8000 anpa1200/CTI_PORTFOLIO_ONEPAGER.md at main · anpa1200/anpa1200 · GitHub
[go: up one dir, main page]

Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
98 lines (74 loc) · 6.83 KB

CTI_PORTFOLIO_ONEPAGER.md

File metadata and controls

98 lines (74 loc) · 6.83 KB

CTI Portfolio One-Pager — Andrey Pautov

Who I Am

Cybersecurity researcher and CTI-to-detection practitioner focused on turning threat intelligence, adversary behavior, log/security telemetry, and AI-assisted workflows into detection-ready, SOC-usable, evidence-based security outputs.

Public proof-of-work:

Best-Fit Roles

  • CTI Analyst
  • Threat Intelligence Researcher
  • CTI-to-Detection Engineer
  • Threat Detection Researcher
  • Security Research Engineer
  • Intel delivery / customer-facing CTI
  • SOC enablement / detection-content role
  • OpenCTI / CTI platform-oriented security role

Flagship Projects

Project What it demonstrates Links
CTI Analyst Field Manual Evidence discipline, source reliability, confidence language, attribution caution, infrastructure pivoting, ATT&CK usage, hunting hypotheses, detection backlog, SOC handoff, and reusable analyst templates. https://1200km.com/cti-analyst-field-manual/
Operation Desert Hydra Complete CTI-to-detection pipeline: 71 source candidates → 8 promoted (CISA, INCD, vendor) → 10 procedures with evidence labels → OpenCTI knowledge graph → 11 detection records (SIEM-agnostic pseudologic) → benign Windows 10 lab → Kibana proof screenshots. 14 PASS / 1 PARTIAL / 1 FAIL across 16 rule checks. 16/21 ATT&CK techniques (76%) fully lab-validated. Failures documented with root cause. One-command reproducible. https://1200km.com/operation-desert-hydra/ · Detection Atlas: https://1200km.com/operation-desert-hydra/docs/phase-4-detection-atlas · Validation: https://1200km.com/operation-desert-hydra/docs/phase-5-results
Israel Government Threat Actors CTI Applied public-source sector CTI for Israeli public-sector and critical-infrastructure exposure: actors, personas, malware families, TTPs, detection opportunities, and defensive context. https://1200km.com/israel-government-threat-actors-cti/
Customer-Driven AI CTI Project Gate-controlled CTI-to-detection delivery methodology from requirements and PIRs/SIRs to evidence handling, detection backlog, SOC handoff, executive reporting, and defensive outcomes. https://1200km.com/customer-driven-ai-cti-project/
OpenCTI Intelligent Shield CTI platform engineering: OpenCTI deployment, connector design, STIX-oriented workflows, analyst-reviewed enrichment, review limitations, and operational CTI infrastructure. https://github.com/anpa1200/opencti-intelligent-shield
CVSS v4.0 Field Guide Vulnerability prioritization, scoring logic, exploitability context, and decision support. https://1200km.com/cvss/
HexStrike AI Guide AI-assisted authorized security research guide used as supporting offensive-informed defensive context. https://1200km.com/Hexstrike-AI-guide/

CTI Skills Demonstrated

  • Evidence labeling and source evaluation.
  • Confidence language based on evidence quality, corroboration, source access, and analytic consistency.
  • Attribution caution: separating infrastructure, malware, TTP overlap, public claims, and assessment language.
  • Infrastructure pivoting from a single IOC to bounded attacker infrastructure hypotheses.
  • ATT&CK candidate mapping used for behavior structuring and detection planning, not attribution proof.
  • Hunting hypotheses, detection backlog creation, SOC handoff, and executive-friendly reporting.

Detection / SOC Outputs

  • Operation Desert Hydra: 11 detection records with SIEM-agnostic pseudologic (Sigma, KQL, Elastic JSON, SPL). Coverage scores: 5 = lab-validated multi-source, 4 = lab-validated single-source, 3 = validation incomplete or failed. 14 PASS / 1 PARTIAL / 1 FAIL across 16 rule checks. All failures documented with root cause and fix path.
  • Detection-ready hypotheses with telemetry requirements and false-positive class notes.
  • ATT&CK candidate mappings requiring evidence review before production use.
  • IOC pivot notes and infrastructure graphs.
  • YARA and malware-analysis outputs from supporting tools.
  • CVE prioritization context using KEV, EPSS, CVSS, and asset profile logic.
  • SOC-usable summaries with evidence, gaps, assumptions, confidence, and operational use.

OpenCTI / CTI Platform Work

  • Operation Desert Hydra: Self-hosted OpenCTI 6.2 — MuddyWater intrusion set, 9 malware families, 4 tools, 21 ATT&CK techniques, 20 source reports. pycti import script with idempotent read-before-create. STIX 2.1 createdBy references the analyst identity, not the threat actor.
  • OpenCTI deployment and workflow notes.
  • Connector and enrichment design considerations.
  • STIX-oriented workflows.
  • Analyst-reviewed enrichment and review gates.
  • Enrichment limitations and operational CTI infrastructure concerns.

AI-Assisted CTI Workflow Experience

My AI work is framed as analyst decision support, not an analyst replacement. AI-assisted workflows in the portfolio focus on structured enrichment, candidate mapping, summarization, and review support.

Guardrails:

  • AI output is untrusted until analyst-reviewed.
  • Candidate scoring requires analyst validation.
  • Candidate ATT&CK mapping requires evidence review.
  • Shared tooling does not prove actor identity.
  • CTI output should identify evidence, gaps, assumptions, confidence, and operational use.

Medium / Writing Proof-Of-Work

Supporting Security Research

Contact

0