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1541 lines (1445 loc) · 44.6 KB
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/* Copyright 2018 The ChromiumOS Authors
* Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
* found in the LICENSE file.
*/
#include <ctype.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include "libminijail-private.h"
#include "libminijail.h"
#include "libsyscalls.h"
#include "config_parser.h"
#include "elfparse.h"
#include "minijail0_cli.h"
#include "system.h"
#include "util.h"
#define IDMAP_LEN 32U
#define DEFAULT_TMP_SIZE (64 * 1024 * 1024)
/* option_entry struct: tracks configuration options. */
struct option_entry {
char *name;
char *args;
struct option_entry *next;
};
/*
* A malloc() that aborts on failure. We only implement this in the CLI as
* the library should return ENOMEM errors when allocations fail.
*/
static void *xmalloc(size_t size)
{
void *ret = malloc(size);
if (!ret)
err(1, "malloc() failed");
return ret;
}
static char *xstrdup(const char *s)
{
char *ret = strdup(s);
if (!ret)
err(1, "strdup() failed");
return ret;
}
static void set_user(struct minijail *j, const char *arg, uid_t *out_uid,
gid_t *out_gid)
{
char *end = NULL;
uid_t uid = strtoul(arg, &end, 10);
if (!*end && *arg) {
*out_uid = uid;
minijail_change_uid(j, uid);
return;
}
int ret = lookup_user(arg, out_uid, out_gid);
if (ret) {
errno = -ret;
err(1, "Bad user '%s'", arg);
}
ret = minijail_change_user(j, arg);
if (ret) {
errno = -ret;
err(1, "minijail_change_user('%s') failed", arg);
}
}
static void set_group(struct minijail *j, const char *arg, gid_t *out_gid)
{
char *end = NULL;
gid_t gid = strtoul(arg, &end, 10);
if (!*end && *arg) {
*out_gid = gid;
minijail_change_gid(j, gid);
return;
}
int ret = lookup_group(arg, out_gid);
if (ret) {
errno = -ret;
err(1, "Bad group '%s'", arg);
}
minijail_change_gid(j, *out_gid);
}
/*
* Helper function used by --add-suppl-group (possibly more than once),
* to build the supplementary gids array.
*/
static void suppl_group_add(size_t *suppl_gids_count, gid_t **suppl_gids,
char *arg)
{
char *end = NULL;
gid_t gid = strtoul(arg, &end, 10);
int ret;
if (!*end && *arg) {
/* A gid number has been specified, proceed. */
} else if ((ret = lookup_group(arg, &gid))) {
/*
* A group name has been specified,
* but doesn't exist: we bail out.
*/
errno = -ret;
err(1, "Bad group '%s'", arg);
}
/*
* From here, gid is guaranteed to be set and valid,
* we add it to our supplementary gids array.
*/
*suppl_gids =
realloc(*suppl_gids, sizeof(gid_t) * ++(*suppl_gids_count));
if (!*suppl_gids)
err(1, "failed to allocate memory");
(*suppl_gids)[*suppl_gids_count - 1] = gid;
}
static void skip_securebits(struct minijail *j, const char *arg)
{
uint64_t securebits_skip_mask;
char *end = NULL;
securebits_skip_mask = strtoull(arg, &end, 16);
if (*end)
errx(1, "Invalid securebit mask: '%s'", arg);
minijail_skip_setting_securebits(j, securebits_skip_mask);
}
static void use_caps(struct minijail *j, const char *arg)
{
uint64_t caps = 0;
cap_t parsed_caps = cap_from_text(arg);
if (parsed_caps != NULL) {
unsigned int i;
const uint64_t >
cap_flag_value_t cap_value;
unsigned int last_valid_cap = get_last_valid_cap();
for (i = 0; i <= last_valid_cap; ++i) {
if (cap_get_flag(parsed_caps, i, CAP_EFFECTIVE,
&cap_value)) {
if (errno == EINVAL) {
/*
* Some versions of libcap reject any
* capabilities they were not compiled
* with by returning EINVAL.
*/
continue;
}
err(1,
"Could not get the value of the %d-th "
"capability",
i);
}
if (cap_value == CAP_SET)
caps |= (one << i);
}
cap_free(parsed_caps);
} else {
char *end = NULL;
caps = strtoull(arg, &end, 16);
if (*end)
errx(1, "Invalid cap set: '%s'", arg);
}
minijail_use_caps(j, caps);
}
static void add_binding(struct minijail *j, char *arg)
{
char *src = tokenize(&arg, ",");
char *dest = tokenize(&arg, ",");
char *flags = tokenize(&arg, ",");
if (!src || src[0] == '\0' || arg != NULL)
errx(1, "Bad binding: %s %s", src, dest);
if (dest == NULL || dest[0] == '\0')
dest = src;
int writable;
if (flags == NULL || flags[0] == '\0' || streq(flags, "0"))
writable = 0;
else if (streq(flags, "1"))
writable = 1;
else
errx(1, "Bad value for <writable>: %s", flags);
if (minijail_bind(j, src, dest, writable))
errx(1, "minijail_bind failed");
}
static void add_rlimit(struct minijail *j, char *arg)
{
char *type = tokenize(&arg, ",");
char *cur = tokenize(&arg, ",");
char *max = tokenize(&arg, ",");
char *end;
if (!type || type[0] == '\0' || !cur || cur[0] == '\0' || !max ||
max[0] == '\0' || arg != NULL) {
errx(1, "Bad rlimit '%s'", arg);
}
rlim_t cur_rlim;
rlim_t max_rlim;
if (streq(cur, "unlimited")) {
cur_rlim = RLIM_INFINITY;
} else {
end = NULL;
cur_rlim = strtoul(cur, &end, 0);
if (*end)
errx(1, "Bad soft limit: '%s'", cur);
}
if (streq(max, "unlimited")) {
max_rlim = RLIM_INFINITY;
} else {
end = NULL;
max_rlim = strtoul(max, &end, 0);
if (*end)
errx(1, "Bad hard limit: '%s'", max);
}
end = NULL;
int resource = parse_single_constant(type, &end);
if (type == end)
errx(1, "Bad rlimit: '%s'", type);
if (minijail_rlimit(j, resource, cur_rlim, max_rlim))
errx(1, "minijail_rlimit '%s,%s,%s' failed", type, cur, max);
}
static void add_mount(struct minijail *j, char *arg)
{
char *src = tokenize(&arg, ",");
char *dest = tokenize(&arg, ",");
char *type = tokenize(&arg, ",");
char *flags = tokenize(&arg, ",");
char *data = NULL;
if (!src || src[0] == '\0' || !dest || dest[0] == '\0' || !type ||
type[0] == '\0') {
errx(1, "Bad mount: %s %s %s", src, dest, type);
}
unsigned long mountflags;
if (flags == NULL || flags[0] == '\0') {
mountflags = 0;
} else {
char *end = NULL;
mountflags = parse_constant(flags, &end);
if (flags == end)
errx(1, "Bad mount flags: %s", flags);
}
bool data_is_used = true;
if (mountflags & MS_BIND) {
data_is_used = false;
}
if (data_is_used) {
data = tokenize(&arg, ",");
/*
* Fun edge case: the data option itself is comma delimited. If
* there were no more options, then arg would be set to NULL.
* But if we had more pending, it'll be pointing to the next
* token. Back up and undo the null byte so it'll be merged
* back.
* An example:
* none,/tmp,tmpfs,0xe,mode=0755,uid=10,gid=10
* The tokenize calls above will turn this memory into:
* none\0/tmp\0tmpfs\00xe\0mode=0755\0uid=10,gid=10
* With data pointing at mode=0755 and arg pointing at
* uid=10,gid=10.
*/
if (arg != NULL)
arg[-1] = ',';
} else {
if (arg != NULL) {
errx(1, "Bad mount: extra arguments after flags: %s",
arg);
}
}
if (minijail_mount_with_data(j, src, dest, type, mountflags, data))
errx(1, "minijail_mount failed");
}
static char *build_idmap(id_t id, id_t lowerid)
{
int ret;
char *idmap = xmalloc(IDMAP_LEN);
ret = snprintf(idmap, IDMAP_LEN, "%d %d 1", id, lowerid);
if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= IDMAP_LEN) {
free(idmap);
errx(1, "Could not build id map");
}
return idmap;
}
static int has_cap_setgid(void)
{
cap_t caps;
cap_flag_value_t cap_value;
if (!CAP_IS_SUPPORTED(CAP_SETGID))
return 0;
caps = cap_get_proc();
if (!caps)
err(1, "Could not get process' capabilities");
if (cap_get_flag(caps, CAP_SETGID, CAP_EFFECTIVE, &cap_value))
err(1, "Could not get the value of CAP_SETGID");
if (cap_free(caps))
err(1, "Could not free capabilities");
return cap_value == CAP_SET;
}
static void set_ugid_mapping(struct minijail *j, bool set_uidmap, uid_t uid,
char *uidmap, bool set_gidmap, gid_t gid,
char *gidmap)
{
if (set_uidmap) {
minijail_namespace_user(j);
minijail_namespace_pids(j);
if (!uidmap) {
/*
* If no map is passed, map the current uid to the
* chosen uid in the target namespace (or root, if none
* was chosen).
*/
uidmap = build_idmap(uid, getuid());
}
if (0 != minijail_uidmap(j, uidmap))
errx(1, "Could not set uid map");
free(uidmap);
}
if (set_gidmap) {
minijail_namespace_user(j);
minijail_namespace_pids(j);
if (!gidmap) {
/*
* If no map is passed, map the current gid to the
* chosen gid in the target namespace.
*/
gidmap = build_idmap(gid, getgid());
}
if (!has_cap_setgid()) {
/*
* This means that we are not running as root,
* so we also have to disable setgroups(2) to
* be able to set the gid map.
* See
* http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/user_namespaces.7.html
*/
minijail_namespace_user_disable_setgroups(j);
}
if (0 != minijail_gidmap(j, gidmap))
errx(1, "Could not set gid map");
free(gidmap);
}
}
static void use_chroot(struct minijail *j, const char *path, bool *chroot,
bool pivot_root)
{
if (pivot_root)
errx(1, "Could not set chroot because -P was specified");
if (minijail_enter_chroot(j, path))
errx(1, "Could not set chroot");
*chroot = true;
}
static void use_pivot_root(struct minijail *j, const char *path,
bool *pivot_root, bool chroot)
{
if (chroot)
errx(1, "Could not set pivot_root because -C was specified");
if (minijail_enter_pivot_root(j, path))
errx(1, "Could not set pivot_root");
minijail_namespace_vfs(j);
*pivot_root = true;
}
static void use_profile(struct minijail *j, const char *profile,
bool *pivot_root, bool chroot, size_t *tmp_size)
{
/* Note: New profiles should be added in minijail0_cli_unittest.cc. */
if (streq(profile, "minimalistic-mountns") ||
streq(profile, "minimalistic-mountns-nodev")) {
minijail_namespace_vfs(j);
if (minijail_bind(j, "/", "/", 0))
errx(1, "minijail_bind(/) failed");
if (minijail_bind(j, "/proc", "/proc", 0))
errx(1, "minijail_bind(/proc) failed");
if (streq(profile, "minimalistic-mountns")) {
if (minijail_bind(j, "/dev/log", "/dev/log", 0))
errx(1, "minijail_bind(/dev/log) failed");
minijail_mount_dev(j);
}
if (!*tmp_size) {
/* Avoid clobbering |tmp_size| if it was already set. */
*tmp_size = DEFAULT_TMP_SIZE;
}
minijail_remount_proc_readonly(j);
minijail_set_using_minimalistic_mountns(j);
use_pivot_root(j, DEFAULT_PIVOT_ROOT, pivot_root, chroot);
} else
errx(1, "Unrecognized profile name '%s'", profile);
}
static void set_remount_mode(struct minijail *j, const char *mode)
{
unsigned long msmode;
if (streq(mode, "shared"))
msmode = MS_SHARED;
else if (streq(mode, "private"))
msmode = MS_PRIVATE;
else if (streq(mode, "slave"))
msmode = MS_SLAVE;
else if (streq(mode, "unbindable"))
msmode = MS_UNBINDABLE;
else
errx(1, "Unknown remount mode: '%s'", mode);
minijail_remount_mode(j, msmode);
}
static void read_seccomp_filter(const char *filter_path,
struct sock_fprog *filter)
{
attribute_cleanup_fp FILE *f = fopen(filter_path, "re");
if (!f)
err(1, "failed to open %s", filter_path);
off_t filter_size = 0;
if (fseeko(f, 0, SEEK_END) == -1 || (filter_size = ftello(f)) == -1)
err(1, "failed to get file size of %s", filter_path);
if (filter_size % sizeof(struct sock_filter) != 0) {
errx(1,
"filter size (%" PRId64 ") of %s is not a multiple of"
" %zu",
filter_size, filter_path, sizeof(struct sock_filter));
}
rewind(f);
filter->len = filter_size / sizeof(struct sock_filter);
filter->filter = xmalloc(filter_size);
if (fread(filter->filter, sizeof(struct sock_filter), filter->len, f) !=
filter->len) {
err(1, "failed read %s", filter_path);
}
}
static void set_seccomp_filters(struct minijail *j, const char *filter_path)
{
struct sock_fprog filter;
read_seccomp_filter(filter_path, &filter);
minijail_set_seccomp_filters(j, &filter);
free((void *)filter.filter);
}
/* Path for v0 of default runtime environment. */
static const char default_policy_path[] = "/etc/security/minijail/v0.bin";
static const char config_flag_name[] = "config";
static const char gen_config_flag_name[] = "gen-config";
/*
* Long options use values starting at 0x100 so that they're out of range of
* bytes which is how command line options are processed. Practically speaking,
* we could get by with the (7-bit) ASCII range, but UTF-8 codepoints would be a
* bit confusing, and honestly there's no reason to "optimize" here.
*
* The long enum values are internal to this file and can freely change at any
* time without breaking anything. Please keep alphabetically ordered.
*/
enum {
/* Everything after this point only have long options. */
LONG_OPTION_BASE = 0x100,
OPT_ADD_SUPPL_GROUP,
OPT_ALLOW_SPECULATIVE_EXECUTION,
OPT_AMBIENT,
OPT_CONFIG,
OPT_ENV_ADD,
OPT_ENV_RESET,
OPT_ENABLE_PROFILE_FS_RESTRICTIONS,
OPT_FS_DEFAULT_PATHS,
OPT_FS_PATH_RX,
OPT_FS_PATH_RO,
OPT_FS_PATH_RW,
OPT_FS_PATH_ADVANCED_RW,
OPT_GEN_CONFIG,
OPT_LOGGING,
OPT_LANDLOCK_ABI,
OPT_NO_DEFAULT_RUNTIME,
OPT_NO_FS_RESTRICTIONS,
OPT_NO_NEW_SESSIONS,
OPT_PRELOAD_LIBRARY,
OPT_PRESERVE_FD,
OPT_PROFILE,
OPT_SECCOMP_BPF_BINARY,
OPT_UTS,
};
/*
* NB: When adding new options, prefer long-option only. Add a short option
* only if its meaning is intuitive/obvious at a glance.
*
* Keep this sorted.
*/
static const char optstring[] =
"+a:b:c:de::f:g:hik:lm::nprst::u:vwyzB:C:GHIK::LM::NP:R:S:T:UV:Y";
static const struct option long_options[] = {
{"help", no_argument, 0, 'h'},
{"mount-dev", no_argument, 0, 'd'},
{"ambient", no_argument, 0, OPT_AMBIENT},
{"uts", optional_argument, 0, OPT_UTS},
{"logging", required_argument, 0, OPT_LOGGING},
{"profile", required_argument, 0, OPT_PROFILE},
{"preload-library", required_argument, 0, OPT_PRELOAD_LIBRARY},
{"seccomp-bpf-binary", required_argument, 0, OPT_SECCOMP_BPF_BINARY},
{"add-suppl-group", required_argument, 0, OPT_ADD_SUPPL_GROUP},
{"allow-speculative-execution", no_argument, 0,
OPT_ALLOW_SPECULATIVE_EXECUTION},
{config_flag_name, required_argument, 0, OPT_CONFIG},
{gen_config_flag_name, required_argument, 0, OPT_GEN_CONFIG},
{"env-add", required_argument, 0, OPT_ENV_ADD},
{"env-reset", no_argument, 0, OPT_ENV_RESET},
{"mount", required_argument, 0, 'k'},
{"bind-mount", required_argument, 0, 'b'},
{"ns-mount", no_argument, 0, 'v'},
{"enable-profile-fs-restrictions", no_argument, 0,
OPT_ENABLE_PROFILE_FS_RESTRICTIONS},
{"fs-default-paths", no_argument, 0, OPT_FS_DEFAULT_PATHS},
{"fs-path-rx", required_argument, 0, OPT_FS_PATH_RX},
{"fs-path-ro", required_argument, 0, OPT_FS_PATH_RO},
{"fs-path-rw", required_argument, 0, OPT_FS_PATH_RW},
{"fs-path-advanced-rw", required_argument, 0, OPT_FS_PATH_ADVANCED_RW},
{"landlock-abi", required_argument, 0, OPT_LANDLOCK_ABI},
{"no-default-runtime-environment", no_argument, 0, OPT_NO_DEFAULT_RUNTIME},
{"no-fs-restrictions", no_argument, 0, OPT_NO_FS_RESTRICTIONS},
{"no-new-sessions", no_argument, 0, OPT_NO_NEW_SESSIONS},
{"preserve-fd", required_argument, 0, OPT_PRESERVE_FD},
{0, 0, 0, 0},
};
/*
* Pull the usage string out into the top-level to help with long-lines. We
* want the output to be wrapped at 80 cols when it's shown to the user in the
* terminal, but we don't want the source wrapped to 80 cols because that will
* effectively make terminal output wrap to much lower levels (like <70).
*/
/* clang-format off */
static const char help_text[] =
"Account (user/group) options:\n"
" -u <user> Change uid to <user>.\n"
" -g <group> Change gid to <group>.\n"
" -G Inherit supplementary groups from new uid.\n"
" Incompatible with -y or --add-suppl-group.\n"
" -y Keep original uid's supplementary groups.\n"
" Incompatible with -G or --add-suppl-group.\n"
" --add-suppl-group <group>\n"
" Add <group> to the proccess' supplementary groups.\n"
" Can be specified multiple times to add several groups.\n"
" Incompatible with -y or -G.\n"
"\n"
"Mount/path options:\n"
" -b <src[,dst[,writable]]>, --bind-mount <...>\n"
" Bind <src> to <dst>.\n"
" -k <src,dst,fstype[,flags[,data]]>, --mount <...>\n"
" Mount <src> at <dst>. <flags> and <data> can be specified as\n"
" in mount(2). Multiple instances allowed.\n"
" -K Do not change share mode of any existing mounts.\n"
" -K<mode> Mark all existing mounts as <mode> instead of MS_PRIVATE.\n"
" -r Remount /proc read-only (implies -v).\n"
" -d, --mount-dev\n"
" Create a new /dev with a minimal set of device nodes\n"
" (implies -v). See minijail0(1) for exact list.\n"
" -t[size] Mount tmpfs at /tmp (implies -v).\n"
" Optional argument specifies size (default \"64M\").\n"
" -C <dir> chroot(2) to <dir>. Incompatible with -P.\n"
" -P <dir> pivot_root(2) to <dir> (implies -v). Incompatible with -C.\n"
"\n"
"Namespace options:\n"
" -N Enter a new cgroup namespace.\n"
" -l Enter new IPC namespace.\n"
" -v, --ns-mount\n"
" Enter new mount namespace.\n"
" -V <file> Enter specified mount namespace.\n"
" -e[file] Enter new network namespace, or existing |file| if provided.\n"
" -p Enter new pid namespace (implies -vr).\n"
" -I Run as init (pid 1) inside a new pid namespace (implies -p).\n"
" -U Enter new user namespace (implies -p).\n"
" -m[<uid> <loweruid> <count>]\n"
" Set the uid map of a user namespace (implies -pU).\n"
" Same arguments as newuidmap(1); mappings are comma separated.\n"
" With no mapping, map the current uid to root.\n"
" Incompatible with -b without the 'writable' option.\n"
" -M[<gid> <lowergid> <count>]\n"
" Set the gid map of a user namespace (implies -pU).\n"
" Same arguments as newgidmap(1); mappings are comma separated.\n"
" With no mapping, map the current gid to root.\n"
" Incompatible with -b without the 'writable' option.\n"
" --uts[=name] Enter a new UTS namespace (and set hostname).\n"
"\n"
"Seccomp options:\n"
" -S <file> Set seccomp filter using <file>.\n"
" E.g., '-S /usr/share/filters/<prog>.$(uname -m)'.\n"
" Requires -n when not running as root.\n"
" --seccomp-bpf-binary=<f>\n"
" Set a pre-compiled seccomp filter using <f>.\n"
" E.g., '-S /usr/share/filters/<prog>.$(uname -m).bpf'.\n"
" Requires -n when not running as root.\n"
" The user is responsible for ensuring that the binary\n"
" was compiled for the correct architecture / kernel version.\n"
" -L Report blocked syscalls when using seccomp filter.\n"
" If the kernel does not support SECCOMP_RET_LOG, some syscalls\n"
" will automatically be allowed (see below).\n"
" -Y Synchronize seccomp filters across thread group.\n"
" -a <table> Use alternate syscall table <table>.\n"
" -s Use seccomp mode 1 (not the same as -S).\n"
"\n"
"Other options:\n"
" --config <file>\n"
" Load the Minijail configuration file <file>.\n"
" If used, must be specified ahead of other options.\n"
" --gen-config <file>\n"
" Convert the current flags to a config file, then exit.\n"
" Only flags impacting the jailed process are included \n"
" (this flag, --config, and help messages are not).\n"
" This should be set first to avoid evaluating other flags, \n"
" or set later to evaluate users and paths currently available\n"
" (example: checking if -u is a valid user).\n"
" Path must be specified.\n"
" --profile <p>\n"
" Configure minijail0 to run with the <p> sandboxing profile,\n"
" which is a convenient way to express multiple flags\n"
" that are typically used together.\n"
" See the minijail0(1) man page for the full list.\n"
" -n Set no_new_privs. See prctl(2) for details.\n"
" -c <caps> Restrict caps to <caps>.\n"
" --ambient Raise ambient capabilities. Requires -c.\n"
" -B <mask> Skip setting <mask> securebits when restricting caps (-c).\n"
" By default, SECURE_NOROOT, SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP, and \n"
" SECURE_KEEP_CAPS (with their respective locks) are set.\n"
" -f <file> Write the pid of the jailed process to <file>.\n"
" -i Exit immediately after fork(2); i.e. background the program.\n"
" -z Don't forward signals to jailed process.\n"
" -R <type,cur,max>\n"
" Call setrlimit(3); can be specified multiple times.\n"
" -T <type> Assume <program> is a <type> ELF binary;\n"
" <type> may be 'static' or 'dynamic'.\n"
" This will avoid accessing <program> binary before execve(2).\n"
" Type 'static' will avoid preload hooking.\n"
" -w Create and join a new anonymous session keyring.\n"
" --env-reset Clear the current environment instead of having <program>\n"
" inherit the active environment. Often used to start <program>\n"
" with a minimal sanitized environment.\n"
" --env-add <NAME=value>\n"
" Sets the specified environment variable <NAME>\n"
" in the <program>'s environment before starting it.\n"
"\n"
"Uncommon options:\n"
" --allow-speculative-execution\n"
" Allow speculative execution by disabling mitigations.\n"
" --enable-profile-fs-restrictions\n"
" Limit paths available when using minimalistic-mountns.\n"
" --fs-default-paths\n"
" Adds a set of allowed paths to allow running common system \n"
" executables.\n"
" --fs-path-rx\n"
" Adds an allowed read-execute path.\n"
" --fs-path-ro\n"
" Adds an allowed read-only path.\n"
" --fs-path-rw\n"
" Adds an allowed read-write path.\n"
" --fs-path-advanced-rw\n"
" Adds an allowed advanced read-write path.\n"
" --landlock-abi <version>\n"
" Set the Landlock ABI version to target.\n"
" Defaults to 2 to prevent implicit behavior changes\n"
" when running on newer kernels. Set to 3 or 5 to\n"
" explicitly enable newer restrictions.\n"
" --no-fs-restrictions\n"
" Disables path-based filesystem restrictions.\n"
" --no-default-runtime-environment\n"
" Disables default seccomp policy and setting of no_new_privs.\n"
" --no-new-sessions\n"
" Skips having Minijail call setsid(). This is useful when\n"
" running a process that expects to have a controlling\n"
" terminal set.\n"
" --preserve-fd\n"
" Preserves an fd and makes it available in the child process.\n"
" The fd is preserved with the same integer value.\n"
" --preload-library=<file>\n"
" Overrides the path to \"" PRELOADPATH "\".\n"
" This is only really useful for local testing.\n"
" --logging=<output>\n"
" Set the logging system output: 'auto' (default),\n"
" 'syslog', or 'stderr'.\n"
" -h Help (this message).\n"
" -H Seccomp filter help message.\n";
/* clang-format on */
static void usage(const char *progn)
{
printf("Usage: %s [options] [--] <program> [args...]\n\n%s", progn,
help_text);
printf("\nsyscalls allowed when logging (-L):\n ");
for (size_t i = 0; i < log_syscalls_len; ++i)
printf(" %s", log_syscalls[i]);
printf("\n");
}
static void seccomp_filter_usage(const char *progn)
{
const struct syscall_entry *entry = syscall_table;
printf("Usage: %s -S <policy.file> <program> [args...]\n\n"
"System call names supported:\n",
progn);
for (; entry->name && entry->nr >= 0; ++entry)
printf(" %s [%d]\n", entry->name, entry->nr);
printf("\nSee minijail0(5) for example policies.\n");
}
/*
* Return the next unconsumed option char/value parsed from
* |*conf_entry_list|. |optarg| is updated to point to an argument from
* the entry value. If all options have been consumed, |*conf_entry_list|
* will be freed and -1 will be returned.
*/
static int getopt_from_conf(const struct option *longopts,
struct config_entry_list **conf_entry_list,
size_t *conf_index)
{
int opt = -1;
/* If we've consumed all the options in the this config, reset it. */
if (*conf_index >= (*conf_entry_list)->num_entries) {
free_config_entry_list(*conf_entry_list);
*conf_entry_list = NULL;
*conf_index = 0;
return opt;
}
struct config_entry *entry = &(*conf_entry_list)->entries[*conf_index];
/* Look up a matching long option. */
size_t i = 0;
const struct option *curr_opt;
bool long_option_found = false;
for (curr_opt = &longopts[0]; curr_opt->name != NULL;
curr_opt = &longopts[++i])
if (streq(entry->key, curr_opt->name)) {
long_option_found = true;
opt = curr_opt->val;
break;
}
/* Look up matching short option. */
if (!long_option_found && strlen(entry->key) == 1 &&
isalpha(*entry->key) && strchr(optstring, *entry->key) != NULL) {
opt = *entry->key;
} else if (curr_opt->name == NULL) {
errx(1,
"Unable to recognize '%s' as Minijail conf entry key, "
"please refer to minijail0(5) for syntax and examples.",
entry->key);
}
optarg = (char *)entry->value;
(*conf_index)++;
return opt;
}
/*
* Similar to getopt(3), return the next option char/value as it
* parses through the CLI argument list. Config entries in
* |*conf_entry_list| will be parsed with precedence over CLI options.
* Same as getopt(3), |optarg| is pointing to the option argument.
*/
static int getopt_conf_or_cli(int argc, char *const argv[],
struct config_entry_list **conf_entry_list,
size_t *conf_index)
{
int opt = -1;
if (*conf_entry_list != NULL)
opt =
getopt_from_conf(long_options, conf_entry_list, conf_index);
if (opt == -1)
opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, optstring, long_options, NULL);
return opt;
}
static char *getname_from_opt(int opt)
{
unsigned int i;
const struct option *entry = long_options;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(long_options); i++) {
if (opt == entry->val) {
return xstrdup(entry->name);
}
entry++;
}
return NULL;
}
static void free_options_list(struct option_entry *opt_entry_head)
{
while (opt_entry_head) {
struct option_entry *entry = opt_entry_head;
opt_entry_head = opt_entry_head->next;
free(entry->name);
free(entry->args);
free(entry);
}
}
static void set_child_env(char ***envp, char *arg, char *const environ[])
{
/* We expect VAR=value format for arg. */
char *delim = strchr(arg, '=');
if (!delim) {
errx(1,
"Expected an argument of the "
"form VAR=value (got '%s')",
arg);
}
*delim = '\0';
const char *env_value = delim + 1;
if (!*envp) {
/*
* We got our first --env-add. Initialize *envp by
* copying our current env to the future child env.
*/
*envp = minijail_copy_env(environ);
if (!*envp)
err(1, "Failed to allocate memory.");
}
if (minijail_setenv(envp, arg, env_value, 1))
err(1, "minijail_setenv() failed.");
}
int parse_args(struct minijail *j, int argc, char *const argv[],
char *const environ[], bool *exit_immediately, ElfType *elftype,
const char **preload_path, char ***envp)
{
enum seccomp_type {
None,
Strict,
Filter,
BpfBinaryFilter
};
enum seccomp_type seccomp = None;
int opt;
bool use_seccomp_filter = false;
bool use_seccomp_filter_binary = false;
bool use_seccomp_log = false;
bool forward_signals = true;
bool have_bind_mounts = false;
bool chroot = false;
bool pivot_root = false;
bool use_mount_ns = false;
bool change_remount = false;
char *remount_mode = NULL;
bool inherit_suppl_gids = false;
bool keep_suppl_gids = false;
bool caps = false;
bool use_ambient_caps = false;
bool use_uid = false;
bool use_gid = false;
uid_t uid = 0;
gid_t gid = 0;
gid_t *suppl_gids = NULL;
size_t suppl_gids_count = 0;
char *uidmap = NULL, *gidmap = NULL;
bool set_uidmap = false;
bool set_gidmap = false;
size_t tmp_size = 0;
attribute_cleanup_str char *filter_path = NULL;
int log_to_stderr = -1;
struct config_entry_list *conf_entry_list = NULL;
size_t conf_index = 0;
bool parse_mode = false;
struct option_entry *opt_entry_head = NULL;
struct option_entry *opt_entry_tail = NULL;
char *config_path = NULL;
bool fs_path_flag_used = false;
bool fs_path_rules_enabled = true;
while ((opt = getopt_conf_or_cli(argc, argv, &conf_entry_list,
&conf_index)) != -1) {
/* Track options for conf file generation. */
struct option_entry *opt_entry = calloc(1, sizeof(*opt_entry));
char *opt_name = getname_from_opt(opt);
if (opt_name != NULL) {
opt_entry->name = opt_name;
} else {
char str[2] = {opt, '\0'};
opt_entry->name = xstrdup(str);
}
if (optarg != NULL) {
opt_entry->args = xstrdup(optarg);
}
if (opt_entry_head) {
opt_entry_tail->next = opt_entry;
} else {
opt_entry_head = opt_entry;
}
opt_entry_tail = opt_entry;
switch (opt) {
case 'u':
if (use_uid)
errx(1, "-u provided multiple times.");
use_uid = true;
if (!parse_mode)
set_user(j, optarg, &uid, &gid);
break;
case 'g':
if (use_gid)
errx(1, "-g provided multiple times.");
use_gid = true;
if (!parse_mode)
set_group(j, optarg, &gid);
break;
case 'n':
minijail_no_new_privs(j);
break;
case 's':
if (seccomp != None && seccomp != Strict) {
errx(1, "Do not use -s, -S, or "
"--seccomp-bpf-binary together");
}
seccomp = Strict;
minijail_use_seccomp(j);
break;
case 'S':
if (seccomp != None && seccomp != Filter) {
errx(1, "Do not use -s, -S, or "
"--seccomp-bpf-binary together");
}
seccomp = Filter;
minijail_use_seccomp_filter(j);
free(filter_path);
filter_path = xstrdup(optarg);
use_seccomp_filter = true;
break;
case 'l':
minijail_namespace_ipc(j);
break;
case 'L':
if (seccomp == BpfBinaryFilter) {
errx(1, "-L does not work with "
"--seccomp-bpf-binary");
}
use_seccomp_log = true;
minijail_log_seccomp_filter_failures(j);
break;
case 'b':
if (!parse_mode)
add_binding(j, optarg);
have_bind_mounts = true;
break;
case 'B':
skip_securebits(j, optarg);
break;
case 'c':
caps = true;
use_caps(j, optarg);
break;
case 'C':
use_chroot(j, optarg, &chroot, pivot_root);
break;
case 'k':