In this section, we employ the Lean 4 theorem prover [@demoura2021] to
formally verify the core mathematical guarantees of the proposed
consensus and reward mechanisms. Using the Mathlib library
[@mathlib2020], we prove the algebraic safety, zero-sum settlement
conservation, and the theoretical resistance to various adversarial
attack vectors. All proofs have been compiled and mathematically
verified using Lean version v4.33.0-rc2.
The following proof verifies that pruning an historical cohort updates an active miner's payout percentage strictly by
The following proof verifies the safety of the base-layer settlement mechanism. It proves that proportionally distributing the aggregated dust (
In many cryptographic protocols (such as quadratic funding or specific proof-of-stake voting models), reward equations scale non-linearly based on user count, making them highly vulnerable to Sybil attacks. EDCA's decay factor (
Because the protocol is strictly linear, an attacker gains zero mathematical advantage by splitting their hashrate. For example, 10% of a block reward split across 100 node identities is mathematically identical to 10% of the reward kept whole. Furthermore, a Sybil attacker incurs a severe economic penalty: settling payouts to multiple identities forces the attacker to pay external network transaction fees to recombine those UTXOs later. The Nash Equilibrium is therefore to mine under a single identity.
We formalize this property in Lean by first proving the baseline 2-split case. Using Lean's \texttt{ring} tactic, we confirm that the scoring formula strictly distributes across two identities. We then generalize this to an
When high-value Miner Extractable Value (MEV) enters the mempool, legacy pool miners are incentivized to disconnect and solo-mine the block. Because EDCA distributes the amplified block reward across all retained historical shares, a whale who disconnects forfeits their expected share of that amplified pool reward. The Expected Value (EV) of solo-mining a block is identical to the EV of mining it inside the pool; therefore, applying a decay penalty to a hopper's historical score results in a strict mathematical loss.
Assume a block reward of
The following Lean proof formally guarantees that the opportunity cost of leaving the pool grows in exact, direct proportion to the MEV the attacker attempts to steal, rendering the attack mathematically irrational. View the Lean Proof
In a linear blockchain, "Selfish Mining" succeeds because block withholding forces a race to orphan honest chain tips. EDCA operates on a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), meaning concurrent shares are never orphaned; they are merged. Consequently, the only mechanical effect of withholding a share is artificially increasing its topological age.
Because the decay factor (