.</p><p>The same task confronted us in engaging with subsequent theories and the changing realities of capitalism. This may also explain why, in his later work, Anwar became increasingly comfortable with a classical-Keynesian characterization of his theoretical project.</p></div></section><section id="sec-6"><header><h2>An Unfinished Conversation</h2></header><div><p>Anwar’s intellectual independence was inseparable from his political commitments. He belonged to a generation for whom radical political economy emerged from struggles against war, racism, imperialism, and capitalist exploitation. He rejected both the false neutrality of mainstream economics and the reduction of critical theory to political slogans.</p><p>As E. Ahmet Tonak has movingly recalled, he was also an extraordinary teacher. My MA students in Bergamo organized a reading group on his book, concluding with a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmmqPVZcGvg">video discussion</a> with Anwar. He explained that a theory of capitalism could not emerge merely by adjusting orthodox assumptions: it required different questions and foundations.</p><p>His generosity extended beyond academic life. I remember spending New Year’s Eve with him in 2017, shortly before a difficult period in my life. Our friendship mattered no less than our theoretical projects. We continued to exchange ideas in later years. In 2021, we discussed Sraffa, Marx, and money at considerable length, defending different interpretations while remaining attentive to each other’s arguments.</p><p>At the conclusion of one exchange, Anwar wrote: “No doubt there are other issues on which we differ, but the mutual respect and affection remains. I raise a glass to our meeting again under better conditions.” Unfortunately, it will never happen.</p><p>To me, Anwar’s legacy is not a closed theoretical system. It is an extraordinary example of how the criticism of capitalism can combine scientific rigor, historical understanding, empirical research, intellectual independence, and political commitment.</p><p>For those of us who encountered his work in the 1970s, he helped make it possible to remain faithful to Marx without treating Marxism as an orthodoxy. For younger generations, he demonstrated that an alternative political economy could be developed rather than merely proclaimed.</p><p>I will miss his friendship, his intellectual generosity, and his determination to pursue an idea wherever it led. Our intellectual dialogue will continue, at least in my mind. After more than fifty years of reading his work, I can think of no better way of honoring his memory.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/shaikh-marxian-political-economic-theory?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-21T14:57:42.10016Z</published><summary type="text">Anwar Shaikh was one of the most original economists of the last half-century. Few did as much to rescue the Marxian critique of political economy from its theoretical difficulties and develop it into a rigorous analysis of contemporary capitalism.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/amazon-dsps-drivers-nyc-council</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/amazon-dsps-drivers-nyc-council"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/202141945092.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/202141945092.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/202141945092.jpg"/><title type="text">Amazon Is Ratcheting Up Its Fight With NYC Delivery Drivers</title><updated>2026-11-20T21:14:56.18222Z</updated><author><name>Alex N. Press</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><category label="Work" term="Work"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>New Yorkers opening Amazon’s app on Thursday were greeted with a warning: “NYC Council could add up to $5 per order.” A link invited them to “act now to protect low prices,” directing customers to contact their city council members about legislation that would require Amazon to directly employ its delivery drivers.</p><p>Amazon rolled out the warnings, which also appear on packages delivered in the New York area, as part of its campaign against New York City’s Delivery Protection Act (DPA), which an Amazon-funded coalition has already spent upward of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/06/nyregion/amazon-regulation-mamdani.html">$8 million</a> opposing. Amazon is warning customers that the legislation would put small delivery companies out of business, eliminate jobs, and delay their packages. The company has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-19/amazon-ups-pressure-on-nyc-delivery-bill-with-threat-to-move-out">not explained</a> how it calculated the additional $5 per order.</p><p>The act’s partisans say Amazon’s threats are absurd.</p><p>“The Delivery Protection Act would require companies like Amazon to pay a $500 licensing fee every other year and comply with workplace and public safety regulations,” Councilmember Tiffany Cabán, the bill’s lead sponsor, told <cite>Jacobin</cite>. “It’s simply dishonest to claim that this bill would require them to charge consumers $5 for every delivery. New Yorkers won’t let themselves be bullied by corporations and billionaires.”</p><p>“It’s a slap in the face to hardworking people everywhere,” Tony Rosario, a New York–based organizer for the Teamsters Amazon Division, told me. “You have to have some nerve to try to blame the city council for holding Amazon accountable.” He dismissed the company’s threats to leave the city should the legislation pass. “They’re not leaving New York City,” he said. The city is largely thought to be the company’s biggest market in the country.</p><p>Mayor Zohran Mamdani also responded to the warnings Thursday afternoon. “If Jeff Bezos adds $5 to your order, it’s not because of City Council’s efforts to protect workers’ rights and keep our streets safe,” he <a href="https://x.com/NYCMayor/status/2123512997335466332?s=20">tweeted</a>. “It’s greed.”</p><p>Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash similarly used their apps to campaign for California’s Proposition 22 in 2020, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-11-13/how-uber-lyft-doordash-won-proposition-22">spending</a> more than $200 million to pass a measure allowing them to continue treating drivers as independent contractors.</p><p>The legislation Amazon is fighting in New York would change who employs its sprawling delivery-driver workforce. Cabán’s <a href="https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?GUID=BDDD32F1-1178-492D-80F2-205845356FD2&amp;ID=7879110">bill</a> would require operators of last-mile delivery facilities to employ their drivers and warehouse workers directly. Amazon currently contracts out much of that work to smaller companies known as Delivery Service Partners (DSPs). The bill would also impose licensing, safety, and training requirements on delivery facilities, with protections for workers whose jobs are affected by the change.</p><p>Thirty-four of the fifty-one City Council members have signed on as sponsors, and Mayor Mamdani supports the bill. Council Speaker Julie Menin, however, has yet to bring it to a vote. Councilmembers are negotiating changes to the legislation, including whether to retain the ban on subcontracting, which Amazon is particularly determined to defeat.</p><p>When the company began planning its own delivery network in 2013, executives worried that entering the transportation business would expose it to organized labor.</p><p>“A primary concern was whether getting into the transportation business would expose them to unions,” executives involved in those discussions told journalist Brad Stone. When Amazon launched the DSP program several years later, it could run its own delivery network while leaving the drivers on someone else’s payroll.</p><p>The Teamsters have spent years fighting to establish that Amazon is a joint employer of those drivers and therefore has to bargain with their union. Amazon has threatened to challenge the DPA in court, and the bill is now fueling a steady stream of criticism in the right-wing <cite>New York Post</cite>. But the legislation could still pass without the requirement that Amazon directly employ its drivers.</p><p>The current version of the bill would spare workers years of litigation at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to establish that Amazon is their employer and therefore must bargain with their union. That wouldn’t guarantee a collective bargaining agreement, but it would eliminate one of the company’s principal defenses against unionization.</p><p>Amazon has funded its multimillion-dollar lobbying and advertising campaign through the Five Borough Jobs Campaign, which operates publicly as New York Delivers. Its advertisements feature DSP owners and drivers warning that the legislation would eliminate small businesses and raise prices. Amazon <a href="https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/policy-news-views/amazon-testimony-delivery-protection-act-new-york-city">says</a> that more than forty DSPs in New York City employ over five thousand workers whose jobs could be threatened if the companies were prohibited from contracting with Amazon. The company has also raised the possibility of moving delivery facilities outside city limits.</p><p>The Teamsters’ Rosario said the concern is misplaced — and that the bill could help DSP owners too. “They’re being squeezed just as much as their employees are,” he said.</p><p>DSP owners are responsible for maintaining and repairing vehicles and bear much of the responsibility when drivers are injured or involved in accidents. Under the existing arrangement, Rosario said, DSPs serve as a “scapegoat” for the company.</p><p>Opposition to the bill includes the city’s chambers of commerce and the National Urban League, which has argued that the legislation would particularly harm black-owned delivery businesses. Amazon is <a href="https://nul.org/basic-page/partners-0">listed</a> among the organization’s highest-tier corporate donors, a category representing contributions of at least $1 million.</p><p>On November 16, the National Urban League and the Amazon-backed New York Delivers coalition threatened <a href="https://www.cityandstateny.com/policy/2026/11/amazon-national-urban-league-threaten-sue-city-if-delivery-protection-act-passes/417239/">legal action</a> if the bill passes in its current form. Their attorney argued that the legislation conflicts with federal and state law. An earlier memo prepared by Brendan McGuire, an attorney at WilmerHale retained by the Amazon-funded Five Borough Jobs Campaign, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/06/nyregion/amazon-regulation-mamdani.html">argued</a> that the bill could violate federal restrictions on local regulation of motor carriers.</p><p>Menin, who supported an earlier version of the bill, has held off on backing the current one. She has raised concerns about potential job losses, higher prices for consumers, and whether the legislation would survive a legal challenge. A spokesman for the Mamdani administration’s Law Department <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/06/nyregion/amazon-regulation-mamdani.html">told</a> <cite>The New York Times</cite> that he was confident the final legislation would withstand legal scrutiny.</p><p>The <cite>Times</cite> also reported that Menin has considered a version of the bill that would license and regulate delivery warehouses without requiring Amazon to directly employ its drivers, though she has not ruled out retaining the subcontracting ban. The <cite>New York Post</cite> <a href="https://nypost.com/2026/11/16/business/nyc-uses-twice-as-many-delivery-contractors-as-amazon-does-data-shows-even-as-city-weighs-crackdown">reports</a> that councilmembers are considering requiring warehouse operators to own the delivery vehicles currently owned or leased by contractors. Other details are still being negotiated, including how large a warehouse must be to fall under the law. Sources familiar with the negotiations expect the text to be finalized next week.</p><p>“Direct employment is one of the most important provisions of the bill,” Rosario said. He said there had been some discussion of exceptions for truly independent contractors but was adamant that Amazon shouldn’t be exempt from the direct-employment requirement. “There’s no way they’re getting around that language,” he said.</p><p>Menin has insisted that the council will regulate Amazon while protecting jobs and consumer prices. On Thursday, she <a href="https://x.com/SpeakerMenin/status/2123453950821093704?s=20">criticized</a> the company’s new direct appeals to customers.</p><p>“It defies logic that Amazon, a $3 trillion corporation, would raise New Yorkers’ cost of living if it’s forced to adhere to basic regulations and worker protections,” she wrote on X. “We are crafting legislation that regulates Amazon and protects workers, without impacting prices or jobs.”</p><p>“If Amazon thinks this deceptive campaign will effectively threaten New Yorkers and intimidate this City Council, they are dead wrong,” she added.</p><p>The Teamsters <a href="https://x.com/Teamsters/status/2123499513470124183?s=20">called</a> Amazon’s warnings to customers “extortion by one of the richest corporations in human history” and accused the company of caring about neither its workers nor its customers.</p><p>The legislation has attracted support from across New York City’s labor movement, including the Central Labor Council, the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, the Hotel and Gaming Trades Council, and the New York Taxi Workers Alliance. On October 22, hundreds of Amazon workers and Teamsters <a href="https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/10/23/union-calls-on-speaker-menin-to-pass-mamdani-backed-delivery-bill-but-shes-not-ready">rallied</a> outside city hall, joined by representatives of other unions, Mayor Zohran Mamdani, and Teamsters President Sean O’Brien. O’Brien accused Menin of failing to keep her promise to bring the bill to a vote.</p><p>“Keep your promises; don’t fall in love with corporate America,” O’Brien said. “Speaker Menin, you need to do what the people want — the people that put you where you’re at.”</p><p>The campaign has extended well beyond the rally, with New York City Democratic Socialists of America (NYC-DSA) playing a central role alongside Teamsters Local 804. NYC-DSA has put its electoral canvassing operation to work on the bill, organizing phone banks and sending volunteers door-to-door. By October, they had <a href="https://indypendent.org/2026/10/dsa-teamsters-amazon-workers-fight-to-pass-the-delivery-protection-act/">knocked</a> on more than 11,000 doors and helped bring three councilmembers on as sponsors. In Menin’s Upper East Side district alone, more than 100 volunteers knocked on 2,500 doors in a single day.</p><p>Mamdani has <a href="https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/11/11/wednesdays-headlines-the-phantom-menin-edition">continued</a> campaigning for the legislation, too. At the October rally, he pointed to the contradiction at the center of Amazon’s employment arrangements.</p><p>“When a driver wears an Amazon vest, drives an Amazon van, [and] follows a route Amazon set and Amazon insists that driver does not work for them, what is that if not exploitation?” he said.</p><p>When <a href="https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/11/transcript--mayor-mamdani-hosts-gaggle">reporters asked</a> Mamdani about the possibility of dropping the ban on subcontracting and passing a narrower bill, he rejected the idea.</p><p>“I don’t think that we need to have a conversation about a new bill,” he said. “I think we have all of the answers in the bill as it currently stands.”</p><p>When I spoke with Julie Su, Mamdani’s deputy mayor for economic justice and the former acting US secretary of labor, about the bill earlier this year, she described Amazon’s arrangement as “a business model built on getting all the benefits of labor while disclaiming any responsibility for it.”</p><p>“It is an end run around a century of labor protections that have been fought for and won,” she said.</p><p>Su also took issue with Amazon’s warnings that the bill would cost workers their jobs.</p><p>“It is an age-old argument by corporations who have profited massively off the backs of exploited workers, to say that working people only have two choices: a really bad job in which you’re struggling to get by, or no job at all,” she told me. “We reject that as a false choice.”</p><p>Amazon has itself put drivers out of work by cutting ties with DSPs whose employees unionized. Last year in Queens, 105 drivers at Cornucopia Logistics lost their jobs when Amazon canceled its contract with the company. The drivers had organized with the Teamsters and accused Amazon of retaliating against them. Amazon denied it.</p><p>In Palmdale, California, Amazon <a href="https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-07-28/a-strike-by-amazon-contract-drivers-is-heating-up">cut ties</a> with Battle-Tested Strategies, a contractor whose eighty-four drivers had <a href="https://jacobin.com/2023/08/unionized-amazon-delivery-drivers-subcontractors-service-partner-working-conditions">organized</a> with the Teamsters in 2023. The NLRB later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/amazon-hit-with-us-labor-board-complaint-over-joint-employment-drivers-2024-10-02/">accused Amazon</a> of illegally ending the contract and refusing to bargain. Drivers at another Amazon contractor in Skokie, Illinois, <a href="https://patch.com/illinois/skokie/amazon-drivers-strike-over-labor-violations-skokie-station">struck</a> in 2024, alleging retaliation for organizing. Amazon denied retaliating against union supporters.</p><p>The DSP arrangement has also cost New York workers jobs when union organizing wasn’t involved. Last week, the company <a href="https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/11/12/as-nyc-debates-amazons-delivery-model-its-partner-fires-200-e-bike-workers">terminated</a> its relationship with Kaizen Management Solutions, a Manhattan contractor whose employees deliver Amazon packages on electric cargo bikes. Roughly two hundred workers learned that their employment would end November 18. Amazon said it had discovered safety violations and fraud involving the recording of drivers’ hours; some workers disputed that explanation.</p><p>“This DSP model is about Amazon’s bottom line,” one worker <a href="https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/11/13/council-speaker-slams-amazon-for-delivery-worker-layoffs">told</a> <cite>Streetsblog</cite>. “The model that allegedly creates jobs just laid off 200 people right before the holidays.”</p><p>“I wish I could tell you I have another thing lined up but I don’t,” he added. “They didn’t even give me a month to figure it out.”</p><p>Rosario met Kaizen’s owner, Ezra Tilaye, at a Teamsters picket outside the Delancey Street facility earlier this week. Tilaye, who is from Guyana, seemed as blindsided by Amazon’s decision as the workers. One driver Rosario spoke with had been on the job for only three days; another had just been promoted to dispatcher. Rosario took that as evidence that Tilaye hadn’t known the contract was about to be terminated. For Rosario, the layoffs made a mockery of Amazon’s campaign to defend small businesses, particularly those owned by minorities.</p><p>“Are you protecting small businesses, or do you just not care and are pretending otherwise?” he asked.</p><p>Menin called the layoffs “terrible” and <a href="https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2026/11/13/council-speaker-slams-amazon-for-delivery-worker-layoffs">said</a> that the city would regulate Amazon “in a very significant way.”</p><p>Amazon may not need to defeat the bill outright. The majority of councilmembers have signed on, but negotiations could still strip out the requirement that Amazon employ its drivers directly. Similar legislation has already been introduced <a href="https://www.fox32chicago.com/news/amazon-delivery-could-change-in-chicago-under-proposed-ordinance.amp">in Chicago</a>, and worker advocates want to pursue it in other cities. What survives the negotiations in New York could shape those efforts elsewhere.</p><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/amazon-dsps-drivers-nyc-council?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-20T21:14:56.18222Z</published><summary type="text">Amazon is warning New Yorkers that a bill making it easier for delivery drivers to unionize will cost jobs and raise prices. The company has already put hundreds of drivers out of work by cutting ties with its contractors.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/huang-scandal-tech-ai-china-hawks</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/huang-scandal-tech-ai-china-hawks"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/775936336079.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/775936336079.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/775936336079.jpg"/><title type="text">The Jensen Huang Scandal: A Gift to China Hawks and AI Giants</title><updated>2026-11-20T19:31:05.857202Z</updated><author><name>Branko Marcetic</name></author><category label="State" term="State"/><category label="Science and Technology" term="Science and Technology"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Often, when people cheat on their spouses, they get kicked out of the house and strain their families. Not many can say they wiped out <a href="https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/article-914519">$1.8 trillion</a> worth of share value and made the economy wobble.</p><p>Yet this is exactly the case with ousted Nvidia chief executive officer Jensen Huang and the scandal surrounding his various infidelities, including to a woman who is allegedly a Chinese spy. (Or is she?)</p><p>The uncertainty around that question is part of the general murkiness of this entire affair (no pun intended), one tied into a knot of three separate political threads: the economy’s outsize reliance on the artificial intelligence industry, ruthless corporate anti-competition, and the simmering new Cold War with China.</p><p>While Huang had a number of infidelities, it’s his affair with business executive Alice Huang that is central to both the global attention this has drawn and to his ouster from the company he had founded over a Denny’s meal with only $40,000 of capital, thanks to his paramour’s alleged role as a spy for the Ministry of State Security, roughly China’s equivalent to the Central Intelligence Agency. Even as the infractions piled up, it’s hard to imagine Huang — a widely <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/silicon-valley-is-still-defending-jensen-huang/">admired</a>, politically connected CEO who <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/nvidia-employees-overwhelmingly-want-huang-154045045.html">commanded</a> intense <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/business/article/bjipnj40mx">loyalty</a> from his employees — being pushed out of his own company over infidelity if not for the possibility, leaked to the press, that he fell for a Chinese government honey trap.</p><p>So it’s notable that no one seems to really know whether or not Alice Huang truly <em>was</em> a spy. CNN <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/11/12/politics/alice-huang-us-intel-jensen-huang-nvidia">reports</a> that US intelligence agencies aren’t actually sure, with some officials viewing media reports alleging that she is as overstating the reality. At the same time, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2026/11/16/trump-unsure-chinese-spy-nvidia-ceo-jensen-huang/92808383007/">Donald Trump</a>, Vice President <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/media/jd-vance-trump-dont-know-alice-huang-chinese-spy">J. D. Vance</a>, and Attorney General <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-justice-department-has-not-concluded-alice-huang-was-chinese-spy-blanche-says-2026-11-12/">Todd Blanche</a> have all publicly claimed uncertainty about this central allegation. The Singaporean government went out of its way to <a href="https://www.mha.gov.sg/media-room/newsroom/clarification-statement-on-wall-street-journals-article/">explicitly deny</a> <cite>The</cite> <cite>Wall Street Journal’s</cite> reporting that its officials had been concerned about her alleged spying for Beijing and investigated it.</p><p>Most explosively, <cite>T</cite><em>he</em> <cite>Washington Post</cite> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2026/11/13/behind-jensen-huangs-spy-scandal-shadow-war-trumps-ear-china/">reported</a> that the spy claim came from one official in particular: China hawk Marco Rubio, who personally reshaped the CIA’s more ambiguous intelligence into a memo forcefully making the spy allegation and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/08/us/politics/rubio-nvidia-ceo-chinese-spy.html">circulated</a> it around the administration all the way back in May, to little effect.</p><p>Let’s take a moment now to note how odd it is that the details of that memo then somehow made their way to the press. Let’s also take a moment to note how odd it is that neither this administration, which has zealously investigated and thrown the book at leakers, nor Rubio, who has <a href="https://www.facebook.com/FoxNews/posts/some-of-your-intelligence-sources-are-liars-others-are-liars-and-criminalssecret/1652311590092030/">called</a> leakers “criminals” and <a href="https://floridapolitics.com/archives/534827-marco-rubio-bill-proposes-serious-penalties-for-scotus-leakers/">once tried</a> to throw some in prison for a decade, seem to particularly care about this leak.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>A Win for Hawks</h2></header><div><p>So what exactly is going on here? It’s too early to say for sure. But one thing we <em>can</em> say with certainty is that Huang was long given the side-eye by Washington’s China hawks owing to his unabashed advocacy for doing business with China, his closeness with the president, and the fact that he had used that closeness to get Trump to let Nvidia <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/11/19/nvidia-amd-china-chip-sales-congress.html">skirt</a> US export controls and sell its chips to China. For those hawks, who Huang publicly <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0w2JKqjByDI">lambasted</a> as carrying a “badge of shame,” this was a grave offense and a threat to national security, with the possibility that China could use the advanced chips to win the “AI race” that this crowd is obsessed with.</p><p>Another certainty is that these same hawks have wasted no time in seizing on the affair to push for harder-line policies against China, at a time when Trump had been <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3374969/xi-trump-ties-tested-calls-grow-washington-tougher-china-policy">edging</a> toward a more conciliatory posture with the country, <a href="https://sigur.elliott.gwu.edu/2026/07/24/7-2-2026-trumps-china-thaw-will-hit-a-washington-wall/">drawing</a> growing pushback from Washington. The Trump administration has now tightened export controls on AI chips in the wake of this scandal, and a consensus is now e<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/speaker-johnson-says-congress-developing-consensus-limiting-chip-exports-china-2026-11-12/">merging</a> in Congress to go beyond this. China hawks are making a renewed push to tighten them even further, with parts of a fourth bill doing so now set to be <a href="https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2026/11/18/congress/remote-access-chip-provisions-in-play-for-defense-package-01174329">added</a> to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2027.</p><p>Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, <a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/11/11/trump-lutnick-nvidia-china-chip-export-controls%20">reportedly</a> the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/15/us/politics/trump-lutnick-ai-chips-nvidia-cantor-fitzgerald.html">main figure</a> within the administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/12/us/politics/lutnick-nvidia-commerce-china-chips.html">resisting</a> a crackdown on the export of Nvidia chips, is being publicly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2026/11/16/fight-between-bessent-lutnick-over-nvidia-chips-heats-up/">undermined</a> by one of his own fellow cabinet members, facing the <a href="https://abcnews.com/Politics/house-senate-republicans-call-howard-lutnick-jensen-huang/story?id=138111390">possibility</a> of being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/nov/18/howard-lutnick-nvidia-cantor-fitzgerald">investigated</a>, and may see his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/republican-senator-urges-ban-chinese-chipmaker-cxmt-us-market-2026-11-12/">head roll</a> over the episode, all as lawmakers <a href="https://x.com/mkraju/status/2122291078380589381">demand</a> he clamp down on the chip exports. China hawks “are thrilled right now” and are “gonna win the day,” one Trump official <a href="https://www.washingtonsun.com/whitehouse/marco-rubio-jensen-huang-outreach-scandal">told</a> <cite>T</cite><em>he</em> <cite>Washington Sun</cite>, while an economist who backs the stricter controls told the outlet that with Lutnick and Nvidia “sidelined, the center of gravity has shifted to Rubio-world,” since they “were the main opposition to any sort of export controls.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>A Win for AI Monopolists</h2></header><div><p>China hawks aren’t the only ones who stand to benefit from Huang’s ouster. The battle over China’s access to high-end AI chips is, in part, a proxy for a whole other battle being fought within the industry.</p><p>The removal of Huang is viewed as a blow to the movement behind open-source AI models — those that the general public can download and tinker with, as opposed to closed-source models like OpenAI’s ChatGPT or Anthropic’s Claude, where the developer has exclusive control but chooses to make the model available for public use. Open-source models also happen to be mostly the kind developed by Chinese companies, whose cheaper models US companies are increasingly <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/07/chinese-ai-models-costs-us-openai-anthropic.html">turning to</a>.</p><p>Huang also happened to be a <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2026/11/16/1148624/the-open-source-movement-wants-jensen-huang-back/">major</a> <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2026/11/12/hugging-face-ceo-vows-to-keep-fighting-for-open-source-ai-after-jensen-huangs-exit/">champion</a> for — and, more importantly, financial backer of — such models, probably because the proliferation of more AI models also <a href="https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3374376/will-jensen-huangs-downfall-tip-scales-against-open-source-ai">means</a> more business for Nvidia. One venture capitalist who invested in some of the same start-ups as Nvidia <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/418ca885-fbcf-4b9f-a8b9-2bd60b543fc5?syn-25a6b1a6=1%20">told</a> the <cite>Financial Times</cite> that Huang getting the boot means “we may end up in a much more concentrated world of model providers.”</p><p>That put him at odds with companies like OpenAI and Anthropic, whose commercial interest lies in trying to dominate the AI market and <em>preventing</em> the spread of open-source models that would make people less reliant on their products. Anthropic has long been an outspoken <a href="https://www.anthropic.com/news/securing-america-s-compute-advantage-anthropic-s-position-on-the-diffusion-rule">proponent</a> of the export controls on AI chips that Huang chafed against, <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/technology/ai/articles/anthropic-breaks-major-tech-group-183505062.html">breaking</a> from other industry players over the issue by backing the three restrictionist bills included in the NDAA for 2027.</p><p>OpenAI, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/20/openai-ai-chips-china-nvidia-01127385">pulled back</a> on its advocacy for export controls, both as Huang’s dealmaking saw it become more financially intertwined with Nvidia and to align more closely with Trump as he came under Huang’s influence, costing China hawks what they had counted as an important industry ally. But Huang’s ouster has “loosened them up a bit,” a source <a href="https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2026/11/12/congress/openai-tells-congressional-offices-it-supports-key-chip-export-control-bills-01162641">told</a> <cite><a href="https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2026/11/12/congress/openai-tells-congressional-offices-it-supports-key-chip-export-control-bills-01162641">Politico</a></cite>, with OpenAI now back to arguing in favor of those same three export control bills in the defense authorization bill for next year.</p><p>In fact, it goes much further than this. Because filings show that both of these closed-source firms have thrown a small mountain of money into lobbying various arms of the federal government on this issue, including the very two organs — the State Department and the National Security Council (NSC) — that happen to be headed by Marco Rubio, China-hawk-in-chief and the main figure responsible for the spy claims about Huang’s mistress.</p><p>Starting from the third quarter of this year, dating from July to the end of September — the period that came after Rubio reportedly circulated his spy allegation memo in May — OpenAI <a href="https://lda.gov/filings/public/filing/81e83fa3-9a11-4cbd-be37-3032cb4696f4/print/">spent</a> a whopping $1.5 million lobbying on issues that included “foreign AI capabilities and national-security risks,” lining up with <cite>Politico’s</cite> <a href="https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2026/11/12/congress/openai-tells-congressional-offices-it-supports-key-chip-export-control-bills-01162641">reporting</a> that the firm had started voicing its support for export controls to Congress in recent months. This was a notable shift from 2025: that year, OpenAI’s in-house lobbying outfit had spent substantially less than this amount per quarter and hadn’t lobbied the State Department, nor does that phrase appear as a lobbying issue in that year’s filings.</p><p>In other words, it’s not just that OpenAI started pushing for restricting the export of chips right after Rubio circulated his questionable memo linking Nvidia’s CEO to Chinese spying, and that it was that CEO’s removal that had “loosened them up” to do it. They also lobbied Rubio’s own department, and did it just months before that memo mysteriously leaked to the press, forcing his ouster.</p><p>There is a similar pattern with the other closed-source AI giant, Anthropic, which, in that same July-to-September period paid several Trumpworld lobbying firms to work on this matter.</p><p>One was Navigators Global, which that very same quarter started <a href="https://lda.gov/filings/public/filing/7b077098-cf19-45e1-a46c-f609c31f41de/print/">lobbying</a> Congress on behalf of the AI firm on the export control provisions in the NDAA. Navigators Global’s <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-influence/2024/12/24/trump-transition-alum-joins-navigators-global-00196012">cofounder</a> happened to be Rubio’s very first chief of staff when he was a senator, while one of the lobbyists who worked on this issue is Andy Keiser, who for fourteen years <a href="https://fedsoc.org/bio/andy-keiser">served</a> in various roles for ex-congressman Mike Rogers, the Trump ally who ran for Michigan’s Senate seat this year and in 2024.</p><p>Sit for a moment with the fact that Anthropic was pushing this issue using a lobbying firm closely connected to the very figure arguably most responsible for driving Huang’s ouster.</p><p>It’s a similar case with Ballard Partners, founded by a longtime Florida lobbyist who <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/jeb-bush-fundraiser-brian-ballard-defects-over-rubio-attacks-n458366">counts</a> Rubio as a friend and where Trump’s recently ousted chief of staff Susie Wiles was <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2025/04/21/ballard-lobbying-trump-revenues-00301056">managing partner</a> for years before joining up with Trump in 2019 — a firm so connected that one departed Trump official has <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/susie-wiles-ballard-partners-trump-maga-feud/">charged</a> it “controlled” White House policy. In the third quarter, it started <a href="https://lda.gov/filings/public/filing/62079cf1-23ea-4988-918e-c690b0f61217/print/">lobbying</a> for Anthropic on “advocacy regarding US policy regarding AI” to the tune of $380,000, including at Rubio’s NSC, for which it employed two recently departed Trump national security personnel, one of whom had just worked at Rubio’s State Department.</p><p>Another specifically Rubio-connected lobbying firm used by Anthropic for this was Continental Strategy, one of whose <a href="https://www.continentalstrategy.com/alberto-martinez">managing partners</a> is Alberto Martinez — a “trusted advisor” to Rubio who worked in various roles for the former senator over the course of a decade, including chief of staff and senior strategist on his first Senate race — and which <a href="https://www.jacksonville.com/story/news/politics/2024/11/08/susie-wiles-daughter-katie-promoted-at-continental-strategy/76137658007/">promoted</a> Wiles’s daughter a day after Trump hired her. Martinez was among the lobbyists Continental used to lobby agencies that included Rubio’s NSC (from April to the end of June) and then Rubio’s State Department (in this just-passed third quarter) on “AI development and national security,” for which it was paid a total of $300,000 by Anthropic for these periods. Both Ballard and Continental’s roles were first <a href="https://www.zerohedge.com/political/anthropic-paid-rubios-ex-chief-staffs-firm-740000-after-jensen-memo-it-lobbied-his-nsc">reported</a> by <cite>ZeroHedge</cite>, but this is based on my own separate analysis of Anthropic’s 2026 lobbying disclosures.</p><p>It’s remarkable that at the same time the interests of Rubio-led China hawks and firms like Anthropic were crossing over, the company was literally employing Rubio’s own former loyalists to lobby the government bodies he was in charge of.</p><p>This is on top of the $230,000 that Anthropic paid over the past year’s three quarters to Fierce Government Relations — a firm with a <a href="https://www.fiercegr.com/our-team/">couple</a> of Trump-connected employees — to lobby Congress and the Office of the President on export controls and the NDAA bills; another $180,000 over the same period to Aquia for the same issues; $60,000 to the Democratic firm Avenue Solutions to lobby Congress on the NDAA starting in the third quarter; and the nearly $6 million it spent in-house in that period to lobby on issues that included these topics. In that last case, it used a longtime staffer of Sen. Patty Murray, who had been <a href="https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/icymi-senator-coons-leads-senior-democrats-accusing-trump-of-failing-to-stand-up-to-china/">demanding</a> in recent months that Trump impose these stricter export controls.</p><p>So in summary, the two closed-source AI firms that view China’s AI industry as a threat to their own bottom line have done the following: lobbied heavily for these China-squeezing export controls this year; appear to have in some cases ramped up their lobbying on this after Rubio circulated the sensational but unproven claim that led to Huang’s booting; hired former staffers from Trumpworld to do that lobbying; and in particular, hired lobbying firms and used lobbyists with long-standing connections to Rubio specifically to do it.</p><p>The picture that emerges is of the unmistakable — some might say convenient — convergence of interests between Washington’s China hawks and AI giants, and the downright eerie overlap between the offices and personnel of what are in theory meant to be two different entities. Even more convenient, all of this has come to a head just as one of these AI giants, Anthropic, was set to embark on its initial public offering, which it did yesterday, raising $81 billion in the largest stock-market debut on record.</p><p>Like I said: convenient.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>A Bet Without Consent</h2></header><div><p>Less convenient is another thing we can say for sure, which is that, Anthropic’s blockbuster IPO aside, this entire saga is causing heart rates to spike.</p><p>That’s because Nvidia — and, owing to his domination of the company and personal role in every deal it struck, Huang himself — is a load-bearing force for an industry straining to stay standing up, passing out the necessary capital for flagship AI firms, start-ups, the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/17/nvidia-financing-open-ai-data-center-ohio.html">building</a> of data centers, and the neo-cloud firms that provide the computing power for firms that can’t build their own. In fact, Nvidia effectively came to the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/janakirammsv/2026/10/21/nvidia-backs-1645-billion-of-ai-data-centers-to-keep-gpus-selling/">rescue</a> of one of those neo-clouds, CoreWeave, when its bonds recently entered distressed territory after skeptical investors started dumping the company’s debt en masse.</p><p>Huang’s ouster throws the industry into uncertainty as it waits to see, first, if any one person is able to actually fill Huang’s shoes, and second, if the person who does has the same kind of appetite for risk that he did. So far, indications are that the interim CEO <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/colette-kress-cfo-who-challenged-huangs-bets-is-nvidias-interim-ceo-2026-11-13/">does not</a>, and with the firm about to be dragged through an acre of thorns in the form of congressional hearings and other scrutiny, it would not be surprising if it embarks on a more conservative approach going forward.</p><p>That doesn’t necessarily mean that the AI industry is headed toward an imminent crash. But this is all spectacularly bad timing given the spate of setbacks and growing investor doubts it’s been weathering, the last one being an incoming US Congress dominated by politicians who ran and won on restricting the data centers that AI firms need to keep being built to stay financially viable.</p><p>At this point, you might stop to marvel at the absurdity that — because of the way we’ve structured our economy, the way it’s intertwined with US foreign policy, and the corrupting distortion of the Washington revolving door and influence-peddling — one man’s horniness <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c68798vdprwpo">threatens</a> to bring down the US economy and ramp up conflict between two nuclear-armed powers. It’s just one of several layers of absurdity to a situation and industry that, without ever being consulted on it, we have all as a society been roped into staking our collective future on.</p><p>Huang is not the first or last CEO who will have a personal scandal that can be exploited by shadowy forces with their own ulterior motives. But because of the nature of the AI industry, whichever executive draws embarrassing headlines next, it’s gossip that we’re all going to have to care deeply about.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/huang-scandal-tech-ai-china-hawks?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-20T19:31:05.857202Z</published><summary type="text">The exact truth behind Jensen Huang’s ouster from Nvidia remains murky. But one thing’s for sure: it’s been a huge boon to China hawks like Marco Rubio and other enormous AI firms.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/billionaire-tax-tech-wealth-control</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/billionaire-tax-tech-wealth-control"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/864475424262.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/864475424262.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/864475424262.jpg"/><title type="text">Billionaires Always Want to Maintain Control</title><updated>2026-11-20T17:54:53.439161Z</updated><author><name>Sophie Bandarkar</name></author><category label="Inequality" term="Inequality"/><category label="Policy" term="Policy"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>In October, Meta released a <a href="https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001326801/000162828026066710/meta-20261021.htm">filing</a> saying that Mark Zuckerberg had threatened to leave California in anticipation of <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/california-ballot-measures-billionaires-taxation-inequality">Proposition 40</a>, the billionaire wealth tax on the 2026 state ballot, which was <a href="https://calmatters.org/politics/elections/2026/11/prop-40-billionaire-tax-defeated/">defeated</a> 53 to 47 percent. According to the document, Zuckerberg told the board he was “evaluating relocating his primary residence outside California,” and that any steps toward doing so, including listing his residential real estate on the market, “would be public and inevitably noted and commented upon by company employees.”</p><p>In response, the board quickly mobilized to negotiate a deal: Meta agreed to issue a new class of nonvoting (“Class C”) stock, which will be <a href="https://fortune.com/2026/10/21/zuckerberg-meta-california-wealth-tax-billions-class-c-stock/">distributed</a> to all shareholders in January 2027. This would have allowed Zuckerberg to sell his shares to convert a portion of his wealth into the billions in cash he would need to meet his potential tax liability, without losing his near-supermajority voting share. In exchange, he agreed to stay in the state for at least eight years and keep his $1 annual salary.</p><p>Conveniently, the new stock will also allow Meta to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mark-zuckerberg-california-billionaire-wealth-tax/">raise capital</a> for artificial intelligence investments without changing the decision-making composition of the company. In the fallout of the proposition’s defeat, it’s useful to reflect on what the Meta deal can help us understand for the long-term movement to tax the ultrarich’s wealth.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>What Proposition 40 Was</h2></header><div><p>Prop 40 was designed as a onetime 5 percent tax, payable over five years, on the net worth of California residents with over $1 billion who lived in the state as of January 1, 2026. The proposition was written by legal and economics faculty and introduced by the health care workers’ union Service Employees International Union-United Healthcare Workers (SEIU-UHW). The goal of the tax was to raise around $100 billion, which would offset roughly 90 percent of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/11/09/california-proposition-40-wealth-tax-billionaires-live-election-results/">federal budget cuts</a> to health programs, including Medi-Cal, since the beginning of the second Trump administration — and in particular, since the <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/ballot-measures-billionaire-tax-abortion-divestment">passing</a> of the 2025 “Big Beautiful Bill,” which takes effect this January.</p><p>According to <a href="https://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/BSZ2026.pdf">research</a> by economists Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, California’s billionaire wealth reached around $2.3 trillion by mid-2026, which is roughly equal to the total income reported by every Californian in a year. This wealth is both extremely concentrated and recent: it’s increased by 144 percent in just three years. The approximately 250 billionaires who would qualify only pay about 0.2 percent of their wealth in California income tax each year, representing 2.4 percent of total California income tax revenue. The four richest billionaires, Larry Page, Sergey Brin, Mark Zuckerberg, and Jensen Huang, pay only 0.07 percent of their wealth.</p><p>If Proposition 40 had passed, it would have been the first tax of its kind and the culmination of decades of advocacy by policymakers and researchers across the world working to expose how dramatically economic inequality has grown and the degree of billionaires’ tax avoidance. This is particularly salient in California, the <a href="https://www.gov.ca.gov/2026/10/05/californias-economy-continues-to-dominate-topping-4-5-t-in-economic-output-and-remains-the-worlds-fourth-largest-economy/">fourth-largest</a> economy in the world and home to <a href="https://www.gov.ca.gov/2025/06/04/california-leads-the-nation-again-with-most-fortune-500-companies/">fifty-eight</a> of the Fortune 500 companies. Companies in the Bay Area alone represent <a href="https://www.facebook.com/McKinsey/videos/companies-headquartered-in-the-bay-area-region-now-represent-35-of-the-market-ca/965745179629254/">35 percent</a> of the market cap of the world’s top hundred companies. This makes the state an ideal place to experiment with taxing the ultrawealthy.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Why It Failed</h2></header><div><p>The initiative failed for myriad, well-documented reasons. Primarily, it faced a concerted and incredibly well-funded opposition campaign. Its opponents, mostly ultrawealthy donors, spent <a href="https://calmatters.org/politics/elections/2026/11/prop-40-billionaire-tax-defeated/">$378.4 million</a> against the measure (compared to the yes campaign’s budget of $33.5 million). Google cofounder and Donald Trump supporter Sergey Brin alone donated $102 million, and also funded two additional Propositions (41 and 42) designed to block the tax if it passed. California Governor Gavin Newsom opposed the measure and endorsed Proposition 42, <a href="https://gavinnewsom.substack.com/p/its-time-for-a-national-billionaires">stating</a>, “Wealth is movable, and it shops for the state with the lowest taxes. The fight belongs at the federal level.”</p><p>According to Rigel Robinson, former Berkeley city councilmember and Democratic public policy consultant,</p><blockquote><p>It would be a mistake to see the electoral outcome of Proposition 40 as a clear rejection of its goal from voters. There was the enormous and well-funded opposition campaign, and competing and confusing ballot measures designed to nullify the measure. Proposition 42, which was put on the ballot to prevent Proposition 40 (and future versions of it) from taking effect even if it did pass, was sold to voters as a protection for retirement savings.</p><p>However, in California and across the country, candidates won on a message of seizing power from billionaires and championing affordability. In many ways, this is the sort of message Bernie Sanders tried to bring to the Democratic agenda a decade ago.</p></blockquote><p>Voters across the country have demonstrated that redistribution and economic justice are clear priorities, and we cannot let the outcome of this proposition diminish the ground won.</p><p>There were also concerns about the legality and mechanics of the legislation — in particular, that it was introduced as a onetime proposition, was not national, and was technically a retroactive tax, since it applied to anyone living in the state as of January 2026. And as Fred Glass <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/california-ballot-measures-billionaires-taxation-inequality">explained</a> in <cite>Jacobin</cite>, California’s labor and progressive forces were unable to form a unified front in support of the measure.</p><p>While disappointing, it’s helpful to historicize the initiative and the broader movement to tax the assets of the ultrawealthy alongside other fights for redistribution. The federal income tax, for example, took several attempts before successfully passing. It took the Sixteenth Amendment <a href="https://www.annenbergclassroom.org/resource/our-constitution/sixteenth-amendment-timeline/">passing</a> in 1913 to make it permanent. SEIU-UHW has already <a href="https://www.independent.com/2026/11/10/california-voters-reject-prop-40-billionaire-tax/">said</a> it plans to try again in 2028, and Bernie Sanders and Ro Khanna have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/02/bernie-sanders-ro-khanna-billionaires-wealth-tax-bill">introduced</a> a bill at the federal level this spring.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Billionaire Wealth Is Money Today</h2></header><div><p>From the Meta deal, we can learn two things. First, it is possible for tech leadership to convert their wealth into liquidity. One of the most persistent arguments against taxing the ultrawealthy is that their money isn’t “real,” since it’s mostly in shares of companies whose value rises and falls with the market. Because of this, it shouldn’t be treated as income.</p><p>Stocks are legal claims on future production whose prices are set by expected returns. It is not uncommon for the companies who issue them to have not yet produced anything profitable or concrete. SpaceX’s shares were the most valuable in history at the time of their initial public offering (IPO), even though its AI division had <a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1181412/000162828026036936/spaceexplorationtechnologi.htm">lost</a> $2 for every dollar of revenue it earned in 2025.</p><p>In other words, a stock is a title of ownership to a slice of the surplus value a company will produce. In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/23792949.2025.2557911?needAccess=true">Marxian sense</a>, this is an example of fictitious capital and inherently speculative. However, “speculative” does not mean unreal. As Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, John Milios, and Spyros Lapatsioras <a href="http://digamo.free.fr/sotiro13.pdf">write</a> in <cite>A Political Economy of Contemporary Capitalism and its Crisis: Demystifying Finance</cite>, fictitious capital is not detached from real production but a necessary phase within its totality, and claims on future income can become commodities in their own right. These can be traded, priced, and converted into money at any time. A stock is not just a promise of future wealth; it is wealth (and command over the labor of others) today.</p><p>Modern finance for the AI sector also has a remarkable capacity to innovate and reinvent itself, and the financial engineering to create the Class C share is another demonstration of the sector’s remarkable capacity to adapt to secure endless capital for the AI rush.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>Another Front of Contestation</h2></header><div><p>Second, tech executives are most concerned with losing control of their companies. As economist and tax expert Gabriel Zucman told me, “the existence of super-voting shares and the Zuckerberg and Proposition 40 episode more generally highlight that what matters most to billionaires, even more than their wealth, is their power to exert control over the giant businesses they own. This is indeed their greatest power.” He also <a href="https://x.com/gabriel_zucman/status/2113231354053669127">commented</a> on X that the opposition to the wealth tax could not be driven by concerns about losing money, since the onetime 5 percent liability would “merely bring billionaire’s fortunes back to where they stood a few weeks ago, at the beginning of September.”</p><p>Meta is not an isolated case, and a dual-class share system (which allows companies to sell shares to the public, while a small group keeps most of the votes) has been on the rise. When SpaceX went public, Elon Musk floated only <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/06/spacex-ipo-musk-inequality-shareholders">3–4 percent</a> of the company and retained 42 percent of its shares, but 85 percent of its voting share through his “super-voting stock.” Anthropic’s IPO includes <a href="https://fortune.com/2026/10/26/anthropic-ipo-dual-class-share-structure-zuckerberg-musk-new-york-times/">five types</a> of stock, which specifically gives the cofounders the ability to keep a say over the controlling vote even if they give away 98 percent of their shares. The most valuable companies in the world are increasingly <a href="https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPOs-Dual-Class.pdf">owned</a> by a handful of individuals insulated from markets, shareholders, and other public mechanisms of accountability.</p><p>As Fred Glass <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/california-ballot-measures-billionaires-taxation-inequality">wrote</a>, Proposition 40 is a lost battle, not a lost war. Amid the manufactured panic over the tax, Zuckerberg seized the political moment to negotiate a deal with his company. The outcome of their agreement deepens our understanding of how to anticipate and oppose the coordinated class response against taxing extreme wealth. First, the shares of future value held by tech billionaires are not just abstractions but real money today, necessary to the current cycle of reproduction. And second, billionaires will fight hardest to protect not their fortune but their control.</p><p>The Left’s political project has to include a new front of contestation beyond fighting for shares of the returns tech companies produce. Countering the enclosure of the AI economy will require reclaiming democratic control over the infrastructures of this intelligence in the first place.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/billionaire-tax-tech-wealth-control?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-20T17:54:53.439161Z</published><summary type="text">California’s billionaire tax was defeated this time. But Mark Zuckerberg’s deal with Meta in anticipation of Proposition 40 teaches us two things: billionaire wealth can be converted into cash, and tech elites value control even more than wealth.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/ottoman-history-capitalism-colonialism-origins</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/ottoman-history-capitalism-colonialism-origins"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/604340626780.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/604340626780.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/604340626780.jpg"/><title type="text">What the Ottomans Tell Us About Plunder and Capitalism</title><updated>2026-11-20T16:53:00.534402Z</updated><author><name>Y. Doğan Çetinkaya</name></author><category label="History" term="History"/><category label="Theory" term="Theory"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Vivek Chibber’s recent interview on the <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/jacobin-radio/id791564318">Jacobin Radio</a> podcast <cite><a href="https://jacobin.com/2025/12/colonialism-transition-feudalism-capitalism-history-economy">Confronting Capitalism</a></cite> and Vijay Prashad’s response in <cite><a href="https://monthlyreview.org/articles/could-capitalism-have-thrived-without-colonialism/">Monthly Review</a></cite> have reopened fundamental questions about capitalism’s origins, colonialism, and the transition from feudalism to capitalism in world history. Drawing on my research into Ottoman history, I want to make the case that societies beyond Europe belong in this history not simply for their contributions to the rise of capitalism in the West but for their own internal transformations.</p><p>The origins of capitalism and its subsequent development through colonialism are distinct historical problems. Ottoman history allows us to draw this distinction by examining a transition beyond the northwestern European cases at the center of this debate.</p><p>On the central question of this debate, I am closer to Chibber: I support his distinction between the emergence of capitalism and colonial plunder, and his insistence on looking to the internal transformation of feudal society for an explanation. I also accept Robert Brenner’s account of the English transition. My disagreement concerns whether capitalist relations could also emerge from within other feudal societies, before Western economic domination and along different historical paths. I agree with some of Prashad’s criticisms of political Marxism, but that agreement does not extend to his account of capitalism’s origins.</p><p>In the Ottoman Empire, too, capitalism developed out of the internal dynamics of feudal society without relying on colonial plunder, and before Western economic domination and the Industrial Revolution. This process transformed both society and the state, later laying the groundwork for internal colonization. Ottoman history thus brings into focus the distinctions between capitalism’s emergence, its colonial expansion, and the rise of the West — processes that Prashad folds into a single explanation.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Wealth Is Not Capital</h2></header><div><p>Chibber’s starting point is that the accumulation of wealth and the emergence of capitalist social relations are distinct processes. A society that possesses vast financial resources does not necessarily organize its production along capitalist lines. Nor does the wealth that colonizers plundered create capitalism on its own.</p><p>Chibber acknowledges that once capitalist relations have emerged, such wealth can accelerate their development. Supporting his argument about capitalism’s origins therefore does not require denying colonialism’s importance in its subsequent history. On the contrary, it allows us to ask within which social relations, and at what historical stage, colonialism acquired that importance. The crucial advance we need to preserve in the debate over capitalism’s origins is the shift from explaining it through the quantity of wealth to explaining it through the character of the relations of production.</p><p>Here the meaning of primitive accumulation becomes clear. Before asking how enough money accumulated to finance investment, we need to explain how producers’ relationships to their means of subsistence and production changed. Capital’s power over production and labor depends on social relations that allow money to function as a social power. The emergence of those relations involves dispossession, coercion, and class struggle.</p><p>But we cannot equate all these processes with colonialism. Transformations within feudal society have their own history of dispossession and struggle. To treat colonial plunder as capitalism’s necessary starting point is to subsume the very history we need to explain under a different process. The value of Chibber’s intervention lies in bringing this social transformation back to the center of the debate over capitalism’s origins.</p><p>Just as trade existed before capitalism, so did plunder, invasion, and conquest. Their existence alone cannot explain the emergence of capitalist social relations.</p><p>We should also note that Chibber does not locate capitalism’s early development exclusively in England. He also includes Holland and other parts of the Low Countries in his account of the transformation of northwestern Europe. I accept Brenner’s account of the emergence of capitalism in England. My objection is not to its validity for England but to ruling out the possibility that capitalist relations could also emerge from feudalism’s internal dynamics in other societies.</p><p>Such transitions need not reproduce England’s historical trajectory or institutional forms. Different paths need not contradict political Marxism’s definition of capitalism: the social relations that define capitalism can emerge under different historical conditions and take different forms. This is the case I am making by bringing Ottoman history into the debate. I am not rejecting the explanation of the English transition but challenging the use of its specific forms as a yardstick that excludes other histories of capitalist development.</p><p>Chibber also points to northwestern Europe’s stronger growth as one reason to locate capitalism’s early development there. Here too we need to be clear about what the evidence allows us to conclude. It is one thing to explain why certain societies grew faster by pointing to capitalist relations; it is another to claim that capitalist relations existed only in those faster-growing societies. The second proposition does not follow from the first.</p><p>A society can become capitalist without becoming a leader in capitalist development. To identify capitalism, we need to establish whether capital accumulation has come to govern production and the conditions under which producers secure their livelihoods. Faster economic growth may be a consequence of capitalist relations, but it is not what defines them.</p><p>Nor can we equate the development of productive forces with economic growth or its pace. It involves changes in productive capacity, including productive techniques and the organization of labor, which we cannot reduce to increases in output. Northwestern Europe’s stronger growth therefore cannot by itself establish that slower-growing societies remained feudal or exclude the possibility of capitalist transitions elsewhere. The distinction between capitalism’s emergence and economic supremacy that we defend against Prashad must also hold when we assess Chibber’s account.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Origins and Expansion</h2></header><div><p>Here I agree with Prashad’s critique of political Marxism’s explanatory framework. We cannot confine the history of capitalism to the history of English agriculture. But moving beyond that limit requires more than bringing in societies outside Europe solely for their contributions to Europe’s capitalist development.</p><p>In such an account, the rest of the world enters the explanation, but the transformation it sets out to explain remains Europe’s. Changes in those societies’ own relations of production disappear. Overcoming Eurocentrism requires more than adding examples of what the rest of the world supplied to the West. We must also investigate the emergence of capitalism within these societies’ own histories.</p><p>Prashad does of course discuss the transformation of labor and social reproduction in colonized societies, so I am not reducing his account to a tally of the wealth that colonizers transferred to Europe. My objection is to making colonial connections the overarching framework for explaining the emergence of capitalism. Explaining transformations under colonial domination does not also explain transitions in which domination played no constitutive role. Colonial relations cannot be the only way we connect societies in a global explanation.</p><p>Prashad makes clear that he does not see colonialism as mechanically producing capitalism. His argument is that we cannot understand capitalism as it historically developed — industrial, global, racialized, and imperial — apart from colonial dispossession. Nor does he discuss only accumulation after the Industrial Revolution: he also examines early plantations and transformations in colonial production.</p><p>Prashad writes: “If you ignore colonialism and the machine, you do not get the genesis of industrial capitalism, only the emergence of certain social relations.” Yet the Industrial Revolution was itself a historical outcome of capitalist development, and industrial capitalism a further stage in that development. These developments transformed capitalist relations that had already emerged; they cannot serve as the defining criteria for capitalism itself.</p><p>Explaining the emergence of those relations therefore addresses the question of capitalism’s origins. It is not simply an incomplete explanation of industrial capitalism. By making a later stage of capitalist development the measure of capitalism itself, Prashad shifts the question from how capitalist relations emerged to how they subsequently developed.</p><p>The emergence of those social relations is itself the transformation we need to investigate. We must distinguish their subsequent combination with colonialism, or their development into a new phase through mechanized production, from the causes of their emergence. When that distinction is precisely what is at issue, substituting capitalism’s entire subsequent history for the question of its origins does not resolve the disagreement.</p><p>My question for Prashad, then, goes beyond whether capitalism is conceivable without colonialism. The capitalist transformation I identify in the Ottoman Empire is not a thought experiment about what might have happened had colonialism never existed but a historical process we need to explain. Why should capitalist relations that developed without colonialism fall outside an account of “capitalism as it actually emerged”?</p><p>Defining the West’s colonial and industrial development as capitalism’s real history, while excluding other paths to capitalism, does not resolve the question of origins. It narrows the history we set out to explain.</p><p>The same problem arises in the relationship between primitive accumulation and colonialism. Colonial dispossession can be one means of separating producers from the means of production and accumulating capital. It does not follow that we must define primitive accumulation, as an explanation of the emergence of capitalist relations, through colonialism.</p><p>We need to distinguish the establishment of capitalist relations from their subsequent expansion into new areas and their reproduction. Colonialism can play an enormous role in this second process. But projecting that role backward changes the explanation of capitalism’s origins.</p><p>My objection to Prashad is not that he discusses colonial dispossession, but that he places this connection at the center of the question of origins. The social conditions under which capitalism emerged without colonialism then drop out of the explanation.</p><p>We therefore cannot treat the emergence of capitalism, the West’s global dominance, and the Industrial Revolution as different names for the same problem. The first asks how new relations of production emerged; the second, how the West established its dominance on a world scale; the third, how the technical and social organization of production changed radically. These processes shape one another, but an explanation of one cannot substitute for an explanation of another. Colonialism’s importance to the West’s rise or industrialization does not establish that capitalism originated in colonialism.</p><p>We are challenging the use of later developments as founding causes of relations that had already emerged. The early appearance of colonial practices does not establish this causal link either. The fact that two processes unfolded at the same time does not show that one produced the other.</p><p>Establishing that requires us to identify the mechanisms through which colonial appropriation brought capitalist relations of production into being. The strength of the Ottoman case lies in shifting the debate from a hypothetical world without colonialism to the question of how these relations actually emerged.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>The Ottoman Transition</h2></header><div><p>My argument is that capitalist relations in the Ottoman Empire emerged from within feudal society between roughly 1550 and 1650. After 1650, these relations reinforced one another and became increasingly decisive in shaping social reproduction. This chronology rules out explaining the origins of Ottoman capitalism as a consequence of the West’s later economic domination. It also prevents us from treating the absence of large-scale mechanized industry as proof of capitalism’s absence.</p><p>What we need to investigate is the transformation of Ottoman society from within during this period. In this light, we see not a feudal society standing still in the face of a capitalist West but a history in which productive forces developed, relations of production changed, and a new social structure took shape through class struggle.</p><p>Recent contributions to Ottoman economic and social history include <a href="https://www.academia.edu/32723653/Locating_an_Ottoman_Port_City_in_the_Early_Modern_Mediterranean_Izmir_1580_1780_TOC_and_Intro_">Mehmet Kuru</a>’s work on Izmir’s regional economy, <a href="https://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstreams/eea3467c-1156-4633-8b1e-b79b4d5d8415/download">Mehmet Ali Çelik</a>’s research on <em>çiftliks</em> and agrarian labor, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417526100401">Önder Eren Akgül</a>’s study of capital accumulation and dispossession in western Anatolia. These studies help illuminate changes in Ottoman production, property, and class relations across different periods.</p><p>What drives this transformation is not the first appearance of trade or money, both of which already existed in feudal society. What changes is the relationship between the conditions that allow producers to continue producing and control over the surplus. When merchant capital begins to organize production through credit, the supply of raw materials, and control over output, the movement of capital comes to govern the continuity of production. Producers’ relationship to the market can shift from merely selling what they have left over to depending on it to sustain their livelihoods and production.</p><p>The interpretation I am developing in ongoing research concerns how changes in property, credit, and labor relations increasingly placed the continuation of production under capital’s control. Demonstrating this requires more than evidence of expanding trade or growing indebtedness: it requires tracing how class struggle transformed producers’ access to the means of production and subsistence. Competitive pressure is one mechanism to investigate within this process, but we cannot reduce the transformation to producers losing their holdings because they could not compete.</p><p>It is in this transformation that I look for the emergence of Ottoman capitalism. The starting point of this explanation is not wealth that colonial plunder brought in from outside but changes within existing social relations. Those changes concern not only who controls the surplus but also how it flows back into reproduction.</p><p>As the expansion of production, control over labor, and access to markets intertwine, accumulation begins to determine the conditions of social reproduction. Capital thus confronts producers not simply as a power that buys their output but as a social relation that governs the conditions under which production can continue.</p><p>The existence of trade does not prove the existence of capitalism. But it does not follow that merchant capital cannot reorganize production or help transform feudal class relations. An increase in the volume of trade is not the same as the subordination of production to capital. This is not a story of capitalism emerging spontaneously from the continuous expansion of markets but a history of qualitative change in capital’s relationship to production.</p><p>The development of productive forces is also part of this transformation. A deeper division of labor, a larger scale of production, connections between different branches of production, and the reorganization of labor all increase society’s productive power even before mechanization. This development proceeds alongside changes in relations of production and struggles over control of the surplus. The conflicting interests of peasants, artisans, merchants, local ruling elites, and the state shape the direction and form of the transformation.</p><p>To speak of feudalism’s internal dynamics is not to tell a story of technological progress unfolding on its own. It is to understand capitalism’s emergence as a history in which productive forces and relations of production develop and reshape one another through class struggle. Producers’ efforts to preserve their access to land and means of subsistence come up against the ruling classes’ attempts to extract a larger surplus. The terms of debt, taxation, and control over production take shape through these conflicts.</p><p>The outcome of the transition is not a destination that feudal society contained from the outset, but the historical product of struggles to preserve and transform existing relations. The development of productive forces, then, is neither an engine operating independently of class relations nor an outcome that appears only after capitalism has emerged, but part of the social process that explains the transition itself.</p><p>The Ottoman Empire’s fiscal transformation is part of this same history. Three changes increasingly tied control over the surplus to relations of capital and credit. The <em>tımar</em> system (rights the state granted to collect agrarian revenues, often in return for military service) changed, tax farming (<em>iltizam</em>) expanded, and the state later introduced lifetime tax farms (<em>malikâne</em>).</p><p>None of these institutions, taken on its own, proves the existence of capitalism. But when we examine them alongside changes in production, property, market dependence, and accumulation, they show that the state itself was changing within the same social process. This moves us away from viewing capitalism as a sphere that emerges within society after the state retreats, as much of the literature assumes. The struggles that reorganize relations between producers and those who appropriate the surplus also transform the state’s sources of revenue and its social foundations.</p><p>This history does not require the Ottoman Empire to replicate the institutions of the English transition. When we turn England’s specific forms of property and labor into universal criteria for capitalism, we fail to recognize capital’s command over production in other societies.</p><p>Treating the transition from feudalism to capitalism as a problem of world history does not mean equating capitalism with trade wherever it occurs. To speak of a transition to the same mode of production is not to insist that every society follow the same historical path. This distinction also challenges the assumption that, once capitalism had emerged, it could take root in other societies only through external diffusion.</p><p>Of course, speaking of the Ottoman Empire’s internal dynamics does not mean treating it as a society isolated from the world. Trade, war, and flows of money are part of this history. But the existence of external connections does not show that the West introduced capitalism or that colonial plunder gave birth to it. What we need to explain are the social relations within which those connections operated.</p><p>Placing the Ottoman capitalist transformation before the West’s decisive economic influence does not write the outside world out of the story; it changes the direction of causality. The West’s later influence acted on capitalist relations that had already begun to emerge. Nor does their subsequent development under conditions of external dependence prove that their origins lay elsewhere. Dependency cannot substitute for an explanation of origins.</p><p>For the same reason, late industrialization is a separate issue. If we measure the existence of capitalism by the prevalence of mechanized production, we end up defining Ottoman relations of production in terms of a technological gap with the West. Yet capitalist societies do not develop at the same pace, occupy the same international position, or enjoy the same opportunities for accumulation. Colonialism can play a decisive role in widening these inequalities and securing the supremacy of particular capitalist states.</p><p>Here we move from the question of origins to that of uneven capitalist development, where the colonial accumulation and industrial transformation that Prashad emphasizes acquire explanatory force. But this explanation does not erase histories in which capitalist relations emerged earlier and without colonial plunder. Accepting Prashad’s emphasis on colonialism does not require abandoning Chibber’s distinction concerning capitalism’s origins.</p><p>The fact that Ottoman capitalism did not originate in colonial plunder does not mean that the empire stood outside later wars and struggles over the division of the world. Its participation in those struggles and wars as a capitalist state does not show that it owed its transition to capitalism to resources it extracted from colonies abroad. We need to distinguish the state’s later political position from the origins of society’s capitalist transformation.</p><p>The same distinction applies to the empire’s long history of conquest. Earlier conquests and relations of taxation do not prove that capitalism emerged from colonial plunder. Empire and capitalist colonialism are not the same historical category. We must reassess the relationship between them as relations of production and the social character of the state change.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>From Capitalist Transformation to Internal Colonization</h2></header><div><p>The transformation of the Ottoman state into a capitalist state is therefore the next step in the argument. Capitalism does more than create new sources of profit for particular sections of society. Through control over property, labor, and the surplus, it also changes how the state reproduces itself.</p><p>What makes a state capitalist is not that its rulers become merchants or that it builds factories but that social relations become organized around the requirements of capital accumulation, with class struggles unfolding on that basis. Capitalist relations emerging from within Ottoman society deepen alongside the state’s fiscal and administrative transformation. The form of state that emerges from this transformation also begins to view the empire’s vast domains in a new light and to reorganize them accordingly.</p><p>It is in the wake of this transformation that I situate internal colonization — the process I call <em>self-colonialism</em>. The Ottoman Empire did not owe its transition to capitalism to the plunder of colonies abroad; as the state became capitalist, it already ruled vast territories and diverse communities toward which it could direct its colonial practices. Its territories in the Balkans, the Middle East, Anatolia, the Caucasus, and North Africa became the terrain on which it established new internal relations of domination. Holding these territories is not the same as reorganizing them as internal colonies, which involved a capitalist state transforming earlier imperial rule to serve new purposes within a new set of social relations.</p><p>In this transformation, the state ties civilizing rhetoric to remaking peripheral communities into populations it can govern and tax and whose labor can be controlled. Scholars have explored Ottoman colonialism from different perspectives: Nilay Özok-Gündoğa through resource extraction in Kurdistan, İlkay Yılmaz through security policies in the eastern provinces, and Ella Fratantuono through immigrant settlement. Selim Deringil and Ussama Makdisi examine the colonial outlook and civilizing claims of Ottoman elites. My question here is how these forms of domination relate to capitalism’s origins.</p><p>I argue that internal colonization follows the capitalist transformation of society and the state; as it unfolds, it can intensify dispossession and open up new opportunities for accumulation. We can thus establish the causal sequence without denying the relationship between colonialism and capitalism. Internal colonization did not create Ottoman capitalism; a capitalist transformation already underway laid the social and political groundwork that made internal colonization possible.</p><p>I am not proposing a single historical sequence valid for all societies, only specifying the direction of the causal relationship we need to explain in the Ottoman case. Here the question is not how colonialism created capitalism but how capitalist transformation reshaped state domination and laid the groundwork for colonial practices.</p><p>This sequence does not imply that capitalism emerged without violence. The dissolution of feudal relations and the formation of capitalist relations involved conflicts over producers’ rights to their means of subsistence, their labor, and the surplus they produced. But treating every act of dispossession as colonialism prevents us from distinguishing changes in class relations from the specific history of colonial domination. We need to distinguish capitalism’s origins from colonialism not to downplay colonial violence but to explain the historical connections between different forms of domination.</p><p>In the Ottoman case, this distinction allows us to trace the capitalist transformation first, then examine how it extended into internal colonization through state action. Recognizing colonialism’s immense importance to capitalist development does not require locating capitalism’s origins in it. This is the fundamental distinction on which I agree with Chibber and part ways with Prashad.</p><p>In the Ottoman Empire, capitalism emerged from within feudal society and transformed both society and the state, and internal colonization followed. This history shows that accepting the analysis of the English transition does not require ruling out capitalism’s origins in other societies.</p><p>Writing a world history of capitalism requires us to explain more than the world’s contributions to the making of the West. We must also explain how the world itself changed. We therefore cannot reduce the transition from feudalism to capitalism to an English or European story. Capitalism’s origins belong to a world history broader than the history of Western domination.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/ottoman-history-capitalism-colonialism-origins?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-20T16:53:00.534402Z</published><summary type="text">Did colonial plunder create capitalism? Ottoman history suggests not.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/hall-woodford-neoclassical-economics-nobel</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/hall-woodford-neoclassical-economics-nobel"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/716417810734.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/716417810734.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/716417810734.jpg"/><title type="text">A Nobel Prize for Being Wrong</title><updated>2026-11-20T16:07:31.929249Z</updated><author><name>Francesco Lamperti</name></author><author><name>Andrea Roventini</name></author><category label="Crisis" term="Crisis"/><category label="Economic Science" term="Economic Science"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>The Nobel Prize in Economics isn’t mentioned in Alfred Nobel’s will. Rather, the gong was established in 1968 by Sweden’s central bank, which still funds it today. As Avner Offer and Gabriel Söderberg show in their book <cite><a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691166032/the-nobel-factor">The Nobel Factor</a></cite>, this is no mere historical curiosity, for the prize’s origins can be understood against the backdrop of a conflict between Swedish social democracy and the champions of the market. Recognizing economists with the prestigious Nobel Prize was supposed to grant their theories the authority of the natural sciences such as physics and chemistry. Yet these imperfect theories do more than just describe the world: they help guide economic policy decisions that affect the lives of millions of people.</p><p>The 2026 prize awarded to Robert Hall and Michael Woodford drew this issue into especially sharp focus. According to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, the two economists <a href="https://www.kva.se/en/news/the-prize-in-economic-sciences-2026/">provided</a> the “microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic stabilization,” developing tools capable of smoothing out the peaks and troughs of the economy. The official statement even claims that their research has made the management of major crises far more effective. The problem is that the models in question, grounded in the contributions of Hall and Woodford, have not helped stabilize economies, as the 2008 crisis clearly demonstrated. Such models have, however, convinced many economists that they <em>could</em> do so. Internal consistency was passed off as a real understanding of the dynamics of capitalist economies; theoretical elegance was equated with empirical validity; and apparent stability was misread as an absence of crises.</p><p>Decisively, this illusion of control was not confined to academic inquiry but guided the economic policies of governments and central banks. This fueled an excessive confidence in monetary policy’s ability to stabilize both inflation and the real economy while ignoring those financial risks that would overwhelm the global economy with the subprime mortgage crisis.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>An Economy Tailored to the Model</h2></header><div><p>In the 1970s, stagflation challenged the statistical relationships through which a certain vintage of “Keynesian” macroeconomics interpreted production, unemployment, and inflation. A “New Classical Macroeconomics” offered a radical response: to study the dynamics of capitalist economies by starting with the consumption, savings, and labor choices of a single hyperrational individual capable of predicting the future based on all available information. Replacing the interactions of millions of people and firms with a single imaginary individual was a convenient shortcut to avoid seriously addressing the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-abstract/99/395/126/5190214?login=false">problems</a> of general-equilibrium models. But this meant sweeping aside the very problems that economic science has to understand and explain: involuntary unemployment, distributional conflicts, inequality, systemic risk, and crises.</p><p>This was the context in which Hall published his famous <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/260724">1978 paper</a> on consumption. If a representative household rationally chooses how much to consume in each period based on the income it expects to earn over its entire lifetime, changes in consumption head on a “random walk,” because they depend solely on new information, which is by definition unpredictable. This theoretical result implies that consumption depends solely on the income expected to be earned over a lifetime, but this contrasts with the behavior of millions of households whose consumption depends on their monthly income.</p><p>In fact, as early as 1989, <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w2924">empirical evidence</a> showed that the predictions from Hall’s model were incorrect, since a considerable portion of consumers made spending decisions based on current, rather than permanent, income. Subsequent research has confirmed the importance of liquidity constraints that limit consumption and differences in wealth among households.</p><p>And this is no minor detail: for a low-income or indebted household, a government transfer can immediately increase consumption, just as a reduction in interest rates can. Income distribution and the composition of fiscal policies thus turn out to be decisive. But in Hall’s model, as in all models built around a mythical representative consumer, these differences are absent by design.</p><p><a href="https://web.stanford.edu/~rehall/Tax-Policy-AER-June-1967.pdf">Hall</a> is also famous for having developed, together with Dale W. Jorgenson, the neoclassical theory of investment, in which a representative firm decides how much to invest based on the cost of capital. In this case, too, numerous <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1937931?origin=crossref">empirical studies</a> have contradicted his and Jorgenson’s neat theoretical findings: for firms’ investment choices depend primarily on expectations of future demand and the availability of financing sources such as bank credit.</p><p>While Hall provided the theories for modeling the dynamics of aggregate consumption and investment, i.e., two fundamental components of GDP, Woodford played a prominent role in the “<a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/654336">New Neoclassical Synthesis</a>,” which sought to explain the dynamics of a capitalist economy. In his 2003 magnum opus <cite><a href="https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781400830169/html">Interest and Prices</a></cite>, Woodford developed a macroeconomic model called Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) based on the rational choices of a representative consumer and firm that maximize utility and profits, respectively, with perfect knowledge of the economic model in which they operate.</p><p>The main difference between this DSGE model and those used by New Classical Macroeconomics is the existence of “market imperfections,” meaning monopolistic competition, and especially that firms do not change prices continuously. The presence of sticky prices thus allows the central bank to stabilize consumption, output, and employment by announcing its future policy decisions and changes in the interest rate. Thanks to this stickiness, monetary policy can influence GDP dynamics, even though the theoretical framework remains that of New Classical Macroeconomics.</p><p>This compromise has often been referred to as “New Keynesianism,” and yet it has little to do with John Maynard Keynes’s work. Economic fluctuations, in fact, stem from shocks external to the model that temporarily push the economy away from market equilibrium, and only price rigidities allow monetary policy to correct these deviations. In contrast, for Keynes, economic cycles are an intrinsic feature of how capitalist systems function even in the presence of flexible prices. In this context, monetary policies, and especially fiscal policies, play a fundamental role in mitigating the lasting effects of financial crises and recessions.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>From the Great Moderation to the Great Recession</h2></header><div><p>The advent of the New Neoclassical Synthesis fueled growing confidence in macroeconomic models, seemingly confirmed by the so-called Great Moderation: a long period beginning in the mid-1980s, when many advanced economies saw a major reduction in the volatility of GDP and inflation. Many economists regarded this outcome as a “divine coincidence,” due in large part to improved <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.21.4.25">monetary policy</a> that slavishly followed the “scientific” principles provided by DSGE models.</p><p>In this climate of optimism, reminiscent of Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis, Nobel laureate <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803321455133">Robert Lucas</a> solemnly declared, like some modern-day Pangloss, that economists had solved the problem of depressions. And in August 2008, Olivier Blanchard <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w14259">described</a> the state of macroeconomics as “good.”</p><p>Unfortunately, the outcome of this story is well known: in the fall of 2008, the subprime mortgage crisis plunged the global economy into the most severe recession since the Great Depression of 1929. Beneath the apparent stability indicated by DSGE models, inequality, household debt, and the fragility of banks and financial intermediaries were on the rise, while the financial sector was being deregulated, and new derivative products were being invented. Price stability masked the growing instability of the financial system. This all happened amid the utter silence of the dominant macroeconomic theory, which paid no attention to the behavior of banks and large investors. It did not acknowledge the possibility of a financial crisis, even as a theoretical prospect.</p><p>As noted by <a href="https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/34/1-2/70/4781816">Joseph Stiglitz</a> and <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/the-state-of-macro-is-sad-wonkish/">Paul Krugman</a>, the failure to account for finance rendered the dominant models useless not only for predicting a crisis but also for explaining why it had emerged. Worse, DSGE models proved useless in formulating the economic policy interventions needed to avert a new depression, such as bank bailouts, expansionary fiscal policies, unconventional monetary policies, macroprudential regulations of the financial system, and extraordinary measures to prevent the collapse of financial markets.</p><p>In essence, the contributions of Hall and Woodford and the New Neoclassical Synthesis more generally provided no theoretical foundation for macroeconomic stabilization. Instead they helped blind many economists and policymakers to the signs of the perfect storm that was about to hit the global economy. And when the crisis erupted, they proved inadequate for devising the economic policies needed to save global economies.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>An Extremely Fine-Grained, Imaginary World</h2></header><div><p>The main strength of DSGE models, which have become the dominant language of modern macroeconomics and influential tools within central banks, is their formal rigor. But mathematical consistency is no guarantee of realism. A model can rigorously describe what would happen in an imaginary world <em>if</em> the underlying assumptions were true, yet be totally unreliable when those assumptions are tested against reality.</p><p>MIT economist <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.24.4.85">Ricardo Caballero</a> explained this clearly in the wake of the 2008 crisis. He showed how mainstream macroeconomics had become captivated by the models’ own internal logic, confusing the precision achieved in the virtual world they constructed with knowledge of the real world. This fed the risky assumption that existing policies would guarantee price and economic stability even as the conditions for the subprime mortgage crisis were being created. If the financial system is treated as marginal, and failures are either absent or greatly simplified, the model can provide extremely detailed answers to the wrong questions. As early as 2002, <a href="https://www.bis.org/publications/working-paper-114-asset-prices-financial-and-monetary-stability-exploring-nexus">research</a> at the Bank for International Settlements had shown that financial imbalances can grow even with low inflation, while economists Òscar Jordà, Alan Taylor, and Moritz Schularick <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jmcb.12069">found</a> that rapid credit growth could signal systemic risks prior to a crisis. Still, this type of analysis remained on the margins of the dominant paradigm. To quote former Bank of England economist <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/unfortunate-uselessness-most-state-art-academic-monetary-economics">Charles Goodheart</a>, the standard DSGE model excludes everything relevant to the stability of the financial system and “has been completely <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/default-and-dsge-models">useless</a> as a guide to the recent financial crisis.”</p><p>Unfortunately, this trend has become more entrenched in mainstream macroeconomics ever since the theories developed in the 1970s by Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent. The focus is, in fact, on mathematical elegance at the expense of critical analysis of the assumptions and the realism of the model. But the implications for economic policy depend on the assumptions, not on mathematical proofs derived from imaginary economies. Otherwise, we risk entrusting our understanding of macroeconomic dynamics and economic policy to “post-real” models, as <a href="https://paulromer.net/trouble-with-macroeconomics-update/WP-Trouble.pdf">Paul Romer</a> wryly put it in 2016.</p><p>After 2008, DSGE models incorporated imperfections in the credit market and homeopathic doses of heterogeneity among consumers. And <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20221712%20%20Poi%20ti%20mando%20altro">Woodford</a> himself addressed the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability. These are developments worth acknowledging. But adding a new host of frictions is not enough to explain how economic imbalances can lead to financial crises and deep recessions.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>The Cost of Orthodoxy and the Need for Pluralism</h2></header><div><p>There is also a less visible cost than the one directly involving economic crisis: namely, the stifling of pluralism in research. The theoretical-political construct developed around Hall’s and Woodford’s framework has become so dominant and self-referential that it has dismissed nearly all opposing arguments. Keynesian approaches as well as those of other economic schools, which focused on deep uncertainty, effective demand, income distribution, institutions, and financial instability, have often been deemed less scientific and marginalized. This not because they are contradicted by the data, but because they fall outside the language of the dominant paradigm, which lends a veneer of formal rigor.</p><p>Krugman <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/the-state-of-macro-is-sad-wonkish/">highlighted</a> this paradox in 2016, asking what accurate predictions justified the hegemony of DSGE models. He noted how this methodology had sidelined less sophisticated analyses that were, however, more useful for understanding crises. This is not an objection to technical rigor but to the transformation of a particular technique into a dogmatic criterion for belonging to the discipline, where the dominant theory becomes almost a creed or, worse, a sect. And when the method matters more than the phenomena to be explained and the results obtained, the supposed rigor becomes a weapon to silence alternative theories. This occurs through control of scientific journals, where the guardians of orthodoxy publish only articles aligned with the relevant theoretical paradigm. In this way, as James Heckman and Sidharth Moktan <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20191574">argue</a>, the careers of young economists are shaped, careerism is encouraged, and creativity is stifled. And all of this, according to <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20191573">George Akerlof</a>, has discouraged research on financial crises, which were considered a secondary issue within the dominant paradigm — at least until the crisis struck.</p><p>The 2026 Nobel Prize in Economics pays homage to a seductive idea. It suggests that, given an elegant theoretical model, the fluctuations of capitalist economies can be easily smoothed out through economic policies designed according to “scientific” principles. The problem is that reality cannot be bent to fit the model if the model represents a leap beyond economics, as <a href="https://freakonomics.com/podcast/ninety-eight-years-of-economic-wisdom/">asserted</a> by Robert Solow. Different theoretical approaches are needed, therefore, like <a href="http://ridge.org/core/books/agentbased-macroeconomics/B7016A5CEE59694A420AF51A1347F00E">those that view</a> economies as complex evolving systems. We can only hope that the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Hall and Woodford will spark a debate leading to greater pluralism in the field of economics, rewarding the ability to explain the real world rather than the formalism of imaginary worlds. Unfortunately, this too may be a little overoptimistic.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/hall-woodford-neoclassical-economics-nobel?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-20T16:07:31.929249Z</published><summary type="text">Handing Michael Woodford and Robert Hall the Nobel Prize for Economics, the awarding committee said their work had helped deal with shocks. In truth, their models fed the illusion of stability that blinded policymakers to the looming 2008 crisis.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/frank-creativity-innovation-neoliberalism-inequality</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/frank-creativity-innovation-neoliberalism-inequality"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/805428000682.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/805428000682.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/805428000682.jpg"/><title type="text">Thomas Frank on How the Promise of Progress Soured</title><updated>2026-11-20T15:06:17.449814Z</updated><author><name>Thomas Frank</name></author><author><name>Ewald Engelen</name></author><category label="Ideas" term="Ideas"/><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>The pundit and cultural historian Thomas Frank has again done what he does best: holding up an unflattering mirror to the extreme center.</p><p>Where the object lesson of Frank’s 2016 book, <cite>Listen, Liberal</cite>, was the Democratic Party’s neoliberal, technocratic turn, and in his 2020 work, <cite>The People, No</cite>, he examined how populism turned from a lived political ideology into a self-serving cuss word, in his new book, <cite>The Creativity Con</cite>, Frank has unpicked the chattering classes’ infatuation with all things innovative. As the title gives away, that obsession has produced a con.</p><p>The book traces the history of creativity thinking in the United States. Frank picks up the thread in the early twentieth century when some ad men (BBDO cofounder Alex Osborn is key here) promised US workers that creativity was a democratic virtue and that everyone could hone their abilities to come up with something new. Frank traces the story all the way to the likes of Richard Florida, who, as an academic and consultant, became rich and influential by selling town halls the world over policy recipes to remake their desolate, deserted neighborhoods into shiny launchpads for the creative class. Ideas, knowledge, and brainpower were supposed to become the commodities of the twenty-first century, while jobs “bending metal” had become the obsolete purview of the losers, the poor, and the uneducated. What was needed to attract the creatives, Florida explained, were lofts and bike paths and lattes, while the plight of the metal benders was treated as an afterthought.</p><p>Frank takes us all the way to the present, with its return of geopolitical conflict and its shadow of technological disruption hanging over the life prospects even of the academically certified. He invites us readers to follow him along with his hilarious reportage (at South by Southwest), deep digs in libraries and archives (Alex Osborn again), and trips to cities where Florida and his ilk sold their magic.</p><p>We also join Frank in parsing US presidential speeches filled to the brim with “innovation blather” (which he calls “innotalk”) and see him deconstruct weapons’ producers marketing material — in the process taking a swipe at Marianna Mazzucato’s modern classic <cite>The Entrepreneurial State</cite> for failing to note that all those big beautiful public innovations from Silicon Valley were meant to maim, kill, and destroy.</p><p>These observations are interspersed with Frank’s more personal ruminations: on the world’s fairs his parents took him to; onthe fate of his artist friends in a world where Spotify has turned the music industry into a winner-takes-all market; and on the goals and aims of <cite>The Baffler</cite>, the countercultural magazine that he and friends set up in 1988.</p><p>In its second part, the book pivots from a critical cultural history to a pamphlet of critical political economy. There Frank contrasts the shiny marketing rhetoric of the creatives and innovators with the material reality they have created. His verdict: the narrative of the United States as the harbinger of newness is, worse than bullshit, a camouflage to obscure that the best times lie not ahead of us but in the past. He concludes that what he calls “progressland” has actually produced a country in decline.</p><p>For <cite>Jacobin</cite>, Ewald Engelen spoke with Frank about the function of “innotalk,” artificial intelligence, the midterms, the blue wave, cynicism, and the need to save the past from the future.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><hr/></header><dl><dt><p>Ewald Engelen</p><p>The key to the book is the flip halfway through from scathing social criticism to the real world “innotalk” has produced. You describe its function as providing camouflage. Explain?</p></dt><dd><p>Thomas Frank</p><p>The word is used by different people to mean different things, but it’s always self-interested. It’s always performing some interest — it’s always some way of describing their interests as universal interests. But it does it by different methods.</p><p>So, when Barack Obama uses the word “innovation,” it means something different than when defense contractors use it. But in both cases, they’re using it for really ugly purposes. Obama is using it to tell his base, Democratic voters, that he’s on board. He’s a progressive because it’s all about progress: innovation is progress. It’s change. And he’s also using it at the same time to tell Google: I hear you. I get it. So, it’s a word that’s extremely useful for him because he gets to have it both ways.</p><p>But then with the defense contractors, it’s camouflage for their project, which is to loot the taxpayer. And the Pentagon — who really cares about national defense? These billion-dollar airplanes and destroyers that cost as much as nuclear aircraft carriers, these crazy things that always come with massive cost overruns and fail to perform: that’s not what this is about. It’s about pocketing the spoils of war. No more, no less.</p></dd><dt><p>Ewald Engelen</p><p>Your exercise in unmasking depends crucially on the 2016 book by the US economic historian Robert Gordon, <cite>The Rise and Fall of American Growth</cite>. In it, he argues that productivity growth has stagnated since the late 1970s and that Big Tech, the smartphone, and the internet have failed to show up in productivity statistics. Is that still the case? What about the AI bubble and the potential wipeout of the creative class?</p></dt><dd><p>Thomas Frank</p><p>Wouldn’t that be something? After all these years, finally, finally. That would be appropriate, because I just finished working on this big project saying it hasn’t happened, and it would be hilarious if then it finally did happen right after I put the book out. So, I don’t know. Maybe tomorrow it’ll finally arrive.</p><p>But look: productivity growth is nowhere near where it was in the 1940s or 1950s or 1960s. Maybe next year it will be, but we haven’t seen it so far. However, I have my doubts, for obvious reasons.</p><p>There’s still a lot of brilliance in the world. There are still a lot of people coming up with new things. It’s just that the incentives are all arranged in such a way that the things they come up with do not add to the general wealth of the country. They add to the personal wealth of a small handful of people. We’ve arranged the incentives in a way that the general public and the economy as a whole don’t benefit much from all the stuff that people have dreamed up.</p></dd><dt><p>Ewald Engelen</p><p><cite>The Creativity Con</cite> appeared a couple of weeks before the midterms. Did you see any signs on the side of Democrats that they have dropped “innotalk” and have shifted to a language of material needs?</p></dt><dd><p>Thomas Frank</p><p>Not in those terms, no. Nobody has. But indirectly, yes. There’s massive backlash against AI and the data centers. And also, Donald Trump’s basically aligning himself with the billionaire elite, specifically Elon Musk. Right now, Jensen Huang was in the news because he was basically [Trump’s] second-best friend after Elon. All of that really came back to bite him, thank goodness.</p><p>The other thing that’s interesting is Barack Obama, who is still regarded and probably will be forever regarded by most Democrats as something of a saint. So, I went to the opening day at the Obama library. In it, he has reimagined his own history so that he is the descendant and legatee of all the great reform movements of the past. He is the culmination of the civil rights movement. He’s the culmination of the women’s suffrage movement. He’s the culmination of progressivism. He’s the culmination of the antiwar movement of the 1960s.</p><p>All these things. There’s this elaborate museum, and the first story of the museum is all about these various left-wing social movements of the past. And they all lead to this one guy, Barack Obama. The exhibit on innovation is on the top story. He doesn’t leave it out, but it’s not emphasized as much as it was during his presidency — implying that his faith in innovation has now gone out of fashion.</p></dd><dt><p>Ewald Engelen</p><p>What about the <cite>Financial Times</cite> claiming that the Democrats won because they replaced identity-talk with class-talk?</p></dt><dd><p>Thomas Frank</p><p>Well, yes. In that sense, it’s a good thing. In that sense, yes, I’m very hopeful about it. But these are the Democrats we’re talking about. They will disappoint you every time.</p><p>Look, I’m sixty-one years old. I’ve been a very cynical person. And cynicism has served me pretty well. So, I’m not going to all of a sudden say, “We’ve turned a corner and this is great.” By the way, the centrist faction in the Democratic Party is fighting back pretty hard right now. And they’re claiming that the election was not about those things. It was actually about their things. This is what they do in America. They have an election, and then they fight about what it actually meant.</p></dd><dt><p>Ewald Engelen</p><p>In the book, you call yourself a scoffer by trade. Why?</p></dt><dd><p>Thomas Frank</p><p>That’s pure H. L. Mencken, the Baltimore newspaper man. He had this very witty, scathing, vicious style. A man of incredible perceptiveness, but who had really lousy politics, really kind of ugly libertarian politics. He hated everything and everybody, he but had this astonishing power to penetrate the surface of things. I read him starting in high school and was always convinced that that was missing from the way the Left talked, the way the Left wrote about politics back in the day when I started.</p><p>It’s also an automatic stance of skepticism toward whatever you see on serious television or read in serious newspapers and whatever you hear on serious radio. There is no intellectual fun in debunking Fox News. There is in reading a <cite>New York Times</cite> op-ed from a mainstream political scientist professor against the grain.</p></dd><dt><p>Ewald Engelen</p><p>The final sentence of the book reads: “Spotify pulls up the Clash for me, a creative work I remember not just liking, but believing in when I was 19. Yet somehow it sounds all wrong now, impossible to understand, some frantic noise from another age, another civilization, a world that is no more.” That is pure nostalgia, isn’t it?</p></dt><dd><p>Thomas Frank</p><p>What I am commenting upon here is directly taken from the British historian E. P. Thompson’s <cite>The Making of the English Working Class</cite>, where at the end he talks about saving the past from the “enormous condescension of posterity.” His book, as well as mine, is a clarion call against forgetfulness, against obsolescence — the obsolescence of humans as well as machines.</p><p>And I was really feeling it. I was on vacation with my daughter. We were in Japan, and I was in an enormous train station in Tokyo. Enormous. And then Spotify, the machine, pulled up a song I was listening to when I was nineteen, bringing forcefully home the downside of progress: obsolescence, and also alienation and condescension. Our condescension for the past, in this culture — in the culture of progress, the culture where innovation is valued — our condescension for the past is enormous.</p><p>In some sense, I’ve always been that guy. I want to be like E.P. Thompson. I want to rescue these people from the condescension of posterity. And the nous and acumen and political courage of the historical populists are the classic case.</p></dd></dl></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/frank-creativity-innovation-neoliberalism-inequality?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-20T15:06:17.449814Z</published><summary type="text">Ideas, knowledge, and brainpower were supposed to become the commodities of the 21st century. But for ever more Americans, the promises of endless innovation have turned out rather hollow.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/reggio-emilia-municipal-politics-ecology-democracy</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/reggio-emilia-municipal-politics-ecology-democracy"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/853816251151.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/853816251151.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/853816251151.jpg"/><title type="text">Reggio Emilia Stares Down an Uncertain Future</title><updated>2026-11-20T14:43:34.859905Z</updated><author><name>Giulia Lasagni</name></author><author><name>Marzia Maccaferri</name></author><category label="Cities" term="Cities"/><category label="Environment" term="Environment"/><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>From early morning on August 3, around a hundred people placed themselves between machinery and 45,000 square meters of abandoned land on the eastern outskirts of Reggio Emilia, a northern Italian city about forty miles from Bologna.</p><p>They came to prevent more than two hundred mature trees, dense undergrowth, and a pond from being cleared for a Conad supermarket. The project also included other planned buildings as well as parking, pavements, and bike lanes.</p><p>The occupation, reached by a small road off the Via Emilia, quickly became a permanent encampment, with a field kitchen, tents, and nightly assemblies. About two months later, the area was cleared by police. The green space, now owned by the supermarket chain, was destroyed.</p><p>The word <em>bosco</em>, woodland, was itself part of the battle. For developers, the site was abandoned land awaiting regeneration. For its defenders, the two decades of neglect had produced an urban forest that serves as badly needed green space in a city facing increasingly extreme weather.</p><p>Bosco Ospizio poses the simple question of who really owns a site abandoned by both public authorities and private capital. Does it belong to the company that holds the deeds, to the city hall that approved its redevelopment, or to the people living with the consequences?</p><p>The answer is controversial even locally. Many opposed the project and joined the campaign, while other residents supported redevelopment as a source of services, jobs, safety, and investment in an area they see as neglected.</p><p>In Reggio Emilia, the question also carries unusual historical weight. The city was one of the great laboratories of Italy’s postwar Communist municipal left. For decades, the Emilia-Romagna region was celebrated for showing that Communists could govern democratically and effectively. Now it’s less clear that today’s left still has the same ability to resolve problems.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>The City as a Collective Project</h2></header><div><p>The “Emilian model” rested on strong municipalities, mass parties, trade unions, cooperatives, neighborhood organizations, and a dense associational culture. Political participation extended beyond elections through party branches, citizens’ committees, cultural associations, and negotiation between institutions and organized society.</p><p>Urban planning was central. As postwar modernization transformed Emilia from an agricultural region into one of Europe’s most dynamic industrial economies, the Left faced the challenge of governing development, preventing speculation, and turning some of the newly generated wealth into public services. Planning meant deciding where people would live, how they would move, and which services they could access, regardless of income.</p><p>The model shouldn’t be romanticized. It depended on party structures that were often hierarchical as well as participatory, and it treated economic growth as the central measure of success. Still, it also had a clear direction: public authority sought to shape the market and redistribute its gains. The city was understood as a collective political project.</p><p>Bosco Ospizio points to an inversion of this relationship. The project was approved under a center-left mayor and carried forward by successive center-left administrations. In the Italian context, center-left refers to the convergence of different political traditions: not only the long-hegemonic Communist Party, but also the Catholic tradition of social reformism associated with Christian Democracy, particularly influential in Reggio Emilia through the legacy of Giuseppe Dossetti.</p><p>In February 2026, city hall announced that building permits had been issued for the site. The proposal combines a 2,500-square-meter supermarket with a library, community hub, and health facilities, while retaining 23,000 square meters as public green space.</p><p>This combination is the project’s strongest defense. Supporters see a practical compromise that would provide services, employment, and a safer, more accessible public space. Opponents argue that mature woodland, a pond, and established vegetation cannot be replaced by landscaping created after construction.</p><p>“Public services are being delegated to a private entity,” one activist said.</p><p>The problem is that the success of a commercial project here becomes the condition for obtaining collective infrastructure. The city hall may negotiate the details, grant permission, and promise mitigation measures, but it no longer commands the process; it only brokers it. Here as around Italy, local authorities have been squeezed for decades by fiscal restraint, privatization, and the erosion of their capacity to plan and invest directly.</p><p>In this scenario, decisions about a neighborhood’s future migrate from the world of political programs and collective planning into business contracts, changes to urban planning, and negotiations with landowners. By the time residents ever get consulted, the fundamental choices may already have been made by others. “There had to be political will [for the Conad plan to go head],” this same activist said.</p><p>Yet support for Bosco Ospizio shows that consultation cannot be dismissed as a mere exercise in managing dissent. The residents who support the project — prioritizing services, employment, safety, and the reuse of neglected land — surely do have a legitimate understanding of the public interest. For them, a library, health center, and supermarket may seem more valuable than preserving a site that was inaccessible or poorly maintained for years.</p><p>The dispute is not simply, then, about whether Conad’s plan contains green space: it surely does. More than that, it raises the question of what kind of green space is needed, who defines its value, and whether the promised benefits justify destroying an existing ecosystem during a climate crisis.</p><p>There is a further irony in this. For the supermarket Conad is not an alien multinational descending on a red city. Founded in Bologna in 1962 as a cooperative of independent retailers, the chain is still today organized through territorial cooperatives. While operating much like any other major supermarket chain, its cooperative origins point to a different economic and political tradition, one whose relationship with the territory has profoundly changed over time. It belongs, at least genealogically, to the same regional cooperative space that gave the Emilian model much of its rootedness in society.</p><p>In this sense, too, the Bosco Ospizio is more widely revealing of the transformation of Emilia’s postwar institutions. The cooperative has itself become a major developer. The Communist municipality has become a center-left power broker. Citizens who once organized through mass politics now do so outside of such spaces, placing their bodies in front of construction machinery to reopen decisions that had formally been settled years earlier. Others accept or welcome the project as a practical response to local needs. In short, while the old institutions remain visible, the relationships involved in them have changed.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>A Mirror of the Left Today</h2></header><div><p>Bosco Ospizio is a small but unusually clear mirror of the Left’s wider predicament. For while center-left parties speak the language of equality, participation, and the ecological transition, their practice in government more often amounts to administering business as usual.</p><p>This practice could easily be accused of hypocrisy. But more realistically, it is a reflection of a political model that prioritizes institutional competence over mass participation. As parties have retreated from workplaces and neighborhoods, their relationship with citizens has become thinner and more limited to election time. Political participation is only a fraction of what it once was. Public authorities, meanwhile, have lost resources, expertise, and confidence, becoming increasingly dependent on private actors to deliver investment.</p><p>The Left may occupy the town hall, but it often lacks, or no longer tries to build, the social power needed to confront the interests shaping the city beyond it.</p><p>If democratic participation cannot reopen a settled decision when ecological conditions, public priorities, and organized opinion have changed, then it becomes a kind of consultation without real consequences. And yet, if it ignores the residents who support the project, it also becomes exclusionary in a different way.</p><p>The activists’ proposal to keep the green space revives a key feature of the Emilian tradition: planning as a democratic process while now updating that inheritance for a city that has been altered by the effects of climate change. The postwar left promised development with social protection. According to the Bosco activists, the Left today must recognize that existing nature is itself a form of essential infrastructure.</p><p>We have said that the Emilian model ought not be romanticized. Its strength was not that the Communist mayors of old were exceptionally capable managers but lay in the fact that their administrations formed part of a larger attempt to shift power away from private wealth and toward organized citizens. This too is why Bosco Ospizio matters beyond Reggio Emilia.</p><p>The idea of progressive municipalism is again in fashion today, from European cities confronting austerity to debates over what local government can and should do. The Emilian experience deserves attention in this regard, but not as a ready-made brand or as a success story worthy of nostalgia.</p><p>At Bosco Ospizio, activists have forced these contradictions into the open. The battle over a patch of woodland has become a larger argument about what a city is for, whose needs count, and, ultimately, who gets to decide.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/reggio-emilia-municipal-politics-ecology-democracy?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-20T14:43:34.859905Z</published><summary type="text">Italy’s Emilia-Romagna region was long home to a mighty Communist Party which dominated local government. Today’s center left is less ambitious, and its promise of new services and job opportunities are dependent on private investment.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/jeffries-congress-speaker-socialists-organizing</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/jeffries-congress-speaker-socialists-organizing"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/858600659316.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/858600659316.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/858600659316.jpg"/><title type="text">Don’t Mourn Hakeem Jeffries’s Speakership. Organize.</title><updated>2026-11-19T20:29:16.745622Z</updated><author><name>Austin Warrington</name></author><category label="Party Politics" term="Party Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the wake of the midterms, the entirety of left-liberal America was jubilant. Democrats won majorities in the House and Senate, outperforming even the most idealistic predictions. But it was not only the Democratic victories that shocked observers — it was the <em>kind</em> of candidates who won. Democratic socialists had their strongest showing of any election in recent history, <a href="https://election.dsausa.org/">winning</a> 169 endorsed ballot measures and seats at the local, state, and federal levels — their strongest showing of any general election in recent history. And the wins by nonsocialist progressives and even many centrists affirmed an agenda <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/bernie-democrats-populist-rhetoric-class-affordability">championed</a> by democratic socialists, centering economic populism, wealth redistribution, and universal health care.</p><p>But then a harsh reality set in: the near inevitability of Rep. Hakeem Jeffries as the next Speaker of the House, a result that seemed to fly in the face of the progressive results we’d just seen. On Wednesday, just eleven Democrats voted against Jeffries in an internal nonbinding vote, including a bloc of five newly elected democratic socialists, joined by two additional Democrats. In a statement on their decision, the no voters cited ongoing negotiations around “Medicare for All, stopping [Immigration and Customs Enforcment (ICE)] terror, getting money out of politics, [and] ending the genocide in Gaza.” Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez notably did not join the no votes.</p><p>Jeffries is decidedly not a leftist nor a progressive. He is a pro-corporate Democrat who defends Israel and readily takes American Israel Public Affairs Committee money and corporate money. How, in the face of such a resounding progressive message from voters, could there be no clear alternative?</p><p>It’s understandable that some on the Left might feel deflated by this outcome. But we can also see the speaker conundrum as exposing an organizing void in Congress, one that the broadly left-leaning forces that felt so heartened by the midterm results have to confront soberly: we simply do not currently have the power, leverage, or internal relationships to elect a speaker that reflects the mandate we just witnessed. Changing that reality will need to start with an honest evaluation of the conditions surrounding the speakership race.</p><p>Jeffries has spent years building up to this moment. The relationships he’s nurtured with his careful, deliberate style and results he’s delivered to the Democratic caucus — negotiating important earmarks for Democrats in a Republican-controlled House, leading a multistate campaign to neutralize Republicans’ gerrymandering efforts, and steering increasingly large <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28227653-dccc-dues-sheet-q1-2026/">fundraising hauls</a> to the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee — were all leading to this moment. Any challenger, particularly one from a rising Left that is at its very beginnings in the halls of power, would be at a massive disadvantage.</p><p>Not only that, but any defectors willing to stick their necks out to back an alternative would be putting a target on their back, as Jeffries plays a key role in committee assignments and setting the agenda for the floor. Asking our electeds to risk their ability to successfully carry out their jobs and advance our priorities would be irresponsible without a viable path to success.</p><p>Socialists grappling with increasing power in government have to think long-term about how to create the conditions where a majority of House Democrats can back a socialist speaker. The time to start building toward that outcome is now, in Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) working groups and organizing committees across the country. Our bench of socialist electeds needs to be deeper in a way that can build buy-in for our goals among the general public, and we need to continue the work of relationship-building with our existing socialist electeds.</p><p>Deepening our bench of electeds happens at every level of government and requires a clear-eyed assessment of what it takes to win races, which usually centers on an ambitious fundraising plan. Designated candidate recruitment organizers can begin by identifying prospective candidates and taking meetings now in anticipation of 2028; ideal candidates have preexisting ties to DSA or a labor union, direct organizing experience, a demonstrated commitment to advancing socialist policies, and a willingness to work collaboratively and meet regularly with chapter leaders once elected.</p><p>Creating buy-in and demonstrating the popularity of our agenda among the public requires frequent and honest communication with the public. Rep. Ocasio-Cortez excels at this, making the often opaque operations of Congress <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/Dfhp2DpiKh6/">accessible</a> to millions through social media. To elect a socialist speaker, we would need to launch a campaign early, educating the public on the mechanisms as well as the stakes of the speaker’s race and building consensus around a candidate. A successful campaign will put us in a strong position when it is time for members to vote, where we can flex our organizing muscle to exert pressure using all of the support we’ve built throughout the course of the campaign.</p><p>Most importantly, we will need to continue the work of building relationships with our bloc of socialist electeds across the country. This work is carried out by trusted organizing leaders in <a href="https://www.newyorksocialistsinoffice.com/">regularly scheduled</a> <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/portland-democratic-socialists-city-council">group meetings</a>. It necessitates strong interpersonal skills on both ends, including the ability to manage conflict healthily and negotiate. Chapters with maturing socialist coalitions should connect with the architects of more <a href="https://jacobin.com/2025/12/zohran-campaign-field-canvassing-volunteers">established programs</a> to take some of the many lessons that have emerged over the years.</p><p>What distinguishes democratic socialists from other politicians is that strategizing and organizing don’t stop after election day. The project of building power is year-round and relies on the active participation of skilled organizers working with elected officials. In the past two weeks, Representatives-elect Claire Valdez and Darializa Avila Chevalier have organized canvasses of their constituents, asking them directly what they should prioritize in Congress and who they should back as speaker. This ongoing dialogue with constituents represents a new kind of strategy — one in which elected officials meet people where they’re at to continue the work of organizing outside of an electoral context, facilitating dialogue at the doors and creating trust and buy-in.</p><p>This is only a small piece of what it will take to win our agenda, but it is an important and meaningful step toward the kind of politics we should always be practicing: one that centers the needs of working people and ensures their voices echo in the halls of power.</p><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/jeffries-congress-speaker-socialists-organizing?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-19T20:29:16.745622Z</published><summary type="text">Hakeem Jeffries was elected the next Speaker of the House because the Left simply does not currently have the power to elect a speaker who reflects the progressive mandate we saw in the midterms. Changing that reality, however, is possible.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/anthropic-ai-security-surveillance-state</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/anthropic-ai-security-surveillance-state"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/345099541009.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/345099541009.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/345099541009.jpg"/><title type="text">Anthropic Is Already Part of the Security Establishment</title><updated>2026-11-19T20:04:02.979119Z</updated><author><name>Jacob Davis</name></author><category label="State" term="State"/><category label="Science and Technology" term="Science and Technology"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Anthropic, which priced its initial public offering (IPO) last night and began trading on the Nasdaq today, published an S-1, the corporate prospectus for the offering. The document, which extends over five hundred pages, is intended to provide potential investors with an outline of its corporate structure, business model, and financial situation. Much of the document is, accordingly, dedicated to mundane legal minutiae: long lists of hypothetical events that might adversely affect investments, specific provisions for investment to comply with foreign nations’ securities law, etc.</p><p>Some points, however, are quite instructive. As the filing explains, large-scale corporate decisions are overseen by a “long-term benefit trust” (LTBT): a five-person body responsible for appointing a majority of Anthropic’s board and entitled to a special class of corporate stock. Unlike most benefit trusts, the LTBT is a “‘<a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2023/10/28/anthropic-long-term-benefit-trust/">purpose trust</a>’ that is managed for the achievement of a purpose rather than for the benefit of a particular set of beneficiaries.”</p><p>While the LTBT itself has received <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/anthropic-ipo-s1-report-takeaways-6eebd721">mainstream attention</a>, less notice has been given to the identity of the trustees. Of the four currently appointed, one is Ben Bernanke — infamous as the architect of the Obama-era Wall St bailouts. And one is Richard Fontaine, chief executive officer of the Center for a New American Security (<a href="https://www.cnas.org/people/richard-fontaine">CNAS</a>) and North American executive director of the <a href="https://acrobat.adobe.com/id/urn:aaid:sc:VA6C2:ae5972c5-85d5-48e0-ab30-c205d633dbd2?">Trilateral Commission</a>. The latter appointment is especially noteworthy, for it speaks to an increasing coalescence of Anthropic, effective altruism, and the US national security establishment.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Company Purpose</h2></header><div><p>The LTBT is something of a novelty in corporate structure. It is a fine-tuning of the usual public benefit corporation (PBC) — a form of corporate governance that allows the company to balance other stated interests against the pecuniary interests of its shareholders. Anthropic’s innovation is to hand over much of the responsibility of enforcing these competing interests to the LTBT, which will eventually appoint a majority of the board of directors. The company is also unusual in the sweeping humanitarian nature of its “company purpose,” against which shareholder returns are to be balanced: “the responsible development and maintenance of advanced AI for the long-term benefit of humanity.”</p><p>The LTBT is an important indicator of Anthropic’s ethical self-understanding. According to the S-1, it “is intended to operate as an independent body of Trustees with expertise in AI safety, national security, public policy, and social enterprise.” These experts are selected for their perceived competence in promoting the humanitarian company purpose and “the best interests of those materially affected by our conduct” — a class which, given Anthropic’s <a href="https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/10/anthropic-ipo-warns-its-ai-could-blackmail-people-become-sentient-end-humanity/">stated beliefs</a> about its potential impact, includes all living humans. In addition to vesting them with material power, therefore, Anthropic’s choice of LTBT members says something about what the company understands those humanitarian interests to be.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>A Greater Degree of Moderation in Democracy</h2></header><div><p>Both CNAS and the Trilateral Commission enjoy a dark reputation among critics of the US-aligned international security community. The commission is especially notorious, and has long starred as the villain in a number of conspiracy theories of varying levels of plausibility. CNAS, however, may yet be the more influential of the two, and is to all appearances more bound up with the emerging hybrid of corporate AI, effective altruism, and the security establishment.</p><p>The Trilateral Commission is a private, international membership organization <a href="https://www.trilateral.org/about/">intended</a> “to discuss and propose solutions to some of the world’s toughest problems.” Members include various senior government officials, business executives, and academics. They are drawn primarily from the commission’s eponymous three regional groups: Europe (mainly Western), East Asia (mainly Japan), and North America (mainly the United States). Their official 2025 <a href="https://acrobat.adobe.com/id/urn:aaid:sc:VA6C2:ae5972c5-85d5-48e0-ab30-c205d633dbd2?">leadership list</a>, which names Fontaine as executive director of the North American group, mourns the passing of two founders: David Rockefeller and Dr Henry Kissinger. The commission’s operations are famously clandestine, which together with the elite status of many of its members has contributed to its perennial mystique.</p><p>Among leftists, it may be best known for its 1975 report (one of only a handful available to the public), “The Crisis of Democracy” — which was prominently <a href="https://chomsky.info/priorities01/">criticized</a> at the time by Noam Chomsky. The report’s section on the United States, authored by conservative intellectual Samuel P. Huntington, ascribes the preceding decade’s social turmoil to an “excess of democracy” — to be counteracted by “a greater degree of moderation in democracy.” Included in this excess were protest movements opposed to the Vietnam War and in support of racial justice. These movements helped dangerously integrate hitherto marginal populations, like black Americans, into the political process. “This marginality on the part of some groups [ . . . has] been one of the factors which has enabled democracy to function effectively.”</p><p>Half a century later, a similar attitude toward protest survives in Anthropic’s commercial and political activities. As Daniel Boguslaw <a href="https://prospect.org/2026/09/09/anthropic-artificial-intelligence-surveillance-system-monitor-activists/">details</a> in <cite>The</cite> <cite>American Prospect</cite>, the company has been explicit about its plans to deploy AI to surveil, predict, and stifle protest activism. These plans include collaboration with law enforcement, and fit well with historical <a href="https://jacobin.com/2023/05/longtermism-new-cold-war-biden-administration-china-semiconductors-ai-policy">calls</a> for digital surveillance from AI safety lobbyists at organizations with ties to Anthropic. Fontaine, who has served as the commission’s North American executive director since 2019, was appointed to Anthropic’s LTBT in 2025.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>The Revolving Door</h2></header><div><p>CNAS, on the other hand, is a Washington-based national security think tank with extensive ties to both Republican and Democratic White House administrations. Joe Biden and Donald Trump staffers with CNAS ties include senior figures like <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/avery-alpha-1431a74a/">Avery Alpha</a>, who occupied high-level roles at the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Homeland Security from 2017 to 2025 before turning to consultancy work. The organization has traditionally pursued a broadly neoconservative line on foreign policy. <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/richard-fontaine-9b78513/">Fontaine</a> was elevated as president in 2012, only to be promoted again to CEO in 2019 — five months before his Trilateral Commission executive appointment.</p><p>CNAS also has an exceptional history of conflicts of interest and likely illicit influence. Several of these came to light in a 2021 bombshell <a href="https://therevolvingdoorproject.org/cnas-report/">report</a> by the Revolving Door Project, which also helped expose CNAS members’ deep presence in the Biden and Trump administrations. The center has repeatedly championed private sector industries, international organizations, and foreign governments from whom it has received funding — often without explicit acknowledgement in the course of their advocacy.</p><p>Fontaine himself has taken direct part in these ethically suspect lobbying campaigns. In 2009, for example, he coauthored a policy <a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/contractors-in-american-conflicts-adapting-to-a-new-reality">paper</a> defending the use of private military contractors in the war on terror — without any explicit acknowledgement of CNAS’s funding from several military contractor firms. He also did not acknowledge the $25,000–$50,000 funding the think tank had received from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, during an event to promote NATO in 2019 at the Truman Library.</p><p>Anthropic is now itself among the beneficiaries of this conflict-ridden advocacy. On November 3, CNAS published a <a href="https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Sovereign-Agents_Final.pdf">report</a> advocating a suite of policy recommendations to protect against autonomous AI agents. The proposed policies align largely with Anthropic’s own stated regulatory agenda. And, conspicuously, certain of the policies clearly serve Anthropic’s commercial interests — especially against Chinese competitors. These include crackdowns on potential avenues of model distillation by foreign entities as well as diplomacy to erect barriers to powerful open-weights models. Model distillation by Chinese competitors has long been a <a href="https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-preventing-distillation-attacks">sore point</a> for Anthropic, and these competitors overwhelmingly favor open-weights licensing. At no point does the report mention Fontaine’s ties to Anthropic.</p><p>This hidden connection is just one part of a broader integration of CNAS, Anthropic, and affiliated organizations. CNAS affiliates now include major figures at Anthropic, like the center’s adjunct senior fellow, <a href="https://www.cnas.org/people/michael-sellitto">Michael Sellitto</a>. Sellitto, who served on the National Security Council during the Obama and first Trump administrations and currently serves on the Council for Foreign Relations, is head of Anthropic’s Global Affairs team. The team is <a href="https://prospect.org/2026/09/09/anthropic-artificial-intelligence-surveillance-system-monitor-activists/">associated</a> with Anthropic’s known surveillance activities and advocacy.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>Effective Altruists and New Cold Warriors</h2></header><div><p>CNAS has also maintained a partnership with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) — an Anthropic-linked AI safety lobbying organization with deep ties in Washington. In 2025, for example, CSET announced its new advisory board, including CNAS member <a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/staff/mike-brown/">Michael Brown</a>. It has also collaborated on several policy documents and research projects, <a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/comments-on-provisions-pertaining-to-u-s-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in-countries-of-concern/">particularly</a> on <a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/controlling-access-to-advanced-compute-via-the-cloud/">combating</a> Chinese AI <a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/controlling-access-to-advanced-compute-via-the-cloud/">development</a>.</p><p>CSET enjoys extensive connections with Anthropic. These include personal overlaps, like <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/video/anthropic-adviser-says-its-not-hypothetical-that-ai-could-abet-biological-weapons-risk/">Anthropic adviser</a> and <a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/staff/ben-buchanan/">CSET Senior Fellow</a> Ben Buchanan, or Anthropic policy executive and CSET advisory board member <a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/staff/joel-meyer/">Joel Meyer</a>. The two organizations have collaborated on the CHIPS Act and export controls against China, and are generally united under the ideological banner of effective altruism and AI safety.</p><p>In addition to personnel, CSET, CNAS, and Anthropic are linked financially through Coefficient Giving, the premier effective altruist donor body. Since its founding in 2019, CSET has <a href="https://www.eagrantsdatabase.org/?q=emerging">received</a> over $100 million from Coefficient Giving (formerly Open Philanthropy), most of it in advance of its collaboration with CNAS. CNAS, too, has <a href="https://www.eagrantsdatabase.org/?q=new+american">received</a> funding directly from Coefficient Giving, albeit in smaller quantities. The bulk of this transfer was conducted in 2022 and 2025, when it received grants of a bit over $5 million and $8 million, respectively, for work in AI governance and security. These larger grants built on a series of smaller ones (from around $24,000 to $260,000) starting in 2017.</p><p>Anthropic enjoys deep ideological and personal ties with Coefficient Giving. Both emerged from the effective altruist and AI safety movements, which continue to shape their rhetoric and policy directions. Holden Karnofsky, cofounder of Coefficient Giving’s precursor GiveWell, is <a href="https://itbb.substack.com/p/who-funds-the-watchdogs">married</a> to Anthropic board member Daniela Amodei, herself the sister of Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei. <a href="https://www.idinsight.org/person/neil-buddy-shah/">Neil Shah</a>, another LTBT member, served as managing director of Givewell until 2022. And <a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/3ucdmfGKMGPcibmF6/leaving-open-philanthropy-going-to-anthropic?ref=foommagazine.org">Joe Carlsmith</a> formerly led the AI-focussed “Worldview Investigations” team at Coefficient Giving (then Open Philanthropy). Now, he heads the “character” team at Anthropic, which is devoted to tailoring the values and personality of the company’s “Claude” assistants.</p><p>In the coming years and months, we are likely to witness a new influx of Anthropic money into Coefficient Giving and similar funding organizations — and thereby to more distant beneficiaries like CSET and CNAS. Many employees and executives have <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/technology/ai/articles/anthropic-founders-reportedly-pledge-away-173019234.html">announced</a> their intention to donate large portions of their wealth to charity, sometimes up to 80 percent. Coefficient Giving, itself a tax-deductible 501(c)3 <a href="https://www.charitynavigator.org/ein/992255770">nonprofit</a>, has been recognized as a “<a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/09/03/2026/coefficient-givings-ceo-on-silicon-valley-40-billion-philanthropy-boom">favorite</a>” of Anthropic executives, whose personal net worths extend into the tens of billions. In addition to laundering the donors’ reputations, these wealth transfers thus promise to further entrench the financial and organizational ties between Anthropic on the one hand and the Washington security establishment on the other.</p></div></section><section id="sec-5"><header><h2>Entanglement</h2></header><div><p>The foregoing connections only scratch the surface of Anthropic’s ever-deepening entanglement with the security state. Beyond Fontaine, for example, the LTBT includes Harvard physicist <a href="https://www.physics.harvard.edu/people/facpages/stubbs">Christopher Stubbs</a> — who in addition to his academic appointments serves as a member of the independent scientific advisory group JASON. JASON’s work (much of it classified) largely concentrates on defense and nuclear strategy, <a href="https://irp.fas.org/agency/dod/jason/">including</a> “studies under contract to the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the FBI.” Most notoriously, it collaborated with military leadership during the Vietnam War, as revealed by Freedom of Information Act <a href="https://nautilus.org/essentially-annihilated/">disclosures</a> in 2002.</p><p>These connections do not merely speak to the increasing influence of the security establishment over Anthropic (and vice versa). They are also a clue as to the meaning of the company’s professed concern for human welfare and survival. Together with statements from company leadership, they paint a picture of long-term human interests deeply inflected by interventionist, antidemocratic, and anti-privacy strains in modern American foreign policy. Those who distrust such strains would do well to regard Anthropic, or any company with similar entanglements, with serious apprehension.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/anthropic-ai-security-surveillance-state?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-19T20:04:02.979119Z</published><summary type="text">Four trustees elect most of Anthropic’s board, and one of them runs a leading national security think tank. The establishment didn’t have to buy Anthropic to get a seat at the table.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/work-freedom-motivation-capitalism-socialism</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/work-freedom-motivation-capitalism-socialism"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/529253509981.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/529253509981.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/529253509981.jpg"/><title type="text">How Will We Get People to Work Under Socialism?</title><updated>2026-11-20T13:08:55.417925Z</updated><author><name>Nick French</name></author><author><name>Neal Meyer</name></author><category label="Ideas" term="Ideas"/><category label="Society" term="Society"/><category label="Work" term="Work"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>With Zohran Mamdani’s rise to the mayoralty of the United States’s largest city and democratic socialists winning more and more elected offices at all levels across the country, there is renewed interest in and excitement about the idea of democratic socialism. But among socialists, there is little consensus on the content of that ideal. Many on the Left describe socialism in terms of greater income redistribution or an expanded public sector, with some socialists even describing their vision as <a href="https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/raman-capitalist-democratic-socialist-dsa-mayor-los-angeles/3960091/">compatible</a> with capitalism. </p><p>But we are seeing a growing number of proposals for <a href="https://blueprintforsocialism.com/">feasible</a> <a href="https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii154/articles/aaron-benanav-beyond-capitalism-2">postcapitalist</a> <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/10/kandiyali-marx-work-flourishing-ai">futures</a>, distinct from both the social democratic welfare states and the state socialist systems of the twentieth century. In a recent <a href="https://catalyst-journal.com/2026/09/labor-under-socialism">article</a> for <cite>Catalyst: A Journal of Theory and Strategy</cite>, <cite>Jacobin</cite> editor Nick French tackles the question of how a just postcapitalist society could get people to work. French argues that a just socialist society would recognize and enforce a general obligation to work while also protecting individual freedom; he argues that labor markets are the best institutional means to achieving these goals.</p><p><cite>Jacobin</cite> contributor Neal Meyer recently sat down with French to talk through the case for labor markets, including arguments against “postwork” visions of life after capitalism and appeals to moral motives, and what sort of economic inequalities might persist under socialism. You can listen to their conversation <a href="https://www.left-notes.com/p/work-capitalism-socialism-labor-markets-justice">here</a>. This transcript has been edited for length and clarity.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>The Duty to Work</h2></header><dl><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>We could start by talking about why you think people should work. It sounds like a preposterous question, but it actually is an important intervention. You and I are basically the same age; when we were in our twenties, the anarchist, libertarian left milieu was quite popular. I remember, as I was getting politicized, people talking about how people should have the right to be lazy, that we want to live in a postwork future. But in your article, you’re making an argument that people should work — that people have a duty to work.</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>I’ll have something to say about these advocates of postwork socialism or postwork communism. But first, on the idea of a duty to work: it’s very intuitive to most people. In order to produce the things that we need, individually and collectively, we have to engage in labor. That often means doing things we don’t want to do, or spending our time such that we would rather be doing something else. It means exercising our capacities for particular ends to serve social needs. This is a kind of burden, a very significant burden, that is placed on people.</p><p>My argument is trying to develop the intuitive idea that there are duties of <em>fairness</em> to other members of society. Insofar as you’re able to work — you’re not significantly disabled, or we can make accommodations for people to work — we all have an obligation to contribute to society through our labor.</p><p>Maybe the more interesting questions about a duty to work are about how we might implement it. Also, people have a lot of objections to the idea that there’s a duty to work based around very valid worries, or even revulsion, at the way the work ethic is deployed in our capitalist society, which is brutally unjust. Oftentimes the reason people are not working is not because they don’t want to, or because they’re just lazy. It’s because they’re actually excluded from the labor market; there’s not enough work to go around. Or they’re not working because they haven’t been provided with adequate educational opportunities, or they’re sick or disabled, and so on.</p><p>I’m not trying to make the argument that, in our actually existing society, people who aren’t working are immoral, or that we ought to shame people who are unemployed. Rather, the argument is: if we were to construct a fair society, where people have basic economic security, where everybody has equal access to high-quality education, where there are institutions that really do give everybody who can work a shot at getting a good job that pays well and treats them with dignity — in that ideal situation, we should expect everyone to contribute.</p></dd><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>This is very much a conversation about the obligations we would have to each other in a future society, not our current society.</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>Right. This is an argument in what philosophers sometimes call “ideal theory,” about the principles that would apply in a society that is basically just.</p></dd></dl></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Freedom of Occupational Choice</h2></header><dl><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>Part of the conception of justice you advance regarding labor is this idea that people should have a right to choose their occupation. Can you say more about that? And then, what’s the contrast you’re trying to draw here? Are there societies where that’s not the case?</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>This is another idea that is intuitive to most people, but it’s important to articulate it clearly. Because when we start trying to come up with a detailed vision of what socialism might look like, it’s important as a North Star to block certain authoritarian possibilities.</p><p>The idea of freedom of occupational choice is based in the notion that individual freedom, or autonomy, is an overriding value. This is something that’s common ground between the Marxist socialist tradition and the left-liberal philosophical tradition, chiefly as represented by people like John Stuart Mill and John Rawls, who I draw on a lot in this article. It’s very important that we be able to choose how we spend our time and how we exercise and develop our productive, creative, and intellectual capacities.</p><p>Part of how we do that is with the traditional civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, the kinds of things people are familiar with from the US Bill of Rights. But freedom of choice of occupation is really important too.</p><p>In formulating an idea of how I want to live my life, I’m crucially thinking about how I want to contribute to society. What sort of productive capacities do I want to develop and exercise? Do I want to be an engineer or a mechanic, an artist or a writer? These are fundamental to people’s identities in contemporary society. And that’s a kind of liberty that we should hope a socialist society would not just preserve but maximize.</p><p>When it comes to the potential contrasts or alternatives I have in mind, I’m thinking of societies where people are either <em>prevented from</em> taking on certain occupations or <em>forced to</em> take on certain jobs or occupations in an extensive way, where there’s not much room for people to set their own course in life. There’s formal legal discrimination, when employers discriminate openly on the basis of race or sex. That obviously is a major violation of freedom of choice of occupation. Again, most people in contemporary society would already reject such discrimination; the right to freedom of choice of occupation protects against it.</p><p>But it also protects against a vision of a more coercive or Stalinist-style socialism, where you have a central authority assigning people to certain jobs because that’s where they are supposedly most needed. We should guard against that as well.</p></dd><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>You mention in the article that that’s not even how state socialist societies actually handled the labor obligation problem. People had the freedom to choose their occupations to a large extent.</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>That’s right. These societies did have what were called “parasite laws.” The constitutions of the Soviet Union and other state socialist countries enshrined a duty to work, and they had laws on the books that would criminalize not working. If you refused to work at all, you would be punished. But in general, they didn’t tell people they had to work in certain occupations. This is more of a theoretical possibility than something that was actually implemented on a large scale.</p></dd></dl></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Can a Basic Income Free Us From Work?</h2></header><dl><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>Your article sets up these goals and then walks through a couple of models that you disagree with before presenting your desired option. The first idea you criticize is what people will probably be most familiar with, which is the universal basic income (UBI).</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>To be clear, I’m not arguing against UBI as a policy. I think something like a UBI would be an important part of a socialist institutional framework. What I’m arguing against is the idea that a UBI could free people from the need to work, which is how postwork theorists present it. People might still work out of the goodness of their hearts, or intrinsic joy in certain activities, but there would be no compulsion, or no duty or necessity, to work.</p><p>Here I’m drawing on Alex Gourevitch, who had a <a href="https://catalyst-journal.com/2022/09/post-work-socialism">great piece</a> in <cite>Catalyst</cite> a few years ago arguing against this postwork idea at length. His basic thought is, if nobody’s working because everybody is just taking a UBI, then no one is producing the goods that people would buy with that UBI. So it’s a fantasy that the UBI could free people from having to work.</p><p>One argument that some postwork thinkers emphasize is that automation can come in, the robots can come in, to do all the work that was formerly done by humans. That’s how we could have no one working and everyone just taking the UBI, because the machines are producing everything we need. I started working on this project before AI was at the top of everyone’s minds, and maybe now a lot of people think it’s more plausible that at least a lot of kinds of work are going to be automated out of existence in the foreseeable future.</p><p>But I still think — and here again I agree with Gourevitch — that we’re always going to have some people working. Crucially, we’re always going to need people to make decisions and oversee the machines that are doing labor. I also think there are lots of kinds of work, especially care work or “<a href="https://jacobin.com/2025/09/connective-labor-pugh-braverman-skill">connective labor</a>,” that seem to essentially involve human-to-human interaction: whether that’s health care or childcare or therapy, or the kind of interactions that we take for granted at, say, a bar or a restaurant or a coffee shop.</p><p>Now, under capitalism a lot of those workers are horribly exploited and not paid enough. But I don’t think an ideal socialist society would get rid of service work. I think those kinds of jobs can and should persist under socialism; workers should just be paid better and treated better and have more say over their working conditions. So even if AI and automation get rid of a lot of work, I think there will still always be work to do, and we need to have an idea of how we’re going to divvy that up and get people to do it.</p></dd></dl></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>Can Moral Motivation Do the Job?</h2></header><dl><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>The second argument you take on is this idea that moral motivation can be a substitute: that people should be exhorted to work harder to do these jobs, and that in a socialist society, these kinds of moral appeals will be sufficient to get people to do the necessary work. What problems do you see here?</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>A natural thought is that, if people have to work and we accept that there’s a duty to work, in a socialist society, we don’t want people to be motivated either by the threat of force or by “the dull compulsion of economic relations,” as Karl Marx put it — i.e., if you don’t work, you’ll starve. Instead, the idea is that we all come together, we democratically decide what work has to get done, and then, because we all see the value in contributing to the social project, we’ll all be motivated by the goodness of our hearts or our sense of duty to do what needs to be done.</p><p>My view is this seems to imply a very big change in human motivation from what we see today, and that there’s an unrealistically altruistic or moralistic conception of human nature and human psychology at play. Again, to go back to the original argument for a duty to work: work is often something that we don’t want to do. It imposes significant burdens. In choosing to work, I’m often choosing to do something where, if I’m left to my own devices, I would rather do something else.</p><p>The idea that you’re going to rely on these kinds of intrinsic moral motivations across a whole national or international economy, bringing together people who have no connection to each other, or maybe even have historical conflicts with one another — that you’re going to get them all to work out of a sense of duty — is just unrealistic.</p><p>I’m not saying it’s impossible. But in setting forward a vision of socialism, we shouldn’t rely on assuming unrealistic changes in human psychology. We should present something that is feasible given human beings as we know and understand them.</p></dd></dl></section><section id="sec-5"><header><h2>Coercion and Compulsion</h2></header><dl><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>Before we move on to your positive argument, I wanted to go back to the topic of coercion. You’re not saying that all attempts to get people to work are necessarily immoral or wrong or unjust. There are cases where some amount of compulsion may be necessary.</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>I want to separate two issues here. The first goes into the positive case I make for labor markets. We can imagine a just society in which people are motivated in part by monetary gain. There’s not necessarily anything wrong with trying to realize compliance with a duty to work by having a basic income or some social minimum that everyone is guaranteed, but then saying, “Hey, if you want to make more than that, you do have to work.” Then you have different jobs that are paying people different amounts of money. But I’ll come back to that.</p><p>The second issue is there might be certain jobs that, for various reasons, not enough people want to do, even if you pay them a lot of extra money — either because they require rare skills or talents, or because they involve a lot of drudgery, or because they’re especially hazardous. The classic example is sanitation workers. Maybe the robots will solve that one day; they don’t seem to be doing it yet. But until then, we’re still going to need people to collect and sort garbage. It’s drudgery, and it’s very hazardous work. We don’t want the market to assign that to whoever happens to want to take those jobs.</p><p>I’m very sympathetic to recent proposals by folks like <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23261270">Lucas Stanczyk</a> and <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/73/1/143/6623423">Jan Kandiyali</a> that people might be forced to take these jobs. I’m especially sympathetic to this idea when it comes to a kind of limited rotation. Maybe everyone should have a year or two of national civil service where they have to work as a sanitation worker, or they have to work cleaning hospitals, or something like that — work that involves more drudgery or is more hazardous. That’s a way of fairly sharing more extreme burdens of work. It’s also a way of inculcating a sense of civic duty and solidarity, that we’re all in this together.</p><p>Where I would draw the line is when it gets to a point that you’re really interfering with freedom of choice of occupation, where you’re forcing people to work for long periods of time, where you’re no longer allowing them to autonomously set the direction of their lives and decide how they want to develop and exercise their creative capacities.</p><p>There’s some room for a kind of coercive work regime in the kind of socialism I’m envisioning, but it has to be limited so that we are still respecting freedom of choice of occupation.</p></dd><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>One of the interesting questions, when thinking about the difference between a socialist society and a capitalist society, is: What kinds of jobs do people need to be incentivized to take? Under capitalism, the assumption is people need to be incentivized to take jobs that require a lot of training, or a lot of autonomy and decision-making, or a lot of organizational skills or people skills. These are jobs that, in a socialist society where there was greater equality of opportunity, a lot of people would have the opportunity to get and would want to take. You can think of a whole list of occupations today that people get paid a lot of money to do that have their own intrinsic rewards besides the financial incentive.</p><p>Under socialism, I would imagine those jobs are not going to pay as much, because a lot of people are going to be willing and able to do them. The jobs that are going to pay a lot are going to be the ones that require a lot of physical labor, that put you at risk, that are onerous or undesirable for many reasons. There’s going to be a kind of flipping of what needs to be incentivized in a transition from capitalism to socialism.</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>That’s how I’m thinking about it. If you have an institutional framework in which firms are collectively owned, where people have equal opportunity in terms of access to high-quality education, and society is really trying to make jobs available to everyone, and also you do have a generous welfare-state social minimum, so that when people are unemployed it’s not an absolute personal disaster — they have that extra leverage. They can walk away from jobs; they’re not desperate to take the first offer that comes into view. We wouldn’t expect as many people to be forced by the market into the more difficult jobs.</p></dd></dl></section><section id="sec-6"><header><h2>The Case for Labor Markets</h2></header><dl><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>We’ve cleared out some of the alternative ideas about how to handle the work problem in a better society. You come to the conclusion that labor markets have a really important role to play. Could you define what you mean by “labor markets,” and why you think they’re an important part of a vision for socialism?</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>By a labor market, I mean that you have firms — whether they’re public sector firms or cooperatives that are owned or managed by their workers — where people can be attracted to those positions by the offer of a certain wage, and they take those jobs because they offer a certain wage. There can be pay differentials to attract people to jobs and firms where they’re most needed. This fits into a broader vision of <a href="https://jacobin.com/store/product/the-blueprint">market socialism</a>.</p><p>The core case for this is provided by the moral arguments we discussed, and also the case against the alternatives. Because there is a duty to work — people need to work, and they ought to do so, and we ought to share that burden equally — and because people’s freedom of choice of occupation should be respected, the best way of realizing both of those principles is a labor market.</p><p>To clarify what I have in mind: Again, this is a socialist society. Obviously, we all have a lot of objections to the way labor markets work under capitalism, which we’ve already talked about. People are forced to take certain jobs because if they don’t, they’ll be on the street; they’ll starve. Also, when they take those jobs, they’re submitting to the <a href="https://jacobin.com/2017/06/private-government-interview-elizabeth-anderson">tyranny</a> of bosses who are not accountable to them in any way, who are following their own unconstrained profit imperatives. Again, I’m imagining a situation in which the relevant employers are democratically worker-managed firms, or public sector enterprises that are democratically accountable to the public, where workers have strong collective bargaining rights and protections.</p><p>Once you have those things in place, and once you have a strong social minimum provided by a welfare state — decommodified health care, free, high-quality education, and something like a universal basic income, so even if you’re not working, you have money to spend on clothes, shoes, and so on — I don’t think there’s any objection per se to a labor market.</p><p>Now, there are practical concerns that you might have about how this all works that I talk about in the paper. One of them is: If you have a really generous welfare state, or a generous basic income, what’s the incentive going to be for people to actually take jobs? We already said we’re not legally forcing people to take certain jobs. If that mute compulsion of economic relations isn’t there, is this really feasible?</p><p>I point to the evidence from really existing, generous social democracies, in the Nordic countries for example, that seems to show that having more robust welfare states doesn’t negatively affect people’s participation in the labor force or economic growth. So we have good reason to be optimistic that having a very generous social minimum is compatible with a dynamic labor market.</p><p>That said, I would acknowledge that if you make that social minimum too generous, then at some point you will lose that motivation that’s provided by offering people extra pay to take certain jobs. There’s always going to be some sort of balancing act. Probably, in our ideal socialist society, we’re going to have to do some trial and error to find where exactly that ideal social minimum lies. But I’m confident that we can ensure everyone a dignified existence.</p></dd><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>People might ask, well, what about those people who can’t work, for whatever reason, or who retire? Presumably they would be offered a higher-than-minimum income.</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>Yeah. Again, actually existing welfare states point in the direction of what a socialist society should do too, which is: if people have disabilities that prevent them from working, or if they’ve reached retirement age, they get an additional stipend above and beyond what they would get if they were working age and not judged to be disabled. That’s a fair way of managing things: to think that there’s some population we define as working age and capable that receives that basic dignified social minimum but also experiences an economic pressure to join the labor force.</p></dd><dt><p>Neal Meyer</p><p>One thing that might be worth also clarifying here is that, in your version of a labor market for socialism, we’re not talking about the kind of society we live in, where there’s no limit to the amount of income that someone can accumulate. The idea is to have a much more egalitarian wage structure.</p></dt><dd><p>Nick French</p><p>Definitely. My thought is that you want to allow inequalities insofar as that is necessary for providing everyone the means to flourish. I’m not coming down hard on an exact view about what the most just income distribution looks like. But I do think something like John Rawls’s difference principle is really compelling: you allow for inequalities in wealth and income insofar as those benefit the worst off.</p><p>Now, the kinds of inequalities that would exist because of pay differentials to get people to take certain jobs are going to be way smaller than exist under capitalism. There are a few reasons for that. One is that I do think people will be more intrinsically motivated in a society that is more solidaristic and where there’s more equality of opportunity. And when more of the economy is under public ownership and less driven by the profit motive, when you have collective bargaining regimes in place that guarantee workers certain minimums and sectoral benchmarks, as we’ve seen in places like Sweden, you’re not going to see runaway pay for executives. We’ve gotten rid of the capitalist class, so you don’t have capitalists hoarding wealth as individuals. So, there’s still inequality, but way less.</p></dd></dl></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/work-freedom-motivation-capitalism-socialism?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-19T17:37:36.911Z</published><summary type="text">Under capitalism, people are often motivated to work by the threat of destitution. A feasible and desirable socialist system has to get people to work while respecting individual freedom.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/jeffries-house-speaker-centrism-socialist-challenge</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/jeffries-house-speaker-centrism-socialist-challenge"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/159852261365.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/159852261365.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/159852261365.jpg"/><title type="text">Hakeem Jeffries Aside, Congress’s Left Is Well Positioned</title><updated>2026-11-19T16:40:04.890512Z</updated><author><name>Branko Marcetic</name></author><category label="Party Politics" term="Party Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>In a bitter disappointment for the Left, Hakeem Jeffries — the vehemently <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/hakeem-jeffries-aipac-israel-house-speaker-chuck-schumer-12679076">pro-Israel</a> Wall Street darling who <a href="https://mondoweiss.net/2014/07/comptroller-stringer-belligerent/">once</a>, bizarrely, did a version of George Wallace’s infamous “segregation forever” speech, only subbing in “Israel” for “segregation” — will be the next speaker of the House of Representatives. The vote wasn’t even close: 251–11, with two members abstaining, something Jeffries’s allies are already celebrating as a sign of his domination of the Democratic caucus.</p><p>Going into this election, the members of the expanded Squad — the twenty or so progressives and socialists elected to Congress who may or may not now be <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/playbook/2026/09/29/matt-gaetzs-advice-for-the-dem-revolution-01096630">known</a> as “The Bloc” — viewed the two years between now and 2028 as a vital, possibly final, chance for Democrats to deliver some actual results for working people and avert future political disaster. Jeffries’s ascension to the speaker’s gavel drastically reduces the chances of that happening.</p><p>That’s the pessimistic way to look at it, at least. There is also a rosier perspective.</p><p>But to start with, there’s a lot to be pessimistic about. Hakeem Jeffries is a champion of political and economic elites. He and <a href="https://x.com/donnydonny/status/2122116449301102662">the rest</a> of the House leadership are <a href="https://readsludge.com/2026/11/04/the-money-behind-hakeem-jeffries/">largely</a> <a href="https://readsludge.com/2026/11/13/jeffries-and-aguilar-top-house-democrats-in-corporate-pac-cash/">funded</a> by the exact industries — finance, defense, health insurers and pharmaceuticals, the crypto industry, and firms like Palantir — that are militantly against the kind of change that people voted his party into power to see.</p><p>His ambitious <a href="https://apnews.com/article/midterm-elections-democrats-affordability-corruption-018019529b14a6b3bc4a343a4e17c44f">agenda</a> if Democrats won was to reverse a handful of policies Donald Trump had enacted last year, including ending the Iran war, and simply bring us back to the intolerable <em>status quo ante</em> that produced Trump’s election in the first place. Jeffries is already <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/jeffries-whos-pledged-to-end-trumps-war-on-iran-says-no-on-defunding-it/">punting</a> on the budding plan to end the war by defunding it. He has <a href="https://x.com/DropSiteNews/status/2123084804707012762">refused</a> to <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/pro-israel-hakeem-jeffries-wins-democrats-speaker-nomination">commit</a> to even holding a vote on US aid to Israel, putting him at odds with not just a large supermajority of his party’s own voters but most of the American public.</p><p>Jeffries is, in other words, an embodiment of everything people do not like about the Democratic Party, which is more or less what incoming Ohio Rep. Don Leonard <a href="https://x.com/mkraju/status/2122084836516979152">told him</a> in a closed-door meeting, a sentiment Jeffries apparently gets. Upon telling the speaker-to-be to his face that his name was “synonymous” with the “low quality” of today’s Democratic Party brand, Jeffries, according to Leonard, nodded.</p><p>Socialists and progressives did not even try to mount a challenge to Jeffries, seemingly confirming fears that the blowout margin of the Democrats’ midterm win would, paradoxically, produce a <em>more conservative</em> outcome by shrinking the Left’s leverage. The party’s left-populist wing made the calculation that Jeffries simply had unassailable numbers, thanks in no small part to his lockstep <a href="https://punchbowl.news/article/washington/jeffries-rise-and-what-it-means-for-dems/">support</a> from the powerful Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), which views the history-making aspect of the first black House speaker as critically important, regardless of that speaker’s actual politics.</p><p>Some progressives <a href="https://www.facebook.com/NYPost/videos/aoc-faces-awkward-moment-over-backing-hakeem-jeffries-for-speaker/1865056404537732/">have</a> also <a href="https://naureenakhter.substack.com/p/the-speakers-frenzy?r=8c0rm">pointed to</a> the lack of viable (or really, any) challenger to Jeffries to explain the failure to move against him, which is partially true. They still could have tried to muster enough members to oppose him that it would make his eventual path to the speakership (for which the actual, full House vote will take place next year) more difficult and eventually wring concessions out of him, as the GOP’s Freedom Caucus did to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/mccarthy-paid-a-steep-price-for-his-speakership-now-what/">Kevin McCarthy</a> three years ago.</p><p>The counterargument to this is that Republicans in 2023 had a far slimmer majority than the Democrats will have — just nine seats, compared to the Democrats’ <a href="https://www.cookpolitical.com/analysis/house/house-overview/2026-house-election-results-numbers">eighty-five</a> seats and counting next year — and that they did this on the back of a GOP midterm performance widely <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/mccarthy-seeks-support-for-house-speakership-despite-objections-from-the-right">viewed</a> as a flop compared to the Democrats’ historic overperformance this year, which Jeffries’s allies like <a href="https://cbc.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3256">the CBC</a> wasted no time in crediting him personally with.</p><p>In any case, the party’s left bloc — which, of course, is still getting its bearings and hasn’t even been sworn in yet in Congress — decided the slim chances of rolling Jeffries wasn’t worth the risk of drawing his ire. The strongest, “steel man” argument for this is that they have done something similar to Zohran Mamdani in New York, who likewise calculated that, given his relatively weak position as a newly elected insurgent mayor, there was no plausible pathway to challenging centrist Democrats in New York, and he would be more successful if he avoided spending political capital on what he viewed as a suicide mission.</p><p>That decision saw Mamdani effectively <a href="https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2025/11/chi-osse-congress/409723/">quash</a> a Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) primary endorsement against Jeffries last year, both to keep the powerful Democratic leader out of his hair as he got his nascent mayoralty going and because he assessed that such a challenge could not win, and ally himself with centrist governor Kathy Hochul, betting he could accomplish the kinds of legislative victories he needed to succeed as mayor by cozying up to the governor (who holds significantly more power across multiple fronts) than by antagonizing her. Both of those proved to be successful bets for Mamdani.</p><p>We’ve gotten some idea of what the consequences for crossing Jeffries could look like from Leonard, who last week <a href="https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2026/11/10/congress/jim-jordan-house-republican-leader-01159192">revealed</a> party leadership had threatened to make him lose reelection in two years time if he didn’t get behind the Brooklyn Democrat. Other than Leonard, from what we know so far, the others who voted against Jeffries were almost all socialist freshmen in safe blue districts — or, in the case of incoming Reps. Frederick Haynes III and Adam Hamawy, Medicare for All–supporting progressives in safe blue districts.</p><p>In other words, the votes against Jeffries are from members who have nothing to lose and in fact could benefit politically in the long run from going on the record opposing someone expected to be a disappointing speaker.</p><p>By one view, this failure to block Jeffries will be fatal to the party and to any hope of it pursuing a pro-working-class agenda. Shortly after the result, Corbin Trent, cofounder of Justice Democrats and former staffer to both the Bernie Sanders presidential campaigns and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, had told me his fears that the Democrats would fail “if the same people who drove this bus of the party into the hands of Donald Trump twice” stayed in place, meaning Jeffries and his Senate counterpart, Chuck Schumer. Trent has spread that message <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/11/10/2026/progressives-confront-their-limited-leverage-as-they-take-on-democratic-leaders">elsewhere</a>, including on <a href="https://x.com/corbintrent/status/2122062194896408741">Fox News</a>, where he appeared to not-so-subtly prod his former boss, Ocasio-Cortez, to be more outspoken in this fight, saying that anyone planning to run for president in 2028 “should be voicing up now.”</p><p>As a number of incumbent and incoming left-insurgent lawmakers told me in the process of reporting a forthcoming <cite>In These Times</cite> piece on the midterm result, a Democratic failure to deliver results, or even to appear to be <em>trying</em> to deliver them, could spark another Obama era–like mass disillusionment that could end up empowering someone much worse than Trump not far down the line. According to the pessimistic view of where things currently stand, we are well on the way to that future right now.</p><p>But again, that’s not the only way to assess what happened here.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Jeffries Isn’t Out of the Woods</h2></header><div><p>There is good reason not to swallow wholesale the corporate center’s <a href="https://x.com/mkraju/status/2123117936634392870">triumphalism</a> over the vote margin, which the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c62v9z7z1z2o">corruption-tainted</a> Rep. Henry Cuellar <a href="https://x.com/mkraju/status/2123117936634392870">gloated</a> showed the opposition to Jeffries is just “a small number of votes that are marginalized” and that “this small little group cannot tell the caucus where we need to be at.” Those reasons go beyond the fact that some version of this line is what this crowd has constantly been telling themselves as their grip on the party has slowly faded the past ten years.</p><p>In advance of the vote, Jeffries had already moved on his initial, tepid program of Trump reversals by publicly <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/house/6219982-jeffries-endorses-medicare-age-lowering/">endorsing</a> Bernie Sanders’s Medicare expansion plan over the weekend. Sanders’s proposal — lowering the Medicare eligibility age to fifty-five, including dental, vision, and hearing in the program, and covering all children with it until they turn nineteen — was not something any Democrat brought up or ran on during the midterms. Yet Jeffries’s adoption of it means it’s quickly becoming a consensus position among both the Democrats’ <a href="https://deluzio.house.gov/media/press-releases/deluzio-jayapal-dingell-ryan-introduce-bill-lower-medicare-eligibility-age">populist</a> and <a href="https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-colleagues-introduces-legislation-to-lower-age-of-medicare-eligibility-to-50">corporate</a> wings since the Vermont senator first <a href="https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2026/11/05/congress/bernie-sanders-launches-medicare-for-all-push-01151604">brought it up</a> two days after the election.</p><p>This would not be a minor reform. It would extend free public health insurance to <a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10738110/">3.45 million</a> adults and anywhere from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/11/07/opinion/democrats-congress-trump.html">four–seven million</a> kids, depending on exactly how many children are thrown off health insurance in the years ahead by Trump’s Medicaid cuts. It would go much further than the Medicare-related parts of Joe Biden’s popular but never-passed Build Back Better bill, which merely added hearing to the program’s coverage, and would go a long way toward alleviating voters’ cost-of-living concerns, since health care is one of the biggest, most stress-inducing, and sometimes life-ruining costs anyone can deal with in today’s United States.</p><p>Left-insurgent lawmakers view the next two years as a unique opportunity: either they pass something that Trump actually ends up signing into law, making good on their election promises and tangibly making voters’ lives better, or Trump vetoes a bunch of things they pass, letting them make the argument to voters in 2028 that they need a Democratic president in the White House. If Jeffries’s movement on this matter holds, it will put socialists and progressives in a decent position to actually pursue this strategy.</p><p>Meanwhile, the fact that Jeffries <em>has</em> moved suggests he’s more vulnerable than the numbers today make it seem. Jeffries has, incredibly, a worse <a href="https://d3nkl3psvxxpe9.cloudfront.net/documents/econTabReport_AdxdJpN.pdf">approval rating</a> than outgoing Republican House speaker Mike Johnson, and while he at least gets overall positive marks from Kamala Harris voters, liberals, and Democrats — three of the paltry four groups he’s <em>not</em> underwater with — he gets them just barely, unable to muster majority support from any of those three.</p><p>More worrying for Jeffries, his congressional district, New York’s 8th, where he will have to contest a primary election in just two years’ time, is deep in <a href="https://nysfocus.com/interactives/2026-election-results/congress/">DSA territory</a>, in a state and city where the socialist organization has emerged over the past year as a leading <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/06/dsa-nyc-elections-zohran-democrats">political power</a>.</p><p>To its immediate north is the 7th district, where DSA member and Mamdani ally Claire Valdez (who just voted against Jeffries) easily bested the Brooklyn borough president for the seat, and at whose watch party DSA members chanted “You’re next!” when Jeffries came on the screen. Bordering its panhandle to the west is the heavily Jewish 10th district, where another Mamdani ally, Brad Lander, comfortably <a href="https://prospect.org/2026/06/24/new-york-mamdani-dsa-brad-lander-claire-valdez-darializa-avila-chevalier/">ousted</a> one of the Democrats’ most well-financed and most ardently pro-Israel members of Congress by taking <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/17/nyregion/lander-goldman-israel-nyc-primary.html">direct aim</a> at his unconditional support for Israel’s genocide. A little further up, and you get to the kingdom of another Mamdani ally and DSA member, Ocasio-Cortez, who eight years ago made her 14th district the final resting place for the career of a different <a href="https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2018/06/27/from-future-speaker-to-primary-loser-inside-crowleys-crushing-defeat-490979">corporate Democrat</a> once tipped to be a future speaker.</p><p>In other words, for the sake of his career, Jeffries has to watch his left flank for the next couple years. A misstep, or a series of them, where he ends up looking like the singular roadblock to Democrats’ progressive ambitions, will be a weakness that a future primary challenger will eagerly exploit.</p><p>Piling on the pressure is the fact that next year’s Democrat-led Senate is now looking like a far more progressive chamber than usual. Besides Sanders, the country’s most prominent and well-liked socialist, it will feature three of his endorsees (Abdul El-Sayed, Troy Jackson, and Peggy Flanagan), all of whom campaigned on Medicare for All, and <a href="https://www.padilla.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/padilla-joins-sanders-and-over-100-lawmakers-in-reintroduction-of-medicare-for-all/">sixteen others</a> who — however disingenuously — endorsed Sanders’s legislation on the program last year, as well as one other — Ron Wyden — who has <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1506/cosponsors">come around</a> to the idea in the past year, and <a href="https://oregoncapitalchronicle.com/2026/11/09/oregons-u-s-sen-wyden-says-hell-use-most-powerful-senate-committee-to-undo-republican-cuts/">vowed</a> to use his coming chairmanship of the Senate Finance Committee to <a href="https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2026/09/24/congress/wyden-supports-medicare-for-all-but-stops-short-of-senate-markup-01157476">push</a> through an expansion of the program.</p><p>It’s notable that the bold idea to risk a government shutdown in order to force Trump to end the Iran war originated from the Senate, and so far has the <a href="https://www.duckworth.senate.gov/news/press-releases/duckworth-bennet-sanders-van-hollen-release-joint-statement-opposing-spending-package-that-funds-trumps-war-on-iran">sign-on</a> of not just Sanders and Chris Van Hollen — who has spent the past twenty-two months courting progressive support for a potential 2028 run — but centrists Michael Bennet and Tammy Duckworth. It’s notable, too, that Jeffries felt he had to go along with the Medicare expansion proposal, another progressive idea that came out of the Senate.</p><p>What happens in the Senate majority leadership race could intensify this dynamic. If Schumer — who is more vulnerable than Jeffries and underwater with the left-leaning demographics that still give the future speaker a slim positive approval rating — really is replaced by the more progressive Van Hollen, it may add further pressure on Jeffries, given that he can’t politically afford to look like he’s stymieing the party’s agenda or undermining its resistance to Trump.</p><p>None of this is guaranteed, and it’s possible in a few months to a year, this will all read as wildly overoptimistic.</p><p>But the opposite, pessimistic case isn’t guaranteed either, and there are reasons to think that the Democrats’ populist wing of socialists and progressives has cards it’s yet to play, as it once more thanklessly drags the party into saving itself. Jeffries’s victory yesterday is certainly a blow for the Left. But it’s not out of the question that in hindsight, it looks more like losing a battle while winning the war.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/jeffries-house-speaker-centrism-socialist-challenge?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-19T16:14:54.731Z</published><summary type="text">Hakeem Jeffries will be the next House speaker, a depressing fact for many angry at the Democratic Party status quo. But there is a strong case that the Left is well positioned for fights with Jeffries and the party establishment in the near future.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/review-phillips-fein-american-inequality-reactionaries</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/review-phillips-fein-american-inequality-reactionaries"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/341748841926.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/341748841926.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/341748841926.jpg"/><title type="text">Rejecting Equality Is a Long-Standing American Tradition</title><updated>2026-11-19T14:54:42.85292Z</updated><author><name>Robbie Nelson</name></author><category label="Ideas" term="Ideas"/><category label="Books" term="Books"/><category label="Conservatism" term="Conservatism"/><category label="Inequality" term="Inequality"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Living in a country whose residents include both the world’s first trillionaire and 1.5 million homeless schoolchildren, the fact of American inequality is hard to miss. Such a reality produces countless justifications, explanations, and plans for ameliorating its worst impacts across the political spectrum. But at its sharpest edge, it also produces a coterie of intellectuals, pseudo-intellectuals, tycoons, activists, and posters who don’t merely attempt to explain or excuse inequality but rather celebrate its fruits and try to consolidate its bases.</p><p>Silicon Valley today plays host to the most prominent nest of techno-fascists, neoreactionaries, transhumanists, and “<a href="https://jacobin.com/2023/01/effective-altruism-longtermism-nick-bostrom-racism">effective altruists</a>” whose obscene wealth allows them to shape political discourse far beyond the strengths of their ideas or their personal charms, such as they are.</p><p>But as Kim Phillips-Fein demonstrates in her new book <cite>Country of Lords</cite>, the current version of explicitly anti-egalitarian politics adopted by today’s economic and political elites is merely the latest in a long tradition of American reactionary thought. Aimed squarely against the premise announced in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal,” this intellectual and political lineage has been carried forward by the lawyers, business moguls, charlatans, and academics who form the primary figures of Phillips-Fein’s sweeping tour of American political history.</p><p><cite>Country of Lords</cite> is a highly readable book, filled with a cast of colorful characters both well-known and more obscure. It sets forth a counter-history to the sunny, <cite>West Wing</cite>–style liberal narrative in which the inevitable march of American progress toward equal inclusion only faces obstacles thrown up by the dead weight of tradition or ignorance. Instead, building upon her previous work about the role of right-wing businessmen in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/12/conservative-movement-roots-capitalist-backlash-new-deal-order-kim-phillips-fein">fighting</a> against the New Deal, Phillips-Fein shows the strenuous and continuous efforts of reactionary figures not merely to conserve some traditional order but to transform and reestablish new hierarchies in the face of technological, social, and political change.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Action and Reaction</h2></header><div><p>The book is organized into six primary chapters, arranged chronologically and each anchored around a few historical figures and their connected sets of ideas. The New England statesman John Adams and the racist pro-slavery theorist George Fitzhugh might seem an odd pairing, but Phillips-Fein links their attempts to define the roles of their respective political and racial “aristocracies” in the early decades of American Republic. Likewise with the Yale professor William Graham Sumner and industrialist Andrew Carnegie enunciating their own versions of “survival of the fittest” in the context of Gilded Age industrial society.</p><p>Next are the “utilitarian racists,” anchored by Lothrop Stoddard and his infamous 1920 book, <cite>The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy</cite>, a deeply racist <em>cri de coeur</em> (beloved by <cite>The Great Gatsby</cite> character Tom Buchanan) that identified World War I and the Bolshevik revolution as the tipping points against European colonial power. The interwar period ushered in the age of Henry Ford and his “Gospel of Production,” a corporatist vision of American society in which the unequal unity of proprietors and their loyal workers could box out both the (Jewish-coded) union Reds and the (Jewish-coded) financiers.</p><p>The book’s fifth chapter, perhaps its most interesting and certainly its most expansive, takes a broader view of postwar liberalism’s discontents. Particularly potent are the various debates around the rise of intelligence quotient (IQ) tests, standardized college admissions exams like the SAT, and ideas about “equality of opportunity” in the midst of the legal changes called forth by the civil rights movements of the 1950s and ’60s. The author eventually hones in on the scientist-turned-racist-crank William Shockley and the Harvard psychologist Richard Herrnstein, two figures associated with the thesis that IQ is heritable and racially differentiated. Phillips-Fein pairs the race-and-IQ crowd with the libertarians and monetarists represented by the likes of Ayn Rand and Milton Friedman. What united these seemingly disparate figures was their belief that purportedly “neutral” mechanisms (standardized intelligence tests and free-market competition) could separate the “natural elite” from those meant to be ruled. The book ends with an investigation of the antidemocratic strains within Silicon Valley that provide a surprising intellectual continuity between the countercultural 1960s to the corporate consolidation of the 1980s and ’90s to the emergence of hard-right tech anti-humanists that dominate the scene today.</p><p>Each chapter could stand on its own, a mini-history of a particular moment and the multiple strands of anti-egalitarian politics that attended it. But, taken together, they paint a larger picture. By fleshing out both the continuities and similarities between inegalitarian ideas across time, some crucial patterns emerge. Idiosyncratic though they may be, these anti-egalitarian thinkers did not develop their ideas in a vacuum. Rather, their politics are deeply responsive to the emerging shape of struggle from below. In other words, reactionary thinkers are always <a href="https://jacobin.com/2014/08/reactionary-minds">reactive to</a> historically particular assertions of political power from the lower orders.</p><p>Although each chapter focuses primarily on conservative ideologues, their antagonists make consistent appearances. In each successive historical moment, new rounds of egalitarian struggle imperiled the ruling order. In response, new reactionary ideologies emerged that sought to both enshrine and update the ideological map of inequality.</p><p>The story lurking beneath <cite>The Country of Lords</cite> is that of an episodic but relatively cohesive American egalitarian tradition. From radical Enlightenment thinkers and indebted Revolutionary War veterans to abolitionists, Knights of Labor to the Socialist Party of Eugene V. Debs, garment workers on the Lower East Side to the NAACP of W. E. B Du Bois, United Auto Workers organizers to civil rights activists and beyond, American history has churned out ceaseless waves of agitators and movements seeking to overturn the social, economic, and political order and establish a more equal future.</p><p>The task of the modern reactionary, then, has not been to simply assert the God-given superiority of certain aristocratic families, but rather to counter each successive challenge with an updated and reorganized hierarchy that fits the changing social, technological, and economic landscapes that they encounter. Henry Ford’s worldview was not atavistic but distinctly modern and technologically driven, in the spirit of his age. His model of American corporatism incorporated not only the revolutionary technologies of internal combustion and the assembly line, but also cutting-edge social-scientific research into managing his workers’ lives and bodies on and off the factory floor.</p><p>Richard Herrnstein likewise did not subscribe to George Wallace–style Southern segregationism, but rather employed advanced (though subsequently debunked) statistical methods to make his arguments about race and IQ, being careful not to deny the possibility of individual black success stories. In other words, the realities of social mobility, new institutions, and new social attitudes pressurized the shape of these anti-egalitarian ideas.</p><p>Almost all of these anti-egalitatarian figures relied heavily on the discursive power of science and technology in both their explanations of inequality and their visions of how that inequality could be leveraged for social good. As the primary modern schema for adjudicating differences between things and producing causal explanations for social phenomena, the natural and social sciences loom large in the reactionary imagination as both threats and resources.</p><p>It is telling that almost all of this book’s subjects were not, themselves, born into high privilege. They ranged from working-class immigrants who worked their way up through industry or academia (Carnegie, Herrnstein, Friedman) to the children of middling farmers (Ford, Adams, Sumner) to the children of moderately successful provincial professionals (Fitzhugh, Stoddard). Interestingly, two of the techno-racists (Shockley and Peter Thiel) are the children of prosperous but highly peripatetic mining engineers.</p><p>Having gained a vantage point on American society from both outside and inside the elite, these up-and-comers were often able to craft and mobilize ideological concepts that went beyond mere defense of status quo elite configurations. Because of their personal prominence in the American economic or intellectual scene, these individuals had deep investment in both upholding the legitimacy of the system as well as opening that system up to the fresh perspectives of those coming from outside the blue-blood northeastern elite. Potential for upward social mobility of one kind or another is a load-bearing feature of most modern reactionary ideologies, because it both serves to justify the merited existence of a ruling class while also leaving open the possibility of entry. The replenishment of the upper classes and the defanging of disruptive movements from below are the dual goals of these political movements.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Constructing Equality</h2></header><div><p>Because of its particular focus on the history of anti-egalitarian ideas in the United States as well as its slim profile, <cite>Country of Lords</cite> does not spend much time building up a competing, left-wing account of and response to inequality. While the Left’s primary political task is countering actual inequality in the workplace, social relations, and the state, we also have to develop our own story about the nature of inequality in order to counter some of the key arguments of the reactionaries and their liberal fellow travelers.</p><p>There are both empirical observations and normative claims at the heart of this story. First, human beings are not “equal” or equivalent in terms of our physical capacities, desires, and talents. We inhabit different bodies and life experiences. But we assert that human beings <em>do</em> have equal dignity and worth and thus should be given, to the greatest extent possible, equal power to determine our own lives and to participate in decision-making that shapes our societies. The question at play in modern progressive politics is determining which institutions and historical processes can cultivate flourishing egalitarian societies in the context of human diversity and nonequivalency.</p><p>Historically speaking, unequal social classes are a pretty recent human social phenomenon, only emerging around twelve thousand years ago during the Neolithic revolution. During this era, the advent of agriculture, livestock domestication, sedentary urbanism, and the complex social division of labor fed into the generation of social surplus. In other words, these societies were able to produce and store more food than was necessary to meet their populations’ immediate needs.</p><p>New elites emerged and solidified their ability to command others’ labor, coordinate production and exchange, and make decisions about how to mobilize that social surplus. These new practices enabled the development of larger human populations, more advanced technology, and greater complexity in social, cultural, and economic life.</p><p>This rough historical sketch, viewed in a certain way, lends credence to anti-egalitarian arguments: human societies, since the birth of agriculture, have depended in fundamental ways on social hierarchy. In this telling, hierarchical divisions of labor were necessary to produce the technological advancements that have propelled humanity from living as small bands of hunter-gatherers to becoming geo-engineers and star-travelers.</p><p>However, the anti-egalitarians err in misidentifying the historically <em>functional</em> inequality of class society as an <em>intrinsic</em> inequality. Unequal power over the social surplus was provisionally necessary for the class system as it has emerged, but, empirically speaking, the actual people in those dominant positions over the course of history have not shared any intrinsic biological, moral, or technical superiority over those they have dominated.</p><p>The socialist movement has thus set for itself the most ambitious task imaginable: the construction of systems that sustain a complex divisions of labor necessary for a technologically advanced mass society — which is comprised of individuals who each have unique capacities and desires — while maintaining roughly equal access to social income and roughly equal decision-making power about the production and distribution of social surplus. An equal future cannot simply be wished or asserted: it needs to be built.</p><p>Despite Karl Marx’s famous injunction against “writing recipes for the cookshops of the future,” there has been a rash of recent English-language writing <a href="https://catalyst-journal.com/2018/12/socialism-for-realists">attempting</a> to <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/08/capitalism-socialism-markets-values-marxism">sketch</a> the <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/products/2843-the-blueprint?srsltid=AYCX9vKUrMRu6EtQl9zivz6pQeSqLUv9Js9UNK0KLcTLfdLBRnf6nMUe">contours</a> of a socialist future. While each example deserves its own complex treatment — and there are tensions between different visions — the ideas and institutions of <em>democracy</em> lie at the heart of each one.</p><p>The particular combination and format of representative and direct democratic decision-making is up for contestation, as is the precise role of markets in economic life. But democratic decision-making is the key mechanism for synthesizing the reality of individual difference with the need for collective deliberation and rough equality of political power. In a socialist future characterized by social complexity, division of labor, technological advancement, civil liberties, rough equality of social income, and rough equality of political capacity, democracy is the indispensable technology.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/review-phillips-fein-american-inequality-reactionaries?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-19T14:54:42.85292Z</published><summary type="text">The current version of explicitly anti-egalitarian politics adopted by today’s economic and political elites is only the latest in a long tradition of American reactionary thought that insists that all men and women are not, in fact, created equal.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/le-pen-far-right-rassemblement-national-violence</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/le-pen-far-right-rassemblement-national-violence"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/747209818888.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/747209818888.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/747209818888.jpg"/><title type="text">The Violent Far-Right Response to France’s Protests</title><updated>2026-11-20T12:35:17.601534Z</updated><author><name>Olly Haynes</name></author><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>For France’s media-political classes, the recent student movement has prompted a series of searching questions about violence and who has the right to use it. Debates often center on the alleged closeness of protesters to La France Insoumise, implying that Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s left-wing party is somehow responsible for vandalism by protesters and marginal acts of violence by students. Less remarked upon however, is that a wave of violence coming from the far right has also marked the protests and the presidential election campaign. Nor has it been much noted that this violence has killed already, and that Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) is alarmingly close to the violent groupuscules involved.</p><p>Already on October 24, far-right militants attacked trade unionists and protesters in Rouen, Nice, and Montpellier. In a video taken by a bystander in Rouen, Normandy, members of local identitarian movement Les Normaux can be seen throwing a man to the pavement before kicking him. None of the men were arrested by the police, although officers were present on the scene. The identitarians attempted to intimidate protesters by yelling far-right slogans such as “Rouen, Rouen is nationalist” and “the street and France belongs to us.”</p><p>The group had launched similar attacks on protesters the week before, beating two people to the ground and leaving them bloody. In a <a href="https://www.streetpress.com/1792420486-rouen-plusieurs-blesses-autour-rassemblement-identitaire-gud-mathieu-balavoine-cyril-wayenburg/">video</a> taken before the incident, a man can be seen at the head of their march, a leather belt wrapped around his fist, metal buckle in hand like a makeshift knuckle-duster. Street Press, a news website that closely monitors far-right activity, identified the man as Mathieu Balavoine, who runs a production company that was hired by the Rassemblement National in 2024, and that last year earned over €100,000 for a contract making videos for the party’s group in the European Parliament.</p><p>The far right’s propensity for lethal violence has also been demonstrated elsewhere in recent weeks. On October 23, Kevin Tessier, a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c6e3xek2457wo">coked-up fascist</a> armed with an automatic weapon, fired 128 bullets at black and Arab people in the city of Trappes, killing one person and injuring four. Trappes had repeatedly been the subject of a media moral panic about “territories lost to the Republic” because of their large minority populations. Le Pen contributed to this over the years, tweeting in 2018 following a stabbing in the city, that Trappes is “the symbol of those cities and neighborhoods where the French Republic has retreated, making way for communalism and Islamism.” Tessier’s motives were undeniably racist. Whether he was influenced directly by Le Pen’s words is unknown, but stickers found in his house suggest that he was at least a party sympathizer. Among a copy of Adolf Hitler’s <cite>Mein Kampf</cite> and other items indicative of his far-right ideology, were thirty stickers bearing the words “Long Live France, the RN, proud to be French.”</p><p>These were just the most recent instances of a longer story of far-right violence in France. In 2022 Argentine rugby player Federico Martín Aramburú was gunned down in the street by two former members of the Groupe Union Défense (GUD), a fascist youth circle with close ties to the RN. In 2023, a wave of far-right violence was unleashed in reaction to the Nahel Merzouk riots, which followed the police killing of a seventeen-year-old. That year, France became the only European country to see a major increase in the number of violent attacks by far-right groups compared to the 2010–2022 national average, according to a <a href="https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/resources/rtv-dataset/rtv-trend-report-2024_final.pdf">study</a> by the Center for Research on Extremism. Since then, acts of violence by such groups targeting ethnic minorities and political opponents have become increasingly common. According to daily <cite><a href="https://www.liberation.fr/idees-et-debats/editorial/extreme-droite-une-violence-de-plus-en-plus-decomplexee-20251229_L4HMHGYFFZAYHFEWUKN7N2WTEQ/">Libération</a></cite>, there was an average of one far-right attack per week in 2025.</p><p>The groups perpetrating these attacks — the formations that emerged following the self-dissolution of the GUD and the mandatory dissolution of Génération Identitaire — are alarmingly close to the RN.</p><p>According to Thomas Portes, who is president of the National Observatory of the Far Right, and France Insoumise MP for Saint-Denis, “There has been no break between the parliamentary far right and the groupuscules.”</p><blockquote><p>[In France] we have an annual mobilization by the May 9 Committee; it’s a Nazi demonstration in homage to a fascist activist who died. It was banned this year, but two years ago, the paperwork for the demonstration was filed by a parliamentary attaché for the RN, called Maylis de Cibon. There was a parliamentary assistant called Raphaël Ayma, who spoke at a conference of the friends of Léon Degrelle, a Belgian Nazi figure [before Ayma was expelled from the RN]. There is the press secretary of the RN group, Elise Laplace, who has just married a neofascist activist that arranged an attack on a political meeting in Bordeaux that was organized by my fellow [France Insoumise] MPs Louis Boyard and Carlos Martens Bilongo.</p></blockquote><p>“It goes beyond the assistants,” Portes tells <cite>Jacobin</cite>, pointing to the case of Tiffany Joncour, an RN MP whose husband, a hooligan with a background in the identitarian movement, <a href="https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/politique/260826/le-mari-de-la-deputee-rn-tiffany-joncour-condamne-pour-avoir-agresse-son-assistant-parlementaire">beat up</a> her parliamentary assistant whom he suspected of having an affair with her.</p><p>Portes’s list continues, telling <cite>Jacobin</cite> about four further examples. Even this list is not exhaustive. While researching another article, in the Eurocom forum that the group organizes through, I found an account of the Save Europe Act, an organization linking identitarian movements across Europe, which includes several groupuscules accused of violence. The account bore the name and location of Philippe Eymery, an RN regional councilor whose party branch was exposed in 2018 for employing Génération Identitaire activists. Eymery recently appeared on a radio show alongside various extreme-right groups that are members of the Eurocom group, promoting remigration. (He did not respond to my message requests on Twitter attempting to confirm if he was the owner of the account with his name.)</p><p>At France Insoumise’s own summer university in August, the party’s parliamentary chief Mathilde Panot told journalists that this would be an unusual presidential election campaign because of the level of violence that she and her colleagues expected. Her assessment has already proved prescient, though France Insoumise has in fact long been a target for far-right violence. The Trappes killer had a list suggesting he was intending to target France Insoumise MPs David Guiraud and Aymeric Caron, as well as anti-police-violence campaigner Assa Traoré and Green MP Sandrine Rousseau. France Insoumise canvassers and parliamentary assistants have been beaten up while campaigning for Mélenchon, and even the Quentin Deranque affair, which ended with a neo-Nazi activist dying from injuries sustained in a street fight by antifascist activists, began with fascist activists ambushing the antifascist activists outside a France Insoumise meeting in Lyon.</p><p>According to Portes, there is an “operation to reverse society’s moral compass based on falsehoods, which is targeted against us. For example, yesterday the minister of education tried to claim that it was France Insoumise, our activists and officials, who brought fireworks to high school students to allow them to fire them at school buildings. The interior minister was forced to deny it today. . . .  As for the far right, we represent everything that they hate. That is to say the imaginary of an anti-racist, anti-colonial, antifascist, egalitarian, New France.”</p><p>Part of Marine Le Pen’s strategy of detoxification has been to expel party members associated with openly extreme or violent groups in French politics. However, they only seem to be expelled when the press gets wind of it, and even then those close to the leader can escape unscathed. The Rassemblement National in parliament with the “shirts and ties” is just “decor” and “window dressing” says Portes. “When you look at the list of people who are elected officials for the RN, or their assistants, it’s a nursery of neo-Nazi, nationalist, royalist, and identitarian activists.”</p><p>Le Pen may have successfully detoxified the party brand. That doesn’t, however, mean that it has actually changed.</p><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/le-pen-far-right-rassemblement-national-violence?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-19T13:53:55.122Z</published><summary type="text">In recent weeks, French far-right militants have carried out several violent attacks. While media focus on young rioters breaking shop windows, they ignore the reactionaries who use deadly force against minorities and left-wingers.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/unions-schumer-van-hollen-senate</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/unions-schumer-van-hollen-senate"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/299499802319.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/299499802319.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/299499802319.jpg"/><title type="text">Why Are Most Union Leaders Silent on Booting Chuck Schumer?</title><updated>2026-11-18T21:26:53.832384Z</updated><author><name>Eric Blanc</name></author><category label="Party Politics" term="Party Politics"/><category label="Unions" term="Unions"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Why have only four national unions publicly backed Chris Van Hollen against Chuck Schumer for Senate leader? The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, the Office and Professional Employees International Union, National Nurses United, and the National Union of Healthcare Workers have taken Van Hollen’s side in this urgent fight. But where is everybody else?</p><p>It’s hard to overstate the stakes. If Democrats once again squander the opportunity given to them by the American people, the lost chance to improve people’s lives — and the ensuing political backlash — could be even worse than what followed the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations. Schumer-style corporate politics might as well have been designed in a lab to ensure that Democrats disappoint voters and quickly hand Republicans back the reins of power, perhaps this time under an even more dangerous and effective incarnation of far-right reaction.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Missing the Moment</h2></header><div><p>There is exactly zero reason to believe Schumer is the man for this moment. He’s a pro-Israel war hawk who is deeply embedded with the same billionaires that Democrats — including every single victorious 2026 Democratic Senate candidate in a battleground state — <a href="https://www.laborpolitics.com/p/dont-let-centrists-rewrite-history">ran against</a> in these midterms.</p><p>Want to see the pro-union Protecting the Right to Organize (<a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/02/labor-law-reform-bill-pro-act-workers">PRO) Act</a> and other urgent reforms passed within the first hundred days of the next Democratic administration? So do I. But even if Democrats win the presidency and retain Congress, getting this crucial labor law reform enacted will almost certainly require abolishing the filibuster. Van Hollen has explicitly endorsed doing so. As he put it <a href="https://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/van-hollen-says-the-filibuster-should-go">last Friday</a>, the Senate needs to let majorities govern with “fifty-one votes,” rather than keeping the “antidemocratic” filibuster. Schumer, by contrast, has refused to say whether he’d support getting rid of it. Asked directly after the midterms whether Democrats should abolish the rule, he <a href="https://www.democrats.senate.gov/news/press-releases/transcript-after-a-historic-senate-flip-leader-schumer-has-a-clear-message-for-the-american-people-thank-you-for-entrusting-us-with-the-majority-we-are-here-to-work-for-you">dodged</a> the question.</p><p>There’s also plenty a Senate majority leader can do over the next two years, even with Trump still holding the presidential veto. Democrats should aggressively investigate the administration’s corruption and use their control over spending to immediately challenge its worst policies on Iran, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Israel. Even more important, they’ll need to make crystal clear to Americans the ambitious agenda they’ll enact if they win the White House in 2028.</p><p>Van Hollen is promising to make the Senate a center of political opposition to billionaire power, putting popular reforms on the table and forcing Republicans to defend their opposition. Schumer is itching to return to the familiar routines of Schumerism: decent policy promises, timid negotiations, and endless excuses for inaction.</p><p>Plus, he’s insanely unpopular. A November YouGov <a href="https://indivisible.org/news/new-indivisible-yougov-poll-only-10-of-voters-support-schumer-as-senate-majority-leader/">poll</a> found that just 23 percent of voters viewed Schumer favorably, compared with 39 percent for Trump. That’s right: the Democratic leader most national unions are so far refusing to buck is substantially less popular than Donald Trump. An astonishing 57 percent of voters view Schumer unfavorably. Only 10 percent want him to remain Senate majority leader, compared with 57 percent who want somebody else.</p><p>Why on earth should the party’s future be placed in the hands of someone so widely disliked?</p><p>Schumer’s supporters understandably point to the Democratic victories this month. He did help recruit some good candidates, and that deserves some credit. But winning a midterm election amid an unpopular president’s economic and political disasters is a pretty different task from governing successfully afterward.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>The Case for Van Hollen</h2></header><div><p>Like Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the 1930s, Van Hollen comes out of the Democratic establishment but is reading the mood of the public and offering a real alternative to politics as usual. He has called for confronting billionaire power, backed Medicare for All, supported ending the filibuster, and taken a much tougher line on using congressional spending authority to end Trump’s war with Iran. He has also pledged to give the new class of insurgent populist senators a greater role in shaping the party’s direction.</p><p>Obviously, changing the leader won’t automatically overcome every obstacle to reform. Obviously, switching Senate leaders doesn’t mean the rest of us can sit back and watch the Democrats finally deliver. But there’s a big difference between a leader promising to break with business as usual and one whose career has largely been built around it.</p><p>Van Hollen has also shown that he’s willing to take political risks for workers. Don’t forget the case of Kilmar Ábrego García, the sheet-metal apprentice and International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART) member who Trump illegally deported to a notorious prison in El Salvador. Van Hollen personally flew there, met with Ábrego García, and helped lead the fight that brought him back to the United States. You would think SMART leadership would back a leader willing to go to such a degree for one of its members.</p><p>Some national unions have so far made clear that they understand the stakes. The Machinists’ president, Brian Bryant, <a href="https://www.goiam.org/news/iam-union-announces-support-for-chris-van-hollen-as-senate-majority-leader/">said</a> Van Hollen understood that the fight was one of “Workers vs. Billionaires.” OPEIU likewise sent Schumer a <a href="https://opeiu.org/opeiu-calls-on-the-senate-democratic-caucus-to-elect-a-new-leader/">letter</a> urging him to withdraw and make way for another leader, such as Van Hollen. National Nurses United put the point well in <a href="https://www.nationalnursesunited.org/press/nnu-backs-senator-van-hollen-for-senate-majority-leader">endorsing</a> Van Hollen. Its executive director, Puneet Maharaj, warned that Democrats must not squander the opening voters have given them.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>Politicking on the K Street Corridor</h2></header><div><p>The reason why more national union leaders aren’t yet saying the same isn’t complicated.</p><p>Many of them feel that a significant part of their job is to build close relationships with congresspeople to deliver for their members and fight for pro-worker legislation. If they back Van Hollen and Schumer wins, there’s a real risk that their union might suddenly find that their calls get returned a little less quickly (or not at all), and that important Democratic leaders might no longer listen to their legislative priorities. That’s a valid concern, especially given how Washington currently works.</p><p>But it’s also an extraordinarily narrow way to calculate political risk, especially at this moment of crisis. For years now, progressive union leaders have rightly insisted that democracy is on the line, that sky-high economic inequality must be reversed, that the Democrats should stand up for the little guy, and that the labor movement must do everything possible to defeat MAGA and greedy CEOs.</p><p>Now union leaders and Democrats have a rare opportunity to actually move the needle in that direction. And it wouldn’t even take much effort. This Senate fight is one of those exceedingly rare moments when a union press release could make a historic difference for working people and the country as a whole.</p><p>There’s no excuse for silence. Schumer is seventy-five and faces reelection in 2028 — if he even chooses to run. He’s hardly a permanent fixture of American politics. And Van Hollen is a respected senator who can work across the party’s ideological divisions.</p><p>The timidity prevailing on the K Street corridor of downtown DC isn’t an inevitable way of doing politics. Just look at how much bolder unions have been in state-level contests this year. In Michigan, the United Auto Workers (UAW), the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) Michigan, National Nurses United, the Association of Flight Attendants, and United Food and Commercial Workers Local 951 were among the unions that took sides in a fiercely contested Democratic Senate primary, backing Abdul El-Sayed against Schumer’s preferred candidate, Haley Stevens. In Maine, the state AFL-CIO and dozens of local unions went all out for Troy Jackson. And in Minnesota, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), UNITE HERE Local 17, and others backed Peggy Flanagan against the more establishment-friendly Angie Craig. All three of these Senate winners are now supporting Van Hollen.</p><p>Moving away from this bold spirit, most national union leaders currently appear to want to stay silent, hoping to square the circle between the evident anger of their base and their desire not to break with Schumer.</p><p>Some of them have framed the issue to me over the past few days as a matter of fighting for the agenda, not the person. But whether they like it or not, it’s precisely that choice of agenda and strategy that’s now being posed by the Senate leadership fight. Everybody knows that who leads the party has a great deal to do with what the party actually does.</p><p>It’s a bit disingenuous, too, to suddenly insist that the agenda matters but the leadership doesn’t, given how many national unions came out swinging for Nancy Pelosi when her speakership seemed like it might be challenged in 2018. Back then, the AFL-CIO, AFT, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, SEIU, UAW, the United Steelworkers, and numerous other unions <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/pelosi-has-union-support-in-bid-for-house-speaker-1">publicly backed</a> Pelosi in her fight to return as House Speaker. Union leaders understand that the choice of congressional leadership matters for the legislative agenda.</p></div></section><section id="sec-4"><header><h2>Not Too Late</h2></header><div><p>My suggestion to rank-and-file members and local and state union leaders is to look at this Van Hollen–Schumer fight as a test of whether their national leaders are ready to meet the moment. If they’re not able to take even this relatively mild risk to help save the Democrats from themselves, why should we expect them to take on the much bigger, even more consequential risks, like backing anti-corporate candidates for office in 2028 or massively investing in new organizing to unionize America afterward?</p><p>National union leaders still sitting this out or leaning toward Schumer should reconsider. In today’s fight for the future of the Democratic Party, national unions have to choose a side. They can stick with the old, corporate-friendly hacks who helped get us into this mess, or stand with those willing to fight against business as usual. There’s no neutral ground here.</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/unions-schumer-van-hollen-senate?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-18T21:26:53.832384Z</published><summary type="text">There is exactly zero reason to believe Chuck Schumer is the man for this moment. Yet most union leaders are not speaking up against him in the fight with Chris Van Hollen for Senate majority leader.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/mokhtefi-algeria-panthers-third-world-revolution</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/mokhtefi-algeria-panthers-third-world-revolution"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/707815894781.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/707815894781.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/707815894781.jpg"/><title type="text">The American Woman Who Joined Algeria’s Socialist Experiment</title><updated>2026-11-20T12:57:13.121914Z</updated><author><name>Julia Harte</name></author><category label="History" term="History"/><category label="Politics" term="Politics"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>Within days of arriving in Algeria, months after its liberation from France in 1962, Elaine Klein knew she was there for the long haul. “The experiment to create a new socialist country from the impoverished colony, the tremendous task of building a state respected in the international arena, was daunting,” she later wrote. Yet, “My gut told me that I would settle here.”</p><p>Her intuition was correct. For more than a decade, the Jewish New Yorker was the only American in Algeria’s new government. She assumed a range of roles — reporter, translator, envoy — as the former French colony established itself as an international haven for resistance groups, political dissidents, and anti-colonial organizers. Klein was not the only one taking on new responsibilities. A national program of popular self-management, or “autogestion,” was <a href="https://jacobin.com/2023/02/algeria-independence-self-management-socialism-democracy-coup">implemented</a> soon after the revolution, giving the Algerian people ownership of the farms, businesses, and buildings abandoned by fleeing European settlers.</p><p>A coup led by military chief Houari Boumédiène overthrew the first postcolonial government. The autogestion experiment largely ended, though Boumédiène kept trying to close Algeria’s wealth gap and resist economic subordination by the Global North. Klein also continued to cover progressive and socialist assemblages around the world on behalf of the national press agency, Algérie Presse Service. When the Organization of Latin American Solidarity gathered in Cuba in 1967 to form a united front against US imperialism, she attended a press conference where Stokely Carmichael called “white Western imperialist society” the “common enemy” of all the delegates present and declared, “Our struggle is to overthrow this system which feeds itself and expands itself through the economic and cultural exploitation of nonwhite, non-Western peoples.” Klein took the opportunity to invite Carmichael to visit Algeria later that year: his first trip to the African continent.</p><p>Into the early 1970s, she served as a sort of domestic ambassador for other Black Panthers and leaders of international revolutionary movements who flocked to open offices in Algiers, a city dubbed the “Mecca of Revolution” by Pan-African Bissau-Guinean poet Amílcar Cabral and the “third world capital” by Klein. Her work brought her under the scope of a vast CIA operation aimed at uncovering foreign involvement in domestic protest movements within the United States. The FBI’s COINTELPRO initiative helped drive a wedge between the international wing of the Black Panther Party, which Klein helped establish, and their US-based counterparts. After more than a decade in Algeria, Klein herself was forced to leave when she refused to spy on a friend for the Boumédiène regime.</p><p>Her idealism, however, never wavered. Until her death this September, she followed an irrepressible impulse to stand with other humans fighting for freedom and self-government, no matter where they were. And despite the remarkable role she played in some of the twentieth century’s most historic anti-colonial, social ownership, and civil rights movements, she never thought of herself as anything more or less than a world citizen.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Revolution in the Third World</h2></header><div><p>Klein first encountered the Algerian anti-colonial movement at the 1952 May Day parade in Paris. She had moved to France months earlier, after being pushed out of her job in New York with the United World Federalists (UWF). The UWF, part of an emerging “world government” movement that aimed to eradicate war and establish a system of global justice, had fractured due to internal divisions and external pressure from US authorities, a process that would recur with many causes Klein championed over time.</p><p>After moving to Paris, she began learning the history of decoloni­zation in North and West Africa through work as a French–English conference interpreter. In 1960, the year that eleven African countries — including nine former French colonies — became independent, she helped organize a congress in Ghana, the first African state to shake off colonial rule. There she developed a fast friendship with Frantz Fanon, whom the Algerian provisional government had recently named their ambassador to Ghana.</p><p>Back in New York later that year, Klein met the Algerian provisional government’s representative to the United Nations. He hired her on the spot to write promotional material and lobby for Algerian independence at the United Nations. On December 19, 1960, those efforts would pay off when the General Assembly voted 63–8 to recognize Algeria’s right to self-rule. (The United States and twenty-seven other countries abstained.) As Mokhtefi later told me, the unexpected job was a long-awaited opportunity for “digging in” and “getting my hands dirty” in the decolonization cause that she had long supported.</p><p>When France recognized Algerian independence in the summer of 1962, a brief power struggle ensued inside the National Liberation Front, the party that had led Algeria’s revolution. One of the Front’s original leaders, Ahmed Ben Bella, and Boumédiène, the head of his army, took control of Algiers in September. Klein arrived in October and started working for the tourism authority, a largely theoretical job in a country that would receive no tourists for years to come. Upon learning she was from New York, Ben Bella’s press and information adviser hired her as his assistant. From there, she was transferred to the government’s secretary general, an office that produced agendas, reports, and press releases for meetings of Algeria’s cabinet. Finally, she was moved to Algérie Presse Service, where she wrote daily op-eds and became the entire “English desk.”</p><p>Ben Bella was an outspoken adherent of Third Worldism, the anti-imperialist, anti-racist movement through which current and former colonies united to resist oppression by European powers as well as, eventually, the American and Sino-Soviet blocs during the Cold War. Third Worldists, as political scientist Robert Malley put it, had an “uneasy coexistence” with the Eurocentrism and cultural superiority embedded in some Marxist theory; Friedrich Engels in 1848 had described France’s conquest of Algeria as “an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization.”</p><p>Yet following the 1962 exodus of French colonists, or “pieds noirs,” socialists from around the world flocked to Algeria, drawn by the revolutionaries’ vision of a more democratic, egalitarian state. These foreigners would become known as “pieds rouges” after Ben Bella’s overthrow ousted many of them from Algeria too. Among them was the Greek Trotskyist Michalis Raptis, aka Michel Pablo. While leading the Fourth International during the 1950s, Pablo had devised a counterfeit-money scheme to buy weapons for Algerian revolutionaries on the world market and had established an arms factory for them in Morocco.</p><p>Soon after Pablo arrived in independent Algeria, he became an economic adviser to Ben Bella, presiding over the campaign of “autogestion” that put the nation’s resources under popular control. Modeled on similar experiments in Cuba and Yugoslavia — countries that also sent medical teams to Algeria to help replace the European health care personnel who had fled — Algeria’s self-management program established worker-run committees to oversee the farms, industrial enterprises, and estates left behind by the colonial regime. After attending an Algerian congress on industrial self-management in 1964, the Trotskyist French militant <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/08/daniel-guerin-socialist-anarchism-anti-colonialism-gay-liberation">Daniel Guérin</a> wrote that the event had been “dominated” by the emergence of “a working class, of a socialist awareness.” Ben Bella himself embraced socialism at public rallies and within his government, opening a National Office for the Support of the Socialist Sector.</p><p>This enthusiasm was short-lived, however. Ben Bella’s other advisers persuaded him to fold the socialist sector support office into the agricultural ministry and to exert more central control over the self-managed farms, giving rise to a corrupt bureaucracy. While the National Liberation Front continued to publicly tout Algeria as a self-managed socialist state, the country slipped further from that ideal. “Power and increasing adulation isolated [Ben Bella] from a truthful examination of events,” according to Klein. “He launched new national projects every day, but neglected the measures required to implement them; he created offices and agencies that functioned in name only.” Ben Bella also began to take more punitive measures against domestic dissidents, arresting, torturing and banishing those who criticized him.</p><p>Three years after Algeria had won its independence, Boumédiène led a coup in which Ben Bella was arrested. It was the result of an internal power struggle more than an ideological rift; Boumédiène would continue to pursue some of the same progressive social policies and redistribution measures as his predecessor. But many pieds rouges, including Pablo, were branded foreign atheists and forced out of Algeria. Klein stayed, even though she had joined popular protests against the coup. Her fluency in English and French — a rare combination in postrevolutionary Algeria — had made her useful to the foreign affairs minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a key ally of Boumédiène. “Hope remained that one day everything would be put right,” Klein later wrote. “And we all went back to work.”</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Panthers, Trotskyists, and G-Men</h2></header><div><p>In the summer of 1969, two years after she had invited Carmichael to Algeria and shown him around the country, Klein received a call that another Black Panther leader was in Algiers — and needed her help establishing a permanent presence there. Eldridge Cleaver had fled the United States several months earlier after exchanging shots with Oakland police the night of Martin Luther King Jr’s assassination. For Klein, who had protested racial segregation in the United States since college and reported on the rise of the Black Panther Party for the Algerian press, the opportunity to work for the Panthers was thrilling. As with many in the Third Worldist movement, she saw anti-racist and anti-colonial activism as inseparable.</p><p>Klein helped formalize Cleaver’s status in the country by involving him in the world’s first Pan-African Cultural Festival, which she organized in Algiers soon after his arrival. She also helped Cleaver and other Panthers establish the party’s international branch there, and accompanied his wife Kathleen on a speaking tour back in the United States. As Cleaver settled into Algeria, he took a more militantly anti-American stance and strengthened the Panthers’ Third World, anti-colonial bona fides through new alliances with figures such as North Korea’s Kim Il Sung and the Palestinian Fatah leader Yasser Arafat. In a 1971 interview with a San Francisco radio station, Cleaver proudly claimed that Black Panther members serving in Vietnam had switched sides, fighting against the US war effort there.</p><p>These moves clashed with the priorities of the US-based Panthers, who, depleted of personnel and funds by the number of Panthers who had ended up in prison, were trying to put more resources into peace­ful community service programs. In March 1970, as part of its COINTELPRO effort to “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings,” the FBI’s second most powerful official recom­mended that the Bureau send Cleaver a letter “aimed at inflaming the dispute” by telling Cleaver he was being undercut by US-based Black Panther Party leaders. One year later, as Cleaver was on the brink of completely falling out with one such leader, Huey Newton, J. Edgar Hoover endorsed a plan to send Cleaver and Newton spurious correspondence designed to “provoke the existing difficulty” between them. One fake letter purported to show Newton denouncing Cleaver to Boumédiène.</p><p>Ten­sions between the Algerian government and the Black Panthers, meanwhile, had been building, exacerbated by the Panthers’ disinclination to inte­grate into Algerian society. There was also a fundamental contradiction between the goals of the Algiers-based Panthers and those of the Algerian government. For Cleaver, the Black Panther Party had a singular objective: overthrowing the US government. But Algerian leaders wanted to limit their military aid to freedom fighters trying to liberate their countries from foreign colonization.</p><p>The mutual frustration between the Algerian authorities and their American guests peaked in August 1972. That month, members of the Black Lib­eration Army, a splinter group started by former Black Panthers who had rejected Huey Newton as too moderate, hijacked a Delta flight from Detroit destined for Miami and landed it in Algiers. They planned to donate their $1 million ransom from the airline to the international Black Panthers, but Algerian authorities confiscated the funds and returned them to Delta. When Cleaver demanded the money, local police raided the Panther villa and took their weapons. Cleaver was never officially deported, but with other Panthers also leaving Algiers, he decided to leave.</p><p>To extract Cleaver from Algeria, Klein enlisted the help of none other than Michel Pablo, who had fled to France after Boumédiène’s 1965 coup. The former Fourth International secretary and Ben Bella adviser who had once counterfeited money to supply arms to Algeria’s revolutionary army sprang into action once more to help a different kind of revolutionary leave Algeria. Pablo gave Klein the number of a “passer” who could meet Cleaver at the Geneva airport and covertly drive him over the border into France. Pablo also supplied her with a “classy British passport with a photo of a Black man who could have been a younger Eldridge,” as Klein wrote in her memoir. She arranged a safe house for Cleaver and helped him find French lawyers to petition for his asylum there.</p><p>Klein’s own position in Algeria was becoming more precarious under Boumédiène’s regime. In 1972, secu­rity agents asked her to spy on a friend of hers who had married Ben Bella, and she refused. Two years later, Klein herself was forced into exile from the country to which she had devoted her life. But she had a companion by her side. Two years earlier, a mutual friend had set her up with Mokhtar Mokhtefi: a dashing hero of the Algerian Revolution, who was also rapidly grow­ing disillusioned with the authoritarian turn of the postindependence lead­ership. When Mokhtefi ended up in France, Klein followed, and they lived there for two decades, doing a mix of odd jobs — from making jewelry to writing children’s books — before moving to the United States in 1994.</p><p>As Klein forged a new life first in Paris and ultimately in New York City, Algeria underwent its own identity crises and political convulsions, straying even farther from the socialist ambitions that had defined its early years of independence. When Bouteflika — the Boumédiène-aligned foreign affairs minister who had used Klein’s translation services in the 1960s — became president of Algeria in 1999, he shored up his power by enriching a small group of oligarchs at the expense of the general population.</p><p>Twenty years into his presidency, Bouteflika was forced out of office by the largest popular opposition movement in Algeria since the revolution that had launched his political career sixty years earlier. On November 1, 2019, the sixty-fifth anniversary of the start of the revolution, tens of thousands of demonstrators who called themselves the Hirak (Arabic for “movement”) surged through Algiers to protest Bouteflika’s final efforts to cling to power. “Algeria will take back its independence,” they chanted in Arabic, clapping in time to the syncopated rallying cry. Young and old Algerians waved flags as they marched in the streets or banged on pots and pans from their windows in solidarity.</p><p>Among the protesters thronging the main streets of Algiers so densely that it was almost impossible to move, Elaine Klein — now Elaine Mokhtefi and ninety years old — could be seen in the crowd, glowing with excitement and cheering on the Hirak with the slogans of the new revolutionaries.</p></div></section><section id="sec-3"><header><h2>“I’ve Started to Talk, and I Don’t Stop”</h2></header><div><p>I first visited Mokhtefi at her Manhattan apartment in 2021, when I emailed her out of the blue to ask if I could interview her for a book I was writing about Americans who had traveled abroad to join revolutionary liberation movements. We spoke for several hours about the remarkable trajectory of her life and the causes she and Mokhtar continued to support after moving back to the United States. It was a lonely repatriation for Mokhtefi, at first: “There was nobody to tell what had happened, neither about the Black Panthers, nor about the Algerian war. Everyone seemed very far from all that.” But she and Mokhtar were not idle. “We had to contribute,” she said. “We had to show that we were still responsible world citizens.” They joined Palestinian liberation demonstrations, climate justice marches, and visited encamped protesters at Zuccotti Park several times during the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement.</p><figure><img alt="A photo of an older Elaine Mokhtefi" height="516" loading="lazy" src="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/982809644122.jpg" width="506"/><figcaption>Elaine Mokhtefi, date unknown. (Dzkouslavia / <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en">CC BY-SA 3.0</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Mokhtar died in 2015, forty-three years after he and Mokhtefi first met. Writing her memoir, <cite>Algiers, Third World Capital: Freedom Fighters, Revolutionaries, Black Panthers</cite>, Mokhtefi told me, had saved her from a pit of grief that she feared might swallow her up. But ever since it was published in 2018, “and I went on these tours, and I saw that people were really inter­ested in what I had lived,” she continued, “I’ve started to talk, and I don’t stop.”</p><p>I stayed in touch with Mokhtefi as I continued working on my chapter about her. In 2022, I went to Algiers to visit prominent sites from her time there and interview former Algerian revolutionaries whose paths had crossed with hers. Eventually she met my partner and daughter, and I got to know many of her friends. Every time we saw each other, I marveled at how busy her social life and traveling schedule remained, even as she grew frailer and memories eluded her more often. In August, I visited her apartment one last time to attend a party she threw to celebrate receiving Algerian nationality in recognition of her service to the nation. By then, I had a copy of my own book to give her.</p><p>A few weeks later — three days before her sudden death — she emailed me, telling me she had started reading my book from the beginning, but that about halfway through the second chapter, “I couldn’t hold myself back, I had to read about me. I just wasn’t capable of waiting my turn. What an experience . . . Thanks, merci, gracias, saha as the Algerians say, the works. I felt so full of myself, validated well beyond any merit.”</p><p>She told me how lucky she felt that we had entered each other’s lives. Then she added, “I will read the other chapters and see your perspective through to the end, and with such pleasure. With love, Elaine.”</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/mokhtefi-algeria-panthers-third-world-revolution?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-18T18:34:47.239Z</published><summary type="text">Elaine Mokhtefi has died. The Jewish New Yorker was the only American to serve in Algeria’s government after independence, and she spent a decade at the center of the Third World revolution.</summary></entry><entry><id>https://jacobin.com/2026/11/seattle-hilton-unite-here-strike</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/seattle-hilton-unite-here-strike"/><link rel="enclosure" type="image/jpeg" href="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/541848125561.jpg"/><media:content url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/541848125561.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg"/><media:thumbnail url="https://media.jacobin.com/images/2026/11/541848125561.jpg"/><title type="text">The Longest Hotel Strike in Washington State History</title><updated>2026-11-18T17:09:47.02242Z</updated><author><name>Diana Varenik</name></author><author><name>Natascha Elena Uhlmann</name></author><category label="Borders and Immigration" term="Borders and Immigration"/><category label="Unions" term="Unions"/><content type="xhtml"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div><p>You’d be forgiven for worrying, twelve weeks into a strike, that the boss is hell-bent on waiting you out. But after more than eighty days on the picket line at Seattle’s Embassy Suites by Hilton in Pioneer Square, Aspen Desmarais was undeterred. “I can live on a budget,” she said. “Been doing it since day one.”</p><p>After eighty-five days, on September 10, workers won the longest hotel strike in Washington state history. Their union, UNITE HERE Local 8, represents four thousand hospitality workers in Oregon and Washington.</p><p>Desmarais, a strike captain and bartender at the hotel, worked to keep others motivated throughout the fight. She and her coworkers were “tired of people talking down to us and not treating us with respect,” she said, “when we’re the reason that place stays running the way that it does.”</p><p>Hilton’s offer, two weeks into the strike, of <a href="https://southseattleemerald.org/news/2026/09/07/the-longest-hotel-worker-strike-in-wa-is-still-going-on-in-pioneer-square">one cent per hour</a> over its previous proposal helped fuel outrage. The union held open bargaining, so members heard the offer firsthand. “I [felt] frustrated and disrespected,” Desmarais said. “Especially with how much hard work my coworkers put into making sure the hotel and its guests have clean spaces and stays that are welcoming.”</p><p>Fritzie Corral, an Embassy Suites breakfast attendant, had only worked at the hotel for two months before walking out. As the strike went on, she said, her son worried that she had made a mistake in taking the job.</p><p>“You see other employees that decided to stay in the hotel working,” she said. “Even during that time, I still believed I made the right choice. It’s my right to voice out what I feel and to fight for my rights.”</p><p>Hilton did not respond to requests for comment.</p></div><section id="sec-1"><header><h2>Protection From ICE</h2></header><div><p>Workers won significant pay increases, lowered barriers for health care eligibility, and highly sought-after protections for immigrant workers. Hilton, which manages the hotel, drew protests earlier this year for housing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents and for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/hilton-removes-minneapolis-hotel-that-cancelled-reservation-immigration-agents-2026-01-06/">cutting ties</a> with a Minneapolis hotel that canceled ICE bookings during Operation Metro Surge.</p><p>The union’s leaders criticized Hilton throughout the strike for dismissing contract language that would protect immigrant workers. “With ICE-related killings in the news for months causing immigrant workers to worry, why is Hilton refusing to give immigrant workers’ union a heads up if ICE is staying at the hotel?” Local 8 President Anita Seth asked <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20260807480874/en/UNITE-HERE-Local-8-Are-Hilton-Hotels-nICE-Hotels-Seattle-Embassy-Suites-Workers-Call-Out-Companys-Insufficient-Protections-for-Immigrants-as-Strike-Passes-50-Days">Business Wire</a>.</p><p>Ultimately workers won a commitment from Hilton not to punish workers who call out due to an immigration enforcement surge, plus language binding the hotel to an expedited resolution process in such an event. Workers who lose their work authorization due to immigration enforcement will now be able to return to their jobs if their work authorization is restored within four years, and to retain their seniority for up to two.</p><p>Desmarais told <cite>Labor Notes</cite> that making sure immigrant coworkers missing work because of ICE “knew they would have a job still and a safe place to come back to” was the “most important” win strikers fought for.</p><p>Starting in 2027, housekeepers will make over $31 an hour — a giant step above the $17.63 an hour that housekeepers make on average across the country, per the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The new contract makes them the highest-paid housekeepers in the state, according to the union. Embassy Suites workers classified as “tipped” will now make $1 more per hour than the city’s minimum wage.</p><p>Health care eligibility was also a core demand for the union. Many hotel workers under collective bargaining agreements must meet a minimum threshold of hours worked to qualify for health benefits in a given period. Seasonal layoffs, a hallmark of hotel work, often mean inconsistent coverage for workers and their families.</p><p>The new contract replaces the month-to-month eligibility standard with an annual threshold of 1,250 hours, or around twenty-four hours a week, to qualify.</p></div></section><section id="sec-2"><header><h2>Mass Cancellations</h2></header><div><p>The strike coincided with five of the six World Cup soccer matches held at Seattle’s Lumen Field this summer, directly across from the Embassy Suites. World Cup–related leverage helped produce quick <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/07/stadium-workers-world-cup-ice">contract wins</a> this summer for service and hospitality workers in Philadelphia, New York, and Los Angeles, but not so in Seattle.</p><p>How did strikers there keep up the pressure for another sixty-three days after the games ended? The hotel’s proximity to Lumen Field makes it a destination for football fans when the season starts in September. On game days, the hotel sets up a bar facing the stadium. Workers set up a separate picket line mere feet away from the customers and urged fans not to cross.</p><p>In between sporting events, Desmarais said solidarity from other union workers played a big role.</p><p>Combined pressure from Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) railworkers (represented by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen Division 518) and sympathetic elected officials pushed Sound Transit to move its contract to another hotel with no promise of return. The transit agency had maintained a block of rooms for the BNSF workers who operate its commuter rail — accounting for twenty-five rooms nightly, or roughly $18,500 in weekly revenues, <a href="https://www.unitehere8.org/strikeimpact/">according to</a> Local 8, and a significant portion of the hotel’s income during low-traffic winter months.</p><p>Embassy Suites workers like Desmarais worked hard to push Sound Transit and other hotel clients to honor the picket line. “There was one day I had to make over ninety phone calls,” she said. “For the most part, it was actually a pretty positive reaction.”</p><p>Teamster sanitation and United Parcel Service workers also refused to service the hotel during the strike. Corral reported seeing the hotel’s director and assistant director hauling garbage out during the World Cup. “It felt so rewarding,” said Desmarais. “Yeah, you have to get your hands dirty and not just do paperwork. I think it gave them a real experience of what we have to deal with.”</p><p>Corral said community solidarity was key in getting Hilton to concede. Strikers’ church groups joined the picket line. So did several Seattle elected officials and even some hotel guests. Guests also brought workers donuts, contributed to the strike fund, and left Google reviews urging hotel management to “come to the table” and “sign the contract already.”</p><p>One temp worker <a href="https://www.instagram.com/reels/DadVcSdh4jL/">walked off</a> the job after only an hour to join the picket line. Corral said such displays of solidarity made workers “more motivated to keep on.”</p><p>Many workers worried about money, the future of their jobs, and their families while on strike. But when someone was scared or upset, there was always another worker to help uplift them, said Corral: “We’re like family.”</p></div></section><p><em>This article originally appeared in <a href="https://jacobin.com/2026/11/seattle-hilton-unite-here-strike?utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Jacobin</a>, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. <a href="https://jacobin.com/subscribe/?code=SYNDICATED&amp;utm_source=msn&amp;utm_medium=syndication&amp;utm_campaign=feed-footer">Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.</a></em></p></div></content><published>2026-11-18T17:09:47.02242Z</published><summary type="text">After 85 days on the picket line, workers at Seattle’s Embassy Suites won a historic strike victory. Workers achieved big pay increases, lower barriers for health care eligibility, and highly sought-after protections for immigrant workers.</summary></entry></feed>