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695 lines (631 loc) · 27.6 KB
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//! Per-process RPC bearer-token authentication.
//!
//! Three initialization paths feed the process-global [`OnceLock`] that holds
//! the active bearer token:
//!
//! 1. **In-memory handoff (preferred for the in-process core)** —
//! [`init_rpc_token_with_value`] sets the token directly from a value the
//! Tauri shell already holds in `CoreProcessHandle.rpc_token`. No env var
//! is read or set; the token never crosses a process-global env surface.
//! This is the path the Tauri host uses now that the core runs in-process
//! (PR #1061) — same-process handoff makes the env crossing unnecessary,
//! and avoiding it keeps the token off `/proc/<pid>/environ` (Linux) and
//! out of `sysctl KERN_PROCARGS2` / `ps eww -p <pid>` (macOS) where any
//! same-UID process could read it without entitlement.
//! 2. **Env-as-config fallback** — when no in-memory token is supplied,
//! [`init_rpc_token`] reads `OPENHUMAN_CORE_TOKEN` from the environment.
//! This is the legitimate operator-supplied transport for Docker / cloud /
//! VPS deployments where the bearer must come from `fly secrets set …`,
//! `docker run -e …`, or a systemd unit file — there is no live shell
//! handing it to the binary in-memory.
//! 3. **Standalone CLI fallback** — when neither path supplies a token, the
//! core generates a fresh 256-bit token and writes it to
//! `{workspace_dir}/core.token` (owner-read-only on Unix) so external CLI
//! clients can authenticate.
//!
//! Once set, the in-memory `OnceLock` is the single source of truth — all
//! transports ([`rpc_auth_middleware`], Socket.IO, SSE query-token fallback,
//! the approval-gate session id) read via [`get_rpc_token`].
//!
//! Endpoints exempt from auth (checked by [`rpc_auth_middleware`]):
//! - `GET /` — public info page
//! - `GET /health` — liveness probe
//! - `GET /auth` — desktop login callback fallback; consumes only
//! one-time login tokens, never raw session JWTs
//! - `GET /auth/telegram` — external browser callback (carries its own token)
//! - `GET /schema` — read-only schema discovery
//! - `GET /events` — SSE stream; browser `EventSource` cannot set
//! headers, so the handler enforces a bind-token /
//! bearer credential itself
//! - `GET /ws/dictation` — WebSocket upgrade; browser WS API cannot set
//! headers, so the handler enforces the bearer
//! (header or `?token=`) + origin itself before the
//! upgrade (C4 / issue #1924)
//! - `OPTIONS *` — CORS preflight (handled by outer CORS middleware)
//!
//! Endpoints that accept the bearer either via header **or** `?token=…` query
//! param (see [`QUERY_TOKEN_PATHS`]):
//! - `GET /events/webhooks` — webhook SSE; browser `EventSource` cannot set
//! headers, so the FE forwards the bearer as a query param. Validated
//! against the same in-process RPC token — no separate secret.
//!
//! Executable surfaces:
//! - `POST /rpc` requires the per-launch core bearer token.
//! - `GET /v1/models` and `POST /v1/chat/completions` accept either that
//! internal bearer or a stable user-managed external API key stored under
//! `openhuman::inference::http::EXTERNAL_OPENAI_COMPAT_PROVIDER`.
use std::io::Write as _;
use std::path::Path;
use std::sync::OnceLock;
#[cfg(unix)]
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt as _;
// The axum RPC-auth middleware + the `/v1` external-inference bearer helpers
// are exclusive to the `http-server` feature (#5048). The always-compiled token
// primitives (`verify_bearer_token`, `init_rpc_token`, `get_rpc_token`,
// `init_rpc_token_with_value`, `bearer_matches`) stay ungated — non-HTTP
// transports and `CoreBuilder` call them in every build. `Config`/`AuthService`/
// the provider-id import are consumed only by the gated `/v1` helpers.
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
use axum::http::{header, Method, StatusCode};
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
use axum::middleware::Next;
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
use axum::Json;
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
use serde_json::json;
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
use crate::openhuman::config::Config;
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
use crate::openhuman::inference::http::EXTERNAL_OPENAI_COMPAT_PROVIDER;
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
use crate::openhuman::security::credentials::AuthService;
static RPC_TOKEN: OnceLock<String> = OnceLock::new();
/// Paths that bypass bearer-token authentication.
///
/// `/rpc` and `/v1/*` carry executable surfaces and must be protected. The
/// other routes are read-only, or are streaming / WebSocket upgrades whose
/// clients (browser `EventSource`, browser `WebSocket`) cannot set
/// `Authorization` headers via standard APIs. `/events` is not unauthenticated
/// — it is exempt from the *middleware* header check but enforces its own
/// bind-token credential inside the handler. `/ws/dictation` is NOT public: it
/// is bearer-gated by this middleware via [`QUERY_TOKEN_PATHS`] (header or
/// `?token=`) so an unauthenticated upgrade is rejected with 401 before the
/// WebSocket handshake; the handler adds an origin check on top (finding C4).
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
const PUBLIC_PATHS: &[&str] = &[
"/",
"/health",
"/auth",
"/auth/telegram",
// External browser OAuth redirect for HTTP-remote MCP servers — the
// authorization server posts back here with `?code=…&state=…` and no
// bearer; the one-time `state` (minted in `oauth_begin`) is the guard.
"/oauth/mcp/callback",
"/schema",
"/events",
];
/// Public path prefixes — match when the request path begins with any entry.
///
/// Use this only when the suffix is dynamic (path params). For exact paths,
/// add to [`PUBLIC_PATHS`] instead.
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
///
/// Intentionally empty: the only entry was AgentBox's `/jobs/{job_id}`, which
/// left with that domain. The mechanism is kept for the next dynamic-suffix
/// public route rather than re-derived when one appears.
const PUBLIC_PATH_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &[];
/// Returns `true` when `path` bypasses bearer-token authentication.
///
/// A path is public when it appears in [`PUBLIC_PATHS`] (exact match) or
/// begins with any entry in [`PUBLIC_PATH_PREFIXES`] (prefix match).
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
fn is_public_path(path: &str) -> bool {
PUBLIC_PATHS.contains(&path)
|| PUBLIC_PATH_PREFIXES
.iter()
.any(|prefix| path.starts_with(prefix))
}
/// Paths that may authenticate via `?token=…` in the URL when no
/// `Authorization` header is present.
///
/// Browser `EventSource` cannot attach custom headers, so an SSE route that
/// returns sensitive data (webhook deliveries, registration changes) is
/// otherwise indistinguishable from a public endpoint — any local process on
/// `127.0.0.1` can subscribe. Allowing the bearer in the query string lets
/// the FE attach it explicitly while keeping a single token of truth
/// (validated by [`bearer_matches`] against the same in-process RPC token).
///
/// Add new entries here only for SSE / WebSocket routes whose clients cannot
/// send headers and that carry per-user data. The follow-up approvals stream
/// (#1339) is the next planned addition.
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
const QUERY_TOKEN_PATHS: &[&str] = &["/events/webhooks", "/ws/dictation"];
/// Operator-supplied environment variable that carries the RPC bearer in
/// non-desktop deployments.
///
/// **The Tauri desktop shell does NOT set this variable.** Since PR #1061
/// the core runs in-process inside the Tauri host, and the shell hands the
/// per-launch bearer to the embedded server via an internal in-memory handle
/// (see [`init_rpc_token_with_value`]). The desktop boot flow never crosses
/// a process-global env surface.
///
/// `OPENHUMAN_CORE_TOKEN` remains the canonical configuration surface for
/// **standalone CLI / Docker / cloud** deployments only — where the bearer
/// must come from `fly secrets set …`, `docker run -e …`, a systemd unit
/// file, or a developer running `openhuman-core serve` from a shell with the
/// env var pre-set. In those shapes there is no live host process to hand
/// the token over in-memory, so env-as-config is the appropriate transport.
///
/// When this variable is present [`init_rpc_token`] uses its value (no file
/// I/O). When absent and no in-memory token was seeded, `init_rpc_token`
/// generates a fresh token and writes it to `{workspace_dir}/core.token` so
/// CLI clients can authenticate.
pub const CORE_TOKEN_ENV_VAR: &str = "OPENHUMAN_CORE_TOKEN";
/// Initialize the per-process RPC token from env-or-file (non-desktop path).
///
/// **Not the desktop path.** The Tauri shell passes the per-launch bearer
/// to the embedded server via the internal in-memory handle (see
/// [`init_rpc_token_with_value`]); it does **not** set
/// `OPENHUMAN_CORE_TOKEN`. This function is the bootstrap path for
/// standalone CLI / Docker / cloud deployments.
///
/// **Env-as-config (preferred for non-desktop)**: when
/// `OPENHUMAN_CORE_TOKEN` is set in the process environment (typically by
/// the container runtime, secrets manager, or systemd unit file), the core
/// uses its value as the RPC token. No file is written; the token is
/// available the instant the process starts.
///
/// **Standalone CLI fallback**: when no env var is supplied, the core
/// generates a fresh 256-bit token, writes it to `{workspace_dir}/core.token`
/// (owner-read-only on Unix) for external callers, and stores it in the
/// process global.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns an error only in the standalone fallback path, if the token file
/// cannot be written.
pub fn init_rpc_token(workspace_dir: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
// Idempotency guard: if the token is already set, do nothing. A second
// call must never write a new token to disk while the process still
// validates the original in-memory value — that would cause clients
// reading core.token to start getting 401s immediately.
if RPC_TOKEN.get().is_some() {
log::debug!("[auth] init_rpc_token: already initialized, skipping");
return Ok(());
}
// Env-as-config path: bearer supplied by the operator via
// OPENHUMAN_CORE_TOKEN. Used by Docker / cloud / systemd / a developer
// running `openhuman-core serve` from a pre-configured shell. Desktop
// (Tauri) does NOT set this variable — it uses `init_rpc_token_with_value`
// for an in-memory handoff instead.
if let Ok(env_token) = std::env::var(CORE_TOKEN_ENV_VAR) {
let env_token = env_token.trim().to_string();
if !env_token.is_empty() {
let _ = RPC_TOKEN.set(env_token);
log::info!("[auth] core RPC token loaded from environment (operator-supplied)");
return Ok(());
}
}
// Fallback: standalone CLI — generate and write to file.
let token = generate_token();
let token_path = workspace_dir.join("core.token");
write_token_file(&token_path, &token)?;
let _ = RPC_TOKEN.set(token);
log::info!(
"[auth] core RPC token generated and written to {}",
token_path.display()
);
Ok(())
}
/// Seed the per-process RPC token directly from a caller-supplied value.
///
/// **In-memory handoff path** — used by the Tauri shell to inject the bearer
/// the host generated in `CoreProcessHandle::new()` into the in-process core
/// without round-tripping through `OPENHUMAN_CORE_TOKEN` in the process
/// environment. The token never lands on a process-global env surface, which
/// keeps it off `/proc/<pid>/environ` (Linux) and out of `sysctl
/// KERN_PROCARGS2` / `ps eww -p <pid>` (macOS) where any same-UID process
/// could otherwise read it without entitlement.
///
/// Idempotent: a second call is a no-op (matches [`init_rpc_token`] — flipping
/// the in-memory bearer mid-life would 401 every in-flight client).
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns an error only if `token` is empty after trimming. A non-empty
/// token is accepted as-is — callers are expected to have generated a
/// CSPRNG hex string (see `CoreProcessHandle::generate_rpc_token`).
pub fn init_rpc_token_with_value(token: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let trimmed = token.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("init_rpc_token_with_value: supplied token is empty");
}
if RPC_TOKEN.get().is_some() {
log::debug!("[auth] init_rpc_token_with_value: already initialized, skipping");
return Ok(());
}
let _ = RPC_TOKEN.set(trimmed.to_string());
log::info!("[auth] core RPC token loaded via in-memory handoff (no env crossing)");
Ok(())
}
/// Returns the active RPC token, if initialized.
pub fn get_rpc_token() -> Option<&'static str> {
RPC_TOKEN.get().map(String::as_str)
}
/// Validate a supplied bearer token against the active per-process RPC token.
///
/// Returns `true` only when the token subsystem is initialised and the
/// supplied token is non-empty and matches the in-memory expected value.
///
/// This is the single entry point that non-HTTP transports (Socket.IO event
/// handlers, SSE bind-token issuance, future WebSocket surfaces) should call
/// before letting attacker-controlled input reach executable code. Keeping
/// the comparison in one helper means every transport gets the same
/// constant-time equality semantics.
pub fn verify_bearer_token(supplied: &str) -> bool {
let Some(expected) = get_rpc_token() else {
return false;
};
bearer_matches(supplied, expected)
}
/// Axum middleware: enforce `Authorization: Bearer <token>` on all protected
/// endpoints.
///
/// Public paths (see [`PUBLIC_PATHS`]) and CORS preflight `OPTIONS` requests
/// bypass this check. `/rpc` requires the exact per-launch bearer token that
/// was written to `core.token` at startup; `/v1/*` additionally accepts a
/// stable user-managed external API key.
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
pub async fn rpc_auth_middleware(req: axum::extract::Request, next: Next) -> Response {
let path = req.uri().path().to_string();
// CORS preflight and public utility paths bypass auth.
if req.method() == Method::OPTIONS || is_public_path(&path) {
return next.run(req).await;
}
let Some(expected) = get_rpc_token() else {
// Shouldn't happen in production — token is always initialized before
// the router starts serving. Deny to be safe.
log::error!("[auth] RPC token not initialized — denying request to {path}");
return (
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
Json(json!({
"ok": false,
"error": "server_error",
"message": "Auth subsystem not initialized"
})),
)
.into_response();
};
let header_token = req
.headers()
.get(header::AUTHORIZATION)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|v| v.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
.unwrap_or("");
if bearer_matches(header_token, expected) {
log::trace!("[auth] authorized request to {path} (header)");
return next.run(req).await;
}
if is_external_inference_path(&path) && verify_external_inference_bearer(header_token).await {
log::trace!("[auth] authorized request to {path} (external inference bearer)");
return next.run(req).await;
}
// Header path failed — fall back to `?token=…` for SSE/WS routes whose
// browser clients cannot set headers. The query token is validated
// against the same in-process RPC bearer (single source of truth), so
// this is not a separate credential — only a transport workaround.
if QUERY_TOKEN_PATHS.contains(&path.as_str()) {
if let Some(query_token) = extract_query_token(req.uri().query()) {
if bearer_matches(&query_token, expected) {
log::trace!("[auth] authorized request to {path} (query token)");
return next.run(req).await;
}
}
}
log::warn!("[auth] unauthorized request to {path} — missing or wrong bearer token");
(
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
Json(json!({
"ok": false,
"error": "unauthorized",
"message": "Missing or invalid Authorization header. Supply 'Authorization: Bearer <token>'."
})),
)
.into_response()
}
/// Single source of truth for token comparison.
///
/// Use constant-time equality so callers that validate attacker-controlled
/// bearer strings do not leak partial-match timing through HTTP, SSE, Socket.IO,
/// or future transports that share this helper.
fn bearer_matches(supplied: &str, expected: &str) -> bool {
!supplied.is_empty() && constant_time_eq(supplied, expected)
}
fn constant_time_eq(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
let a = a.as_bytes();
let b = b.as_bytes();
let len_diff = a.len() ^ b.len();
let max_len = a.len().max(b.len());
let mut byte_diff = 0u8;
for i in 0..max_len {
let left = *a.get(i).unwrap_or(&0);
let right = *b.get(i).unwrap_or(&0);
byte_diff |= left ^ right;
}
(len_diff == 0) & (byte_diff == 0)
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
fn is_external_inference_path(path: &str) -> bool {
path == "/v1" || path.starts_with("/v1/")
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
fn verify_external_inference_bearer_for_config(config: &Config, supplied: &str) -> bool {
if supplied.trim().is_empty() {
return false;
}
let auth = AuthService::from_config(config);
match auth.get_provider_bearer_token(EXTERNAL_OPENAI_COMPAT_PROVIDER, None) {
Ok(Some(expected)) => bearer_matches(supplied, expected.trim()),
Ok(None) => false,
Err(err) => {
log::warn!("[auth] failed to read external inference bearer: {err}");
false
}
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
async fn verify_external_inference_bearer(supplied: &str) -> bool {
if supplied.trim().is_empty() {
return false;
}
let config = match Config::load_or_init().await {
Ok(config) => config,
Err(err) => {
log::warn!("[auth] failed to load config for external inference bearer: {err}");
return false;
}
};
verify_external_inference_bearer_for_config(&config, supplied)
}
/// Pull the first `token` query parameter out of a URL query string.
///
/// Returns `None` when the query is absent, the key is missing, or the
/// value is empty after trimming. URL decoding is delegated to
/// [`url::form_urlencoded`] so percent-encoded tokens decode the same way
/// they were encoded by the FE via `encodeURIComponent`.
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
fn extract_query_token(query: Option<&str>) -> Option<String> {
let query = query?;
for (key, value) in url::form_urlencoded::parse(query.as_bytes()) {
if key == "token" {
let value = value.trim().to_string();
if !value.is_empty() {
return Some(value);
}
}
}
None
}
/// Generate a 256-bit cryptographically-random token as a lowercase hex string.
///
/// Uses `rand::rng()` (thread-local, OS-seeded CSPRNG) introduced in rand 0.9.
fn generate_token() -> String {
use rand::RngExt as _;
log::trace!("[auth] generate_token: start (32 bytes)");
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
rand::rng().fill(&mut bytes);
let token = hex::encode(bytes);
log::trace!("[auth] generate_token: complete (64 hex chars)");
token
}
/// Write `token` to `path` with owner-only read+write permissions on Unix.
fn write_token_file(path: &Path, token: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
}
#[cfg(unix)]
{
let mut file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.write(true)
.create(true)
.truncate(true)
.mode(0o600)
.open(path)?;
file.write_all(token.as_bytes())?;
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
{
std::fs::write(path, token)?;
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn generate_token_produces_64_hex_chars() {
let t = generate_token();
assert_eq!(t.len(), 64, "256 bits → 64 hex chars");
assert!(t.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()), "must be hex");
}
#[test]
fn generate_token_is_not_constant() {
assert_ne!(generate_token(), generate_token());
}
#[test]
fn write_and_read_token_roundtrips() {
let tmp = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("core-auth-test-{}", std::process::id()));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&tmp).unwrap();
let path = tmp.join("core.token");
let token = "cafebabe1234567890abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567";
write_token_file(&path, token).unwrap();
let back = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
assert_eq!(back, token);
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp).ok();
}
#[test]
fn bearer_matches_rejects_empty_supplied() {
let expected = "cafebabe";
assert!(!bearer_matches("", expected));
}
#[test]
fn bearer_matches_rejects_mismatch() {
assert!(!bearer_matches("deadbeef", "cafebabe"));
}
#[test]
fn bearer_matches_rejects_prefix_match() {
assert!(!bearer_matches("cafeba", "cafebabe"));
}
#[test]
fn bearer_matches_accepts_exact() {
assert!(bearer_matches("cafebabe", "cafebabe"));
}
#[test]
fn verify_bearer_token_returns_false_when_token_uninitialized() {
// RPC_TOKEN is a process-global OnceLock; on a fresh test binary it
// may already be set by another test that ran first, so we cannot
// assert the uninitialized branch here without process isolation.
// We can however confirm that an empty supplied value is always
// rejected, which exercises the second-leg invariant.
assert!(!verify_bearer_token(""));
}
#[test]
fn init_rpc_token_with_value_rejects_empty() {
// Trimmed-empty values must error rather than seed an empty bearer.
assert!(init_rpc_token_with_value("").is_err());
assert!(init_rpc_token_with_value(" ").is_err());
}
/// `init_rpc_token_with_value` populates the same `RPC_TOKEN` OnceLock
/// that `get_rpc_token` reads — i.e. the in-memory handoff path produces
/// the bearer everyone else (HTTP middleware, Socket.IO verifier,
/// approval-gate session_id) reads from. We can't deterministically
/// assert the *value* set here (the OnceLock may already be seeded by a
/// sibling test that ran first in the same binary), but we can assert
/// the OnceLock is initialised after this call returns Ok, and that the
/// helper is idempotent.
#[test]
fn init_rpc_token_with_value_seeds_and_is_idempotent() {
// First call: either we seed, or a sibling test already did. Either
// way the helper must return Ok and leave `get_rpc_token` populated.
let token = "cafebabe1234567890abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567";
init_rpc_token_with_value(token).expect("seed succeeds");
assert!(
get_rpc_token().is_some(),
"after init_rpc_token_with_value, get_rpc_token must return Some"
);
// Second call is a no-op (matching init_rpc_token semantics) — must
// not error, must not flip the in-memory value.
let before = get_rpc_token().map(str::to_string);
init_rpc_token_with_value("a-different-value-that-must-be-ignored")
.expect("idempotent re-init succeeds");
let after = get_rpc_token().map(str::to_string);
assert_eq!(
before, after,
"second init_rpc_token_with_value must not flip the in-memory bearer"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
#[test]
fn extract_query_token_returns_none_on_missing_query() {
assert_eq!(extract_query_token(None), None);
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
#[test]
fn extract_query_token_returns_none_when_key_absent() {
assert_eq!(extract_query_token(Some("other=1&foo=bar")), None);
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
#[test]
fn extract_query_token_returns_none_on_empty_value() {
assert_eq!(extract_query_token(Some("token=")), None);
assert_eq!(extract_query_token(Some("token=%20%20")), None);
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
#[test]
fn extract_query_token_returns_first_value_on_duplicate_keys() {
// Last-wins vs first-wins is a question the FE never hits; pin
// first-wins so any future ambiguity is documented.
assert_eq!(
extract_query_token(Some("token=alpha&token=beta")),
Some("alpha".to_string())
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
#[test]
fn extract_query_token_url_decodes_value() {
// `encodeURIComponent` on the FE may percent-encode a hex
80AF
token
// accidentally (it shouldn't, but defensive); confirm round-trip.
assert_eq!(
extract_query_token(Some("token=cafe%2Dbabe")),
Some("cafe-babe".to_string())
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
#[test]
fn public_paths_include_desktop_auth_callback() {
assert!(PUBLIC_PATHS.contains(&"/auth"));
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
#[test]
fn agentbox_run_and_jobs_paths_are_no_longer_public() {
// These bypassed bearer auth only to serve the AgentBox marketplace
// surface, which moved to tinybox. Nothing mounts them now, so they
// must authenticate like any other path — a re-added entry here would
// silently open an unauthenticated route.
assert!(!is_public_path("/run"));
assert!(!is_public_path("/jobs/abc-123"));
assert!(!is_public_path(
"/jobs/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
));
// Sanity: still protect the executable surface.
assert!(!is_public_path("/rpc"));
assert!(!is_public_path("/v1/chat/completions"));
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn token_file_has_owner_only_permissions() {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
let tmp = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("core-auth-perms-{}", std::process::id()));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&tmp).unwrap();
let path = tmp.join("core.token");
write_token_file(&path, "abc").unwrap();
let mode = std::fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode();
assert_eq!(mode & 0o777, 0o600, "token file must be 0o600");
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp).ok();
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
#[test]
fn is_external_inference_path_matches_only_v1_routes() {
assert!(is_external_inference_path("/v1"));
assert!(is_external_inference_path("/v1/models"));
assert!(is_external_inference_path("/v1/chat/completions"));
assert!(!is_external_inference_path("/rpc"));
assert!(!is_external_inference_path("/v10/models"));
}
#[cfg(feature = "http-server")]
#[test]
fn verify_external_inference_bearer_for_config_accepts_stored_key() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let mut config = Config::default();
config.config_path = tmp.path().join("config.toml");
let auth = AuthService::from_config(&config);
auth.store_provider_token(
EXTERNAL_OPENAI_COMPAT_PROVIDER,
"default",
"external-test-key",
std::collections::HashMap::new(),
true,
)
.unwrap();
assert!(verify_external_inference_bearer_for_config(
&config,
"external-test-key"
));
assert!(!verify_external_inference_bearer_for_config(
&config,
"wrong-key"
));
}
}