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Replies: 5 comments 10 replies
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Seems to be based on signed commits in git, and chain of custody thereof. All good stuff I've wanted to implement for a long time, alongside deterministic/reproducible builds. I believe there won't be a negative impact on product, I remember hearing about some downsides to signed commits in git when they were first introduced, but I can't find much on that now, it's possible they worked out the bugs. |
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This is a fantastic idea and cosign would likely be a great tool. If the distribution is packaged into a tar it can be easily distributed using the Github Container Registry and signed. It might also be valuable to follow some of the guidance here to create and sign an SBOM. |
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Which public key can I verify the signatures against? |
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The keys we are currently using are now published on the website; https://www.keycloak.org/downloads - https://www.keycloak.org/keys |
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Keycloak releases only offers a basic hash (MD5/SHA1) as a way to verify the integrity of releases. MDA/SHA1 have issues, but in addition adds little value other than checking download integrity as the hashes can be generated by anyone, and are hosted on the same site as the downloads themselves.
We should like at options on properly signing releases. Where sigstore seems to be a good candidate.
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