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I am recovering my own DJI RC 2 (RC331 / KATMAI-IDP), which stopped booting after an experimental system flash. Original stock partition backups are available. The controller responds to Sahara identification over USB 05c6:9008, but I do not have a verified compatible Firehose programmer.
The outer DJI Root CA certificate in the saved original XBL hashes to the same value. Authentication-enable fuses have not been read, and no candidate loader has been uploaded, so I am not claiming an observed signature rejection.
Does anyone have a legitimately shareable RC331-compatible programmer, or a public service-package source containing one? A source URL, file SHA256, supported hardware IDs and successful Sahara/Firehose log would help verify it. I am looking for an actual EDL programmer rather than an OTA firmware .bin, Android rescue APK, or fastboot image.
Generic Xiaomi/Oplus/Samsung candidates inspected so far have different OEM roots; the published Action 5 Pro/RedMagic method targets a different processor. The aim is to read the live partition layout first and preserve calibration, RPMB and device-specific data before restoring stock.
Device serial numbers, account information and private backups are intentionally omitted. Thanks for any leads.
Diagnostic update: only ELF headers and non-executable hash/signature metadata have now been transferred; no complete programmer or executable segment was sent, and no flash/erase commands were issued.
The original DJI XBL metadata progresses to a request for its first code segment (offset 0x3000), where the probe stops. A copy differing by exactly one bit in the ECDSA signature disconnects/re-enumerates immediately after metadata; the unchanged original then progresses again. Offline ECDSA/SHA384 verification passes for the original and fails for that control. This is strong evidence of signature validation on this path, though authentication fuses were not read. Three non-DJI programmer candidates also disconnected at the metadata stage.
The stock XBL contains XBLRamDump/Sahara code, but it is not a demonstrated Firehose programmer. We still need a legitimately shareable RC331-compatible signed programmer or a verified stock recovery procedure. The saved stock partitions are a partial backup, not a full-device backup.
Activity
Jayjay3623 commentedon Nov 5, 2026
Diagnostic update: only ELF headers and non-executable hash/signature metadata have now been transferred; no complete programmer or executable segment was sent, and no flash/erase commands were issued.
The original DJI XBL metadata progresses to a request for its first code segment (offset 0x3000), where the probe stops. A copy differing by exactly one bit in the ECDSA signature disconnects/re-enumerates immediately after metadata; the unchanged original then progresses again. Offline ECDSA/SHA384 verification passes for the original and fails for that control. This is strong evidence of signature validation on this path, though authentication fuses were not read. Three non-DJI programmer candidates also disconnected at the metadata stage.
The stock XBL contains XBLRamDump/Sahara code, but it is not a demonstrated Firehose programmer. We still need a legitimately shareable RC331-compatible signed programmer or a verified stock recovery procedure. The saved stock partitions are a partial backup, not a full-device backup.